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INTRODUCTION

The avoidable consequences doctrine, sometimes called the duty to
mitigate damages, precludes plaintiffs from recovering damages for
losses they could have prevented by reasonable efforts. 1 Legal
authorities generally treat the doctrine as an exception to or a limitation
on the expectation interest.2 The expectation interest normally permits
the nonbreaching plaintiff to recover damages sufficient to put the
I. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350 (1979); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 9 I 8 ( 1977). This Article will frequently rely on these
Restatements to summarize state law, rather than producing long and unnecessary string
citations of case law.
2. The headings for the Restatement sections in the preceding footnote reveal the
general view: "Avoidability as a Limitation on Damages," RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS§ 350, and "Diminution of Damages," RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 918. (Technically, "Diminution of Damages" is the title of Topic 2 in Chapter 47
(Damages). Section 918 is the first section of Topic 2). Section titles in contracts
treatises and contracts and remedies casebooks reveal the degree to which scholars share
this conception of the avoidable consequences doctrine. See, e.g., E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.12 (2d ed. I 990) ("Avoidability as a Limitation"); JOHN
E. MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 122 (3d ed. 1990) ("The Mitigation
Limitation"); JOHN P. DAWSON ET AL., CASES AND COMMENT ON CONTRACTS 37 (5th
ed. 1987) ("Limitations on Expectation Damages," a section that begins with avoidable
consequences cases); CHARLES L. KNAPP & NATHAN M. CRYSTAL, PROBLEMS IN
CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERJALS 940 (3d ed. 1993) ("Restrictions on the
Recovery of Expectation Damages: Mitigation of Damages"); DOUGLAS LAYCOCK,
MODERN AMERJCAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERJALS 13 1 (I 985) ("Limits on the
Basic Principle," which begins with a subsection on "Avoidable Consequences");
ROBERT S. THOMPSON & JOHN A. SEBERT, JR., REMEDIES: DAMAGES, EQUITY AND
RESTITUTION § 2.03 (2d ed. I 989) ("The Major Limitations on Damages Recoveries,"
which includes subsection [C] labelled "Avoidable Consequences").
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plaintiff in the position she would have occupied if the defendant had
performed the contract. 3 Application of the avoidable consequences
doctrine may leave the plaintiff short of that position, 4 If the plaintiff
failed to avoid some part of the loss because she failed to act reasonably,
the damage award will not compensate her for the avoidable portion of
the loss. This apparently leaves her worse off than if the contract had
been performed. 5 The avoidable consequences doctrine imposes a
portion of the loss on the plaintiff rather than on the breaching
defendant.
This Article challenges the traditional approach to the avoidable
consequences doctrine. The avoidable consequences doctrine produces
results entirely consistent with the expectation interest. In every contract
case where the avoidable consequences doctrine reduces a damage
award, the breach appears to bestow some benefit on the plaintiff for
which the expectation interest must account. The expectation interest
insists that courts not make the plaintiff better off than if the contract
had been performed. 6 If the breach left the plaintiff with some benefit,
then the damage award must subtract the value of that benefit from the
amount that the plaintiff may recover. The avoidable consequences
doctrine serves this function, estimating the value of benefits that courts
might have difficulty recognizing or valuing directly.
3. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 cmt. a (1979);
FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, §§ 12.1, 12.6, at 840,871.
4. See, e.g., DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, TEACHER'S MANUAL: MODERN AMERICAN
REMEDIES 84 ( 1985).
5. For example, if a discharged employee refuses to take a comparable job when
available, the court should reduce the award by the amount that the employee could have
earned by accepting the job. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350 cmt. c,
illus. 8; see, e.g., Sutherland v. Wyer, 67 Me. 64 (1877) (employee took substitute
employment, but quit before expiration of contract term with defendant). Reducing the
recovery in these circumstances leaves the plaintiff with less money than she would have
received if she had continued to work for the defendant.
6. See, e.g., Thorne v. White, I 03 A.2d 579 (D.C. 1954). Without this insistence,
the award would miss the target: the position that the plaintiff would have occupied if
the defendant had performed. Indeed, even the reliance interest, as applied by courts,
cannot place the plaintiff in a better position than if the contract had been performed.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 349 ( I 979). The theoretical justifications of
this limitation to the reliance interest have been explored elsewhere. See Lon L. Fuller
& William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52,
79 (1936); Michael B. Kelly, The Phantom Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 1992
WIS. L. REV. 1755, 1783-1811; Mark Pettit, Jr., Private Advantage and Public Power:
Reexamining the Expectation and Reliance Interests in Contract Damages, 38 HASTINGS
L.J. 417, 445-52 (1987),

177

Part I develops this theme in several contexts. Basically, when a
plaintiff chooses not to avoid losses, her choice implies a judgment that
she would be better off to incur those losses rather than to avoid them.
That judgment suggests that she expects to benefit from the breach,
either directly (such as leisure to a discharged worker) or indirectly (such
as by redirecting productive capacity to projects she could not have
pursued if the defendant had performed the contract). If courts
compensate the plaintiff for the full loss, without accounting for the
benefit of the breach, they leave the plaintiff in a better position than she
could have occupied if the defendant had performed. Since the
expectation interest cannot justify this result, it must create an offset for
the benefits. Because the decision not to avoid the loss implies that the
value of the benefit to the plaintiff at least equals the loss she could have
avoided by reasonable efforts, the amount of avoidable loss becomes a
reasonable estimate of the amount to subtract when accounting for the
benefit. Thus, rather than reducing damage awards below what the
expectation interest normally would require, the avoidable consequences
doctrine simply implements a limitation inherent in the expectation
interest.
Standing alone, Part I deserves attention. It identifies a previously
unrecognized purpose served by the subtraction of avoidable losses from
contract damage awards. Future discussions of the avoidable consequences doctrine need to take this function into account, along with
other goals the avoidable consequences doctrine serves. In addition, Part
I reconciles the avoidable consequences doctrine with the expectation
interest.
We no longer need to explain why the law accepts
undercompensation in the name of mitigation. Mitigation is necessary
to avoid overcompensation.
Part II advances a more extreme implication of the arguments
presented here: the law could live without the avoidable consequences
doctrine. Even if courts never again mentioned the avoidable consequences doctrine or a duty to mitigate damages, proper implementation
of the expectation interest would produce the same damage awards.
That extension, however, confronts an obstacle. Part I rests upon a
critical inference: the failure to minimize losses reveals the plaintiff's
valuation of the benefits of the breach. That inference, however,
arguably assumes the existence of the avoidable consequences doctrine,
making the argument circular. Part II addresses the independence of the
analysis here in two ways. First, continued reference to the avoidable
consequences doctrine is superfluous. Even if its existence was
necessary to create the inference, from now on that inference can
displace the avoidable consequences doctrine.
Second and more
importantly, common-law judges concerned with proper implementation
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of the expectation interest would have needed to create an offset for the
benefits of breach even if the avoidable consequences doctrine never
existed. In so doing, they could have drawn the inference proposed here
independently of any concerns for avoidable consequences.
In explaining how common-law courts could have derived the offset,
this Article stumbles upon a concept that may have considerable
significance in other areas: the idea of natural harm, or the amount of
harm that would have occurred if no remedy was available. Some losses
a plaintiff incurs may exist as much because of the remedies the law
makes available as because of the defendant's misconduct. Recognizing
this fact may shed light on other remedial issues far removed from the
narrow question discussed here. Part III, however, focuses on the
narrower issues that motivated this work. It identifies the significance
of viewing the avoidable consequences doctrine as a corollary to the
expectation interest.
Part I does not propose any change in the rules courts apply. Whether
viewed as a separate avoidable consequences doctrine or as an intrinsic
part of the expectation interest, courts must reduce awards by the
amounts that plaintiffs could have avoided by reasonable conduct.
Nonetheless, at least three advantages seem likely to flow from the
analysis presented here--one theoretical, two more practical.
First, understanding the avoidable consequences doctrine may
illuminate our theories of contract remedies--and, more generally, of
contract law. Recent efforts to explain contract remedies as including
fault principles start by criticizing the expectation interest's ability to
explain limitations on remedies. 7 If the expectation interest can in fact
explain these limitations on recovery, these theories may require
additional thought. 8 At the very least, our understanding of contract
remedies will be richer once it accounts for the consistency between the
avoidable consequences doctrine and the expectation interest.
Second, court decisions occasionally deviate from the avoidable
consequences doctrine, apparently because they place undue emphasis on

7. George M. Cohen, The Fault Lines in Contract Damages, 80 VA. L. REv.
1225, 1229 (1994).
8. This Article does not attempt to rebut Professor Cohen's excellent work, which
presents ideas I find quite appealing. In fact, the initial working title for this Article (in
1991) was Contributory Negligence in Contract Law. That project began with the
argument that the avoidable consequences doctrine incorporated fault notions--,m idea
I gave up because I could not overcome the argument presented below.
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the existence or nonexistence of a duty to mitigate damages. 9 Scholars
have long argued that the avoidable consequences doctrine does not
really involve a duty to mitigate damages 10 and is not a manifestation
of contributory negligence. 11 Nonetheless, the language of duty persists
in legal decisions. That persistence flows, at least in part, from the
weakness of efforts to explain why the avoidable consequences doctrine
is not a manifestation of contributory negligence. The explanation
offered here cuts the link to duty-based concepts such as contributory
negligence. Thus, it may help prevent misapplication of the avoidable
consequences doctrine in the future.
Third, recognizing the harmony between the avoidable consequences
doctrine and the expectation interest may help courts apply the avoidable
consequences doctrine more appropriately. The avoidable consequences
doctrine can arise in some intricate situations, when an appreciation of
its harmony with the expectation interest can help the court approach the
problem in a productive way.

9. The language used to discuss the avoidable consequences doctrine may not
have much significance. Dobbs, for one, believes "no one is likely to be misled" by
imprecise usage such as the duty to mitigate damages. DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF
REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTIT\JTION § 3.9 n.5 (2d ed. I 993). Shortly after the
treatise's appearance, however, Riffer and Barrowman reported significant confusion
over the existence of a duty to mitigate. See Jeffrey K. Riffer & Elizabeth Barrowman,
Recent Misinterpretations of the Avoidable Consequences Rule: The "Duty"' To Mitigate
and Other Fictions, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 411 (1993).
10. See. e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES§ 3.7, at 188
(1973); CHARLES T. McCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES 128 (1935);
ARTHUR G. SEDGWICK, ELEMENTS OF THE LAW OF DAMAGES 73 (2d ed. 1909).
11. Scholars generally agree that the doctrine is not a manifestation of either
contributory or comparative negligence. DOBBS, supra note I 0, § 3. 7, at I 88;
MCCORMICK, supra note 10, at 128. But see SEDGWICK, supra note 10, at 73-74.
While neither proposition has achieved universal support, each has achieved a breadth
of support that most principles of black letter law would covet. The support extends far
beyond the authors of scholarly treatises. The American Law Institute's Restatements,
on which practitioners and judges frequently rely, endorse the propositions. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 cmt. a (1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 350 cmt. b (1979) (relating only to duty, perhaps because contributory
negligence plays no obvious role in contract law). Legal encyclopedias, designed
primarily as practice aids, reiterate the points, citing case authority for them. See 22
AM. JUR. 2D Damages §§ 497, 499 (1988); 15 AM. JuR. Damages § 27 (1938)
(distinguishing contributory negligence, though otherwise using language of duty); 25
C.J.S. Damages § 32 ( 1966) ( distinguishing comparative negligence, but otherwise using
language of duty). Articles by practitioners indicate the propositions have penetrated law
offices, a fate that gives them effect beyond that of many scholarly exhortations. See
Riffer & Barrowman, supra note 9.
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I.

A VOIDABLE

CONSEQUENCES AS A COROLLARY OF THE
EXPECTATION INTEREST

This section seeks to explain how the avoidable consequences doctrine
is completely consistent with the expectation interest. That explanation
is complicated somewhat by the existence of several different rules that
use the same moniker. 12 At the same time, the law avoids identifying
several very similar results as applications of the avoidable consequences
doctrine by incorporating the limitations on damages into basic damage
calculations. The expectation interest explains the avoidable consequences doctrine's peripheral and core aspects. Readers may find the
discussion of the peripheral aspects too elementary. Nonetheless, the
discussion of the periphery lays the groundwork for the more controversial argument that follows. In addition, the Article can claim success
only by explaining all aspects of the avoidable consequences doctrine.
Thus, a brief explanation of two collateral aspects of the avoidable
consequences doctrine follows.

A.
1.

Peripheral Aspects of the Avoidable Consequences Doctrine
Affirmative Uses of the Avoidable Consequences Doctrine

A fundamental division within the avoidable consequences doctrine
comes from its affirmative and negative applications. 13 Most people
think of the doctrine as a limitation on damages: plaintiff cannot recover
damages for losses she could have avoided by reasonable conduct. 14
But the avoidable consequences doctrine includes a corollary: plaintiff
can recover the cost of any reasonable effort to avoid the losses inflicted
by the defendant's wrongful conduct. 15
Affirmative application of the avoidable consequences doctrine adds
virtually nothing to the law of damages. It simply duplicates the result
achieved by the fundamental principle of damages: putting the plaintiff

Dobbs identifies "four rules of avoidable consequences." DOBBS, supra note
at 271 (emphasis in original).
See DOBBS, supra note IO, § 3.7, at 187.
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350 (1979); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 918 (1977).
15. See DOBBS, supra note 10, § 3.7, at 187; DOBBS, supra note 9, § 3.9,
12.
9, § 3.9,
13.
14.
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as nearly as possible in the position she would have occupied if the
wrong had not occurred. 16 If the wrong had not occurred, the injured
party would incur no expense to minimize the harm caused by the
wrong. Compensation for such losses, thus, seems inescapable.
Consider how the affirmative use of the avoidable consequences
doctrine might arise in a simple contract case. A seller breaches, forcing
a buyer, in order to avoid consequential losses, to purchase substitute
goods (or land or services). As long as the buyer makes reasonable
efforts to obtain substitute goods, the affirmative application of the
avoidable consequences doctrine would permit the buyer to recover these
incidental expenses. Similarly, if a buyer breaches, the seller incurs the
cost of arranging to sell the goods to another person. The affirmative
aspect of the avoidable consequences doctrine would entitle the seller to
recover the cost of resale.
Contract law does not need the avoidable consequences doctrine to
explain why a nonbreaching seller may recover the cost of reselling the
goods to another or why a nonbreaching buyer may recover the cost of
effectuating cover. The expectation interest explains the law perfectly
without any embellishment from the avoidable consequences doctrine.
If the contract had been performed, the plaintiff would not have incurred
the costs of reselling or covering. 17 Thus, the plaintiff should recover

16. See, e.g., Hatahley v. United States, 257 F.2d 920, 923 (10th Cir. 1958);
LAYCOCK, supra note 2, at 14 ("Hatah/ey's rule----that the fundamental principle of
damages is to restore the injured party as nearly as possible to the position he would
have been in but for the wrong-is the essence of compensatory damages."). This
Article occasionally follows Laycock's shorthand of referring to this as the plaintiffs
"rightful position."
17. For those who prefer the reliance interest, we might adapt the sentence in the
text. If the contract had not been made, the plaintiff still would have incurred the cost
of buying or selling the goods (or land or services) in the cover transaction, but might
not have incurred the cost of buying the goods from or selling the goods to the
defendant. By forcing the plaintiff to incur these transaction costs twice, the breach left
the plaintiff worse off than if the contract had not been made. The reliance interest
refocuses our attention on recovering the cost of dealing with the defendant, not the cost
of the cover or resale transaction. The net effect is much the same.
This transformation assumes that the reliance interest would hypothesize no dealing
between the plaintiff and the defendant. Arguably, we could assume that the parties
would have incurred all of the expenses of dealing with each other, but at the last
possible moment would have stopped short of entering the agreement. Under that
assumption, the reliance interest might reject recovery of incidental expenses incurred
in the process of making either sale. The reliance interest does not compel any
particular assumption concerning the hypothetical bargaining that might have occurred
if the contract had not been made. It dictates the general question ("What if the contract
had not been made?"), but leaves the answer open to several alternatives, including lost
opportunities to deal with others in addition to the two possibilities already identified in
this footnote. See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 6, at 55, 60-61; Pettit, supra note 6, at
420-21. As long as the resale or cover generates actual out-of-pocket expenses, recovery
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any such costs incurred in finding a substitute transaction. To the extent
that we need a name for this portion of the award, "incidental damages"
should serve the purpose quite well. 18 No embellishment of the basic
damage rule is necessary to generate this result.
The point extends beyond contract law. In every case where a plaintiff
must incur expenses to minimize the losses caused by the defendant's
wrong (regardless of the nature of the wrong), 19 the plaintiff would not
have incurred those expenditures but for the wrong. Any effort to put
her into the position she would have occupied but for the wrong
necessarily must include expenses incurred to ~inimize the harm. Both
the damage formula (the position but for the wrong) and the definition
of the expenses recoverable under the affirmative use of the avoidable
consequences doctrine (expenses to reduce the harm caused by the
wrong) focus on damages caused by the wrong. Under these circumstances, the affirmative application of the avoidable consequences
doctrine remains a subset of the damages recoverable under the
expectation interest, requiring no separate explanation.
2.

Avoided Consequences

The negative application of the avoidable consequences doctrine
presents three further possibilities: the plaintiff may fail to make

of those expenditures would serve the principle advantages of the reliance interest:
certainty and measurability. Thus, one might anticipate courts choosing to allow
recovery of these expenses under the reliance interest. Since contract law generally
prefers the expectation interest, any additional discussion of whether the reliance interest
would adopt a stingier view of incidental damages seems unnecessary here.
18. U.C.C. §§ 2-710, 2-715 (1995); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 347
cmt. c (1979).
19. The superfluous nature of affirmative avoidable consequences applies even in
tort. Medical expenses minimize harm: rather than suffer through life without the use
of one leg, the plaintiff should have the bone set, allowing her to use the leg again
within a few months. Since those expenses are reasonable, the affirmative use of the
avoidable consequences doctrine justifies their recovery. Medical expenses in tort may
be the archetypical affirmative use of the avoidable consequences doctrine. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 cmt. d ( 1977). But tort law does not need the
avoidable consequences doctrine to explain why an injured party may recover medical
expenses. If the tort had not occurred, the plaintiff would not have incurred medical
expenses. Causing the plaintiff to incur medical expenses fits comfortably within
compensation for "the creation of liabilities." Id. § 906(c ). Thus, basic damage
principles justify awarding medical expenses without reference to the avoidable
consequences doctrine.
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reasonable efforts to avoid the loss; the plaintiff may make reasonable
efforts that nonetheless fail to avoid the loss; or the plaintiff may make
successful efforts to avoid the loss. The avoidable consequences
doctrine usually addresses only the first two situations. The Restatement
(Second) of Contracts deals with only the first two situations. 20 The
Restatement (Second) of Torts leaves a similar gap in the definition of
the avoidable consequences doctrine. 21 Unless the law prefers to
encourage futile efforts to avoid the loss, omitting the treatment of
successful efforts seems odd. 22 At least superficially, the avoidable
consequences doctrine seems designed primarily to encourage successful
efforts to minimize the loss. 23
The law does not need the avoidable consequences doctrine in order
to decide how to treat successful efforts to avoid the loss. The
expectation interest addresses the issue by limiting recovery to damages
caused by the breach. Damages aim to put the plaintiff in the position
she would have occupied if the defendant had performed the contract,
but not a better position. 24 If the plaintiff avoids some portion of the
loss, allowing recovery for the avoided loss would leave her in a
position better than the one she would have occupied if the contract had
been performed. This general rule finds specific manifestation in several
provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code.
For example, a
nonbreaching seller may recover contract price minus the amount she
realized by reselling the goods to a new buyer (net of resale expenses,
of course). 25 The defendant deprived the seller of the full price, but the
seller avoided part of the loss by selling to another, leaving only part of

20.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350 ( I 979):
(I) Except as stated in Subsection (2), damages are not recoverable for loss

that the injured party could have avoided without undue risk, burden or
humiliation.
(2) The injured party is not precluded from recovery by the rule stated in
Subsection (!) to the extent that he has made reasonable but unsuccessful
efforts to avoid loss.
While the language explicitly discusses unsuccessful efforts to avoid the loss, it does not
explain how to treat successful efforts.
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 ( 1977). By including the benefits
rule in another section, the Restatement (Second) a/Torts fills the gap left by§ 918. See
id.§ 920.
22. This may explain why Dobbs includes losses actually avoided as the first of
his "four rules of avoidable consequences." See DOBBS, supra note 9, § 3.9.
23. One purpose for the avoidable consequences doctrine is to prevent waste. See
McCORMICK, supra note JO, at 127; DOBBS, supra note IO, at 188. Successful efforts
prevent waste far better than unsuccessful efforts.
24. FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, § 12.1, at 840; MURRAY, supra note 2, § 117;
JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 14-4 (3d ed.
I 987).
25. u.c.c. § 2-706 (1995).
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the price unsatisfied. Similarly, the nonbreaching buyer may not collect
the full cost of the substitute goods, only the cost minus the price she
would have paid under the contract with the breaching seller. 26
Although everything in this section seems obvious, the conclusion may
not be as apparent. The avoidable consequences doctrine does not
address losses actually avoided. That treatment, like the affirmative
applications of the avoidable consequences doctrine, stems entirely from
the expectation interest. Even if the law never examined the adequacy
of the plaintiff's efforts to avoid the loss, the law nonetheless would not
permit recovery of losses actually avoided.
B.

Unsuccessful Efforts To Avoid the Loss

The core of the avoidable consequences doctrine involves its treatment
of unavoided losses. In this area, the avoidable consequences doctrine
augments the expectation interest by providing a limitation that the
general rules do not appear to include. 27 It limits recovery by excluding amounts the plaintiff could have avoided losing even if those
amounts are necessary to put the plaintiff in the position she would have
occupied if the contract had been performed. Thus, an employee
discharged in breach of contract may receive less than her full salary
even if she does not find other employment, if she could have found
other employment by reasonable efforts. 28 A company that cannot
resell goods because the seller failed to deliver them in breach of
contract may not recover the profits lost on the resale if they could have
avoided the loss by reasonable efforts to cover. 29 In each case, if the
contract had been performed, the plaintiff would have received more
money---the full salary or the profits on the lost resale. But the
avoidable consequences doctrine precludes recovery of those losses
despite the basic damage principle. 30 The avoidable consequences
doctrine dictates results that seem to diverge from the expectation
interest.

26. Id. § 2-712(2).
27. Despite this appearence, this Article argues that the expectation interest does
include a limitation on a plaintiff's ability to recover unavoided losses. See infra Part
J.C.
28. See, e.g., Gulf Consol. Int'! v. Murphy, 658 S.W.2d 565, 566 (Tex. 1983).
29. U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a) (1995).
30. Kelly, supra note 6, at 1765 n.39; LAYCOCK, supra note 4, at 84.
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To a large extent, the need for the avoidable consequences doctrine
stems from the treatment of losses actually avoided. If the plaintiff
could recover for losses even though she had avoided them, one would
not need to limit damages in order to encourage mitigation efforts. The
gain from such efforts would accrue to the plaintiff, providing her with
ample incentive to keep losses to a minimum. The expectation interest,
however, permits the defendant to capture the benefit of any loss
reduction the plaintiff actually achieves. Thus, moral hazard might lead
some plaintiffs to allow avoidable losses to mount. 31 The buyer might
not cover, no matter how easily she could find substitute goods and
resell them at a profit. The employee might remain idle no matter how
easily she could find other work.
The avoidable consequences doctrine combats this moral hazard by
imposing the cost of avoidable losses on the plaintiff, despite the
defendant's wrongful conduct that caused the losses. When appropriately applied, it eliminates the difference between avoided losses and
avoidable losses by allowing the plaintiff the same recovery regardless
of whether she actually avoided the losses. 32 The plaintiff cannot
externalize the cost of idleness; it will fall on her, not on the defendant.
Thus, the plaintiff again has an incentive to make efforts to minimize the
losses. Efforts to avoid the loss will accrue to her benefit, by providing
her money she cannot obtain in a damage award. In fact, efforts to

3 I. See Christopher T. Wonnell, The Abstract Character of Contract Law, 22
CONN. L. REV. 437, 493-94 (1990). Rockingham County v. Luten Bridge Co., 35 F.2d
301 (4th Cir. I 929), provides a vivid example. The county hired the plaintiff to build
a bridge. When the county decided not to build a road up to the bridge, it notified the
plaintiff to stop work. The plaintiff could have minimized the loss by doing nothing--about as easy a task as the avoidable consequences doctrine will ever require. The
plaintiff finished the bridge anyway and sued for the price. The plaintiff must have
assumed that any additional expenditures it incurred would come out of the defendant's
pocket, not its own---a classic example of moral hazard. The court, of course, refused
to allow recovery of expenses incurred after the county's repudiation.
32. Unlike the possibility raised in the preceding section, the avoidable
consequences doctrine eliminates the difference between avoided and avoidable losses
by denying recovery for both rather than by granting recovery for both. Either approach
would reduce moral hazard following the wrong. Allowing recovery for both avoided
losses and avoidable losses violates the basic stricture prohibiting recoveries in excess
of the position the plaintiff would have occupied if the defendant had performed. In
addition, recoveries in excess of losses create a different kind of hazard: an incentive
to provoke the other party into breach, since the plaintiff might receive more money
from a damage award than she could have obtained if the other party had performed.
See Andrew Kull, Restitution as a Remedy for Breach of Contract, 67 S. CAL. L. REV.
1465, 1506-11 (1994); Kelly, supra note 6, at 1768-69 & n.48 (discussing situations
where a party can obtain a substantial recovery in restitution even though the expectation
interest might be small or even negative because the plaintiff would have incurred large
losses under the contract if the defendant had performed).
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minimize the loss will increase the damage award slightly because the
award will include the cost of reasonable efforts to minimize the loss.
C.

The Benefits of Breach of Contract

The preceding sections demonstrate how the expectation interest
explains portions of the avoidable consequences doctrine. If the
defendant had performed as promised, the plaintiff would not have
incurred any expenses attempting to minimize the consequences of the
defendant's breach. Thus, the expectation interest compels the recovery
provided by affirmative application of the avoidable consequences
doctrine. Similarly, if the plaintiff actually avoided a portion of the
losses, recovery for avoided losses would defy the expectation interest
by putting the plaintiff in a position better than she would have achieved
if the defendant had performed. Thus, the expectation interest compels
denying recovery of losses actually avoided. These peripheral aspects
of the avoidable consequences doctrine pose no inconsistencies with the
expectation interest at all.
The core of the avoidable consequences doctrine, however, appears to
conflict with the expectation interest. By denying recovery of some
damages that the breach caused and that the plaintiff did not avoid, the
avoidable consequences doctrine leaves the plaintiff in a position worse
than the one she would have occupied if the defendant had performed.
This section will attempt to explain how the expectation interest can
account for this apparent inconsistency.

I.

Identifying the Benefits of Breach

The explanation depends on a fundamental premise: every time the
avoidable consequences doctrine comes into play, breach of the contract
provides the nonbreaching party with benefits for which the expectation
interest must account. 33 When a seller breaches before the buyer has

33. The proposal to offset contract recoveries to account for benefits of breach
resembles the offset for benefits in tort law. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 918 (1977). The proposal differs in several particulars, however, notably in the
mechanics of evaluation. The benefit rule in tort limits the offset to injury to the same
interest benefitted. While that limitation has been questioned, see LAYCOCK, supra note
2, at 141, it may serve some purpose where either the benefits or the losses cannot be
measured with much confidence or accuracy. Thus, when pecuniary harm can be proven
with certainty, allowing an offset for emotional benefits that cannot be calculated by
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paid in full for the goods (or services or land), 34 the buyer benefits
from the breach by retaining money that she would not have retained if
the contract had been performed. 35 If a buyer breaches before the seller
has delivered all of the goods (or services or land), the seller benefits by
retaining goods (or time or land) that she would not have if the contract
had been performed.
Contract remedies often account for these benefits without any
reference to the avoidable consequences doctrine or the benefits rule.
The basic damage formulae in the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.)
subtract these benefits from the award without comment. Section 2-712
allows the buyer to recover the difference between the cover price and
the contract price, in effect offsetting the amount that the buyer did not
pay the seller as a benefit. 36 Section 2-706 allows the seller to resell
the goods and recover the difference between the resale price and the
contract price. 37 Each section allows further offset for other benefits
reference to any market may make little sense. See Kelly, infra note 53, at 520-21
(discussing genetic counselling torts). Whatever the merits of this distinction, the
discussion of contract damages proceeds without any effort to ascertain or distinguish
among the various interests that the plaintiff may have (except, of course, to keep the
expectation interest distinct from the reliance interest). Laycock points out that contract
law has avoided the distinction drawn by the benefit rule in tort. See LAYCOCK, supra
note 2, at 142. That may result from the reluctance to allow recovery for emotional
distress and other intangible losses in contract cases. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS, §§ 352-53 (1979). Rather than rely on these doctrines, this Article
proposes relatively ascertainable market measures of the benefits involved. The measure
of these benefits will be indirect, depending upon inferences. In each case, however, the
measure relies upon a market transaction (or decision by an actor in the market) rather
than a jury judgment about the relative dollar value of emotion or pain, divorced from
any objective criteria. Thus, even if differentiating the interests under the benefit rule
makes sense in tort, perhaps the rationale will not apply to the approach advanced here.
34. Initially I will focus on breaches that occur before full performance by the
nonbreaching party, since these provide the clearest examples of benefits from the
breach. As the Article progresses, the application to nonbreaching parties who have
fully performed the contract should become apparent.
35. This sentence assumes that if the seller had performed, the buyer also would
have performed. While the buyer could have retained the benefit of money not paid
even after full performance by the seller, presumably the law would remove that benefit
via a damage award against the buyer in favor of the seller. Thus, I refer to the situation
if both parties had performed fully.
36. U.C.C. § 2-712 (I 995). The U.C.C. treats the entire contract price as a benefit
because another section allows the buyer to recover amounts paid to the seller in
addition to the remedy under § 2-7 I 2. Id. § 2-711.
37. Id. § 2-706. A lost volume seller-one who could have sold goods both to the
breaching buyer and to the customer who purchased the goods on resale-may recover
lost profit on the original sale and keep the profit on the resale. See, e.g., Neri v. Retail
Marine Corp., 285 N.E.2d 311 (N.Y. 1972); U.C.C. § 2-708(2) (1995). The avoidable
consequences doctrine does not reduce the recovery by lost volume sellers because the
resale does not avoid losing the profit on the original sale. Rather, breach of the original
contract leaves the seller with the profit on one sale (the resale) instead of the profit on
two sales (the original sale and the resale). See DOBBS, supra note 10, § 12.19, at 889.
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of the breach by subtracting "expenses saved in consequence of the ...
breach." 38
The benefits noted in the preceding paragraph represent avoided
losses, not avoidable losses. The U.C.C., however, treats avoidable
losses in exactly the same manner. If a seller does not resell the goods,
she still cannot claim the entire price without regard to the benefit of
retaining the goods. Instead, the U.C.C. looks to the amount the plaintiff
could have received by reselling the goods (the market price) and values
the benefit to the seller at that amount as if it was the resale price. 39
In effect, this treats the goods as having been resold to the seller at the
market price. This income is fictional, attributed to the seller and
subtracted from the award even though the seller does not possess the
money she would have received from the contract or from an actual

38. u.c.c. §§ 2-706, -712 (1995).
39. Id. § 2-708. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts and at least one court
have recognized that the contract/market differential amounts to application of the
avoidable consequences doctrine. See Autonumerics v. Bayer Indus., 696 P.2d 1330,
1341 (Ariz. Ct. App. I 985); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350 cmt. C.
( l 979). Dobbs recognizes that this market measure serves the purpose of minimizing
damages, but suggests procedural differences remove it from the avoidable consequences
doctrine. See DOBBS, supra note 9, § 3.9 & n.4 (identifying the specified date and the
willingness to ignore potential transactions above the market price as differences between
the avoidable consequences doctrine and market measures). To the extent that Dobbs
seeks to identify mechanical differences in the way the avoidable consequences doctrine
operates within market measures, I concur in his distinction. But the procedural
differences he isolates do not negate the manifestation of the avoidable consequences
doctrine within market measures. The focus on a specific date (such as the date of
breach, of notice of repudiation, or of an actual cover or resale transaction) limits
litigation costs by precluding lengthy argument, based on 20-20 hindsight, concerning
when to assess the market price. But the market price remains an estimate of how much
the plaintiff could have obtained by reasonable efforts. Similarly, the decision to ignore
opportunities to deal above the market price merely reflects the avoidable consequences
doctrine's limitation to reasonable efforts. The avoidable consequences doctrine does
not insist that a plaintiff make the best possible transaction. As long as the plaintiff
enters a reasonable transaction, the avoidable consequences doctrine will not reduce the
award. Thus, the U.C.C. formula need not impute the best possible transaction to a
plaintiff who does not cover or resell. Market price----0r, more accurately, the average
price at which transactions in the market occurred at that time (see infra note
73}-seems presumptively reasonable. Some commercial actors entered transactions for
less; the plaintiff hardly could be faulted for not getting more. That the market measures
produce this result mechanically rather than insisting upon case-specific evidence
represents a procedural compromise of a sort Dobbs recognizes. See DOBBS, supra note
9, § 3.1, at 213-24. That compromise, however, does not negate the fundamental role
the avoidable consequences doctrine plays in the formula embodying the market
measure.
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resale. Similarly, a buyer who does not cover nonetheless finds the
unpaid portion of the contract price subtracted from the recovery. 40 In
each case, other expenses saved remain an offset against the award.
I anticipate the objection that I am still dealing with avoided losses,
not with avoidable losses. But that is precisely the point, not an
objection at all. The law attributes the market price to the seller not
because she could have realized that value by reasonable efforts to sell
the goods, but because she did realize that value by retaining the goods.
The goods are valuable; retaining them is a benefit. The plaintiff, thus,
has received an actual benefit from the breach, not merely an opportunity to reduce the loss. The expectation interest requires an offset for the
value of that benefit.
The seller of services presents an even clearer example. An employee
discharged in breach of a contract with a specified duration receives a
benefit: the time she can devote to other pursuits. She may devote this
time to another job, in which case she receives the benefit of the wages
earned in the other job. She may devote this time to leisure activities,
eschewing other employment for the remainder of her contract term. In
that case, she receives the benefit of the leisure time she would not have
enjoyed if her employer had performed the contract. In either case, she
has received an actual benefit from the discharge. 41

2.

Quantifying the Benefits

In order to offset the value of these benefits against the damage award,
the law needs a mechanism for measuring the benefit. The market
price-----the amount the seller could have realized in a reasonable sale of
the goods (or land or services)-offers an acceptable proxy for, or
estimate of, the amount of that benefit. The subjective benefit to the
seller might exceed the market price. The seller may have a use for the
goods (or land or time) that she values more highly than other market
participants. But the seller must value the goods (or land or time) at
least as highly as the market price. Otherwise she would resell them.
Thus, attributing to the seller a benefit valued at the market price fixes
the lowest reasonable offset for benefits bestowed. 42

40. u.c.c. § 2-713 (1995).
41. A third possibility-that she devotes the time to an unsuccessful search for
substitute employmen!--will be discussed shortly. See infra Part I.D. l.
42. The analysis does not rest on the assumption that the seller has not fully
performed, see supra note 34, but applies with equal force to cases where the buyer
breaches after full performance by the seller. Following full performance, however,
neither the avoidable consequences doctrine nor the expectation interest suggests any
offset against the seller's recovery. The seller has no apparent way to reduce the loss.
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While the expectation interest compels some reduction for the benefits
of a breach, it may not compel the specific measure urged here. The
benefit to the nonbreaching party consists of the subjective value she
attaches to whatever she retained by not completing performance. For
various reasons, that subjective value might differ from the amount she
could have saved by reasonable efforts to minimize the loss. 43 Argu-

She retains no goods to resell; full performance implies that she has delivered all of the
goods to the buyer. All expenses she normally would incur have been incurred.
Retaining no goods, the seller has no apparent benefit from the breach and, thus, no
offset arises under either U.C.C. § 2-706 or § 2-708. The same applies to the employee
discharged after full performance. The principal remaining duty is the employer's duty
to pay. The employee cannot find someone else willing to pay for the time already
spent working for the breaching employer. The time the employee retains is time she
would have retained despite the breach--time to which the employer had no claim. Full
performance by the employee removes the issue of avoidable consequences from the
table under any theory.
Despite delivery of the goods, the seller may have additional duties, such as service
obligations under a warranty. When the buyer breaches before full performance of the
warranty by the seller, a different portion of the rules applies. The buyer's breach
benefits the seller, but not in ways the U.C.C. accounts for by subtracting resale price
or market price. Instead, the seller's benefit falls within the provisions subtracting
"expenses saved in consequence of the buyer's breach." See U.C.C. §§ 2-706, -708
(I 995). Nonetheless, the expenses represent actual savings---expenses not incurred to
repair the product. (I assume here that the buyer's breach is material, thus excusing the
seller's performance of the warranty obligations. If the buyer's breach is not material,
the seller may need to perform under the warranty and seek damages against the
breaching party. In this case, the avoidable consequences doctrine will not come into
play, since the seller has no way to reduce the loss and receives no savings.) These
savings exist immediately upon the buyer's rejection; the seller need not expend any
effort to obtain them. Thus, we again face avoided, not avoidable, losses. The savings
do not accrue to the seller who actually resells, since she incurs the same warranty
obligations to the new, different buyer. They will apply, however, to the lost volume
seller, who incurs only one set of warranty obligations where she would have incurred
two but for the breach. See Laycock, supra note 4, at 71 (discussing Neri v. Retail
Marine Corp., 285 N.E.2d 31 I (N.Y. 1972)).
43. One difference, already noted in text, arises because the amount of loss the
plaintiff could have avoided offers only a minimum estimate of the value to the plaintiff.
We know she values the benefit more than the amount of loss she could prevent, but we
do not know how much more. Unconstrained by the avoidable consequences doctrine,
defendants might urge courts to subtract more than the amount of avoidable loss rather
than settle for a minimum estimate. Another difference arises if the plaintiff mistakes
the amount of loss she could avoid. If she overestimates the amount of loss she could
prevent and still does not avoid the loss, defendants again might urge reducing the
damages by more to reflect the true value to the plaintiff. On the other hand, if the
plaintiff underestimates the amount of loss she could prevent, she may retain the benefit
even though she values it less than she values the savings she actually could have
obtained. In this case, plaintiff might object that subtracting the full amount she could
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ably, the expectation interest dictates subtracting the entire subjective
value of the benefit retained. 44
The avoidable consequences doctrine attaches no significance to
subjective values. It rests entirely on the objective value of the portion
of the loss that the plaintiff should have avoided. Arguably, the
difference between these two methods of calculating the offset reveals
an inconsistency between the expectation interest and the avoidable
consequences doctrine.
The inconsistency is more apparent than real. If a reasonable
lawmaker set out to devise a method of evaluating the subjective benefits
of the breach to the nonbreaching party, she easily might choose the
amount ofloss the nonbreaching party could have avoided by reasonable
efforts. 45 The lawmaker understandably might prefer to draw inferences of value from objectively verifiable facts, rather than resort to a
subjective inquiry into value to the plaintiff. Efforts to measure the
value of benefits apart from the market confront serious problems that
might justify recourse to proxies, such as the amount of avoidable
loss. 46 Direct evidence of the subjective value of the benefit will be
difficult to adduce. In most cases, it will come entirely from the seller,

have prevented would overestimate the benefit and provide too little relief.
44. See DOBBS, supra note 9, § 1.9, at 37-38.
45. Some may feel that I have skewed the inquiry by positing a lawmaker in
search of a way to measure subjective benefits. That, however, is entirely consistent
with my thesis. This inquiry will not answer any historical questions about the origins
of these rules. That the law could have generated them without the avoidable
consequences doctrine does not prove that the law did generate them without that
doctrine. But I do not contend that the avoidable consequences doctrine does not exist,
only that it produces results already required by the expectation interest and, thus, need
not exist. If a lawmaker concerned with measuring benefits to the plaintiff would
produce the same measure of offset, then logically my thesis holds: the avoidable
consequences doctrine is consistent with the expectation interest (since they produce the
same measure of offset). In fact, we could live without the avoidable consequences
doctrine, since the offset need not change at all in its absence.
Nor would it be any objection to these hypotheses that the avoidable consequences
doctrine presents a more elegant explanation of these damage rules. That either theory
explains them better does not destroy the consistency of the two theories, since each
produces the same result. Thus, I will spend no time discussing the relative merits of
explaining the existing rules as an aspect of the avoidable consequences doctrine or the
expectation interest-except in Part lll, where I suggest that recognizing the expectation
interest as at least part of the basis for this offset may clarify the appropriate amount of
offset in some situations.
46. I will frequently abbreviate the phrase "the amount of the loss that the plaintiff
could have avoided by reasonable efforts" to "the avoidable loss." Where it is necessary
to differentiate the entire amount of the avoidable loss from the portion of the loss
avoidable by reasonable efforts, I will try to use the full phrases, avoiding the condensed
version for either component.
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with inevitable concerns for distortion (conscious or otherwise). 47
Problems increase if the benefits consist of additional utility rather than
additional monetary gain--as, for example, when an employee gains

47. Courts are familiar with the phenomena of selective perception and selective
retention, which help explain how an individual may quite honestly come to believe facts
that do not accord with reality-or, at least, with the reality perceived and recalled by
other observers. See, e.g., In re Kreps, 700 F.2d 372, 375 (7th Cir. 1987). The
problems take on particular significance when the facts sought to be adduced involve the
subjective state of mind of the individual. The Kreps case involved reliance, in effect
seeking to determine whether a bank officer renewed a loan because of a financial
statement that contained material misrepresentations or whether the officer would have
renewed the loan for other reasons even with an accurate financial statement. The
bankruptcy court noted:
Rynberk, who personally handled the loan transaction for the plaintiff,
testified that he relied on the financial statement on the second renewal of the
loan. Now, if the trial court was bound by the testimony of loan officers about
reliance, trials would end at that point and lending institutions would win
I 00% of the cases because in the court's considerable experience with such
cases it has never heard a loan officer testify that he did not rely upon a
financial statement and does not expect to hear one do so. Looking at the
evidence as a whole, the court believes Rynberk was induced to allow the loan
renewal by reason of his bank's loan experience with the debtor dating back
I 5 years. The court is not convinced that Rynberk would not have approved
the renewal if the financial statement had not been given ....
What has been said about loan officers in trials always testifying that they
relied on financial statements is not intended to imply that they intentionally
gave false testimony. There seems to be something in the make-up of human
beings which enables them, by the processes of hindsight, self-deception,
rationalization, forgetfulness and whatever else comes into play, to convince
themselves that events of the past were different than what actually took place
. . . . In the field of psychology, these processes are known by the following
terms: selective perception, selective retention and selective forgetfulness.
Id. at 375. Subjective value seems equally susceptible to these phenomena---and equally
difficult to discern without reference to external indicators, such as market forces.
The holding of Kreps, which reversed the bankruptcy court's finding that the bank
officer did not rely on the financial statement, establishes the need for presumptions like
the one noted in the text. If courts engage in a specific inquiry into subjective factors,
knowing that phenomena like selective perception and selective retention exist may not
produce appropriate outcomes in a given case. One may not prove that these forces have
distorted the testimony of a specific witness. Even a credibility judgment may not
withstand appeal in the absence of contrary evidence. Thus, a lawmaker may prefer a
manageable standard to one that relies too heavily upon the vagaries of individual
factfinding. Heriot has pointed out how rules, by minimizing the problems of
administration (including factfinding), may produce more appropriate results than caseby-case adjudication. See Gail Heriot, A Study in the Choice of Form: Statutes of
Limitation and the Doctrine ofLaches, 1992 B.Y.U. L. REV. 917, 935-41.
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leisure rather than substitute wages. 48 "[N]o one knows how to
measure utility, " 49 let alone how to translate a measurement into
monetary terms. 50 Even when the goods produce a monetary benefit
for the seller, courts may have trouble allocating the benefit between the
goods and the other productive inputs of the seller that helped generate
the monetary gain. 51 Problems with certainty may doom efforts to
measure the benefit directly. 52 If the breaching party bore the burden
of proof on the amount of the benefit, 53 the problems with certainty

48. I use the economic meaning of utility: consumer satisfaction. See MILTON H.
SPENCER, CONTEMPORARY ECONOMICS 341, 706 (1971).
49. Id. at 341.
50. We could attempt to zero in on the amount of utility the goods have for the
seller by using the contract price as the highest possible value of the goods to the seller.
The plaintiff seller was ready and willing to part with the goods for that amount, giving
rise to the inference that she did not value the goods more than she valued the contract
price. At best, however, this merely prevents estimates of utility that exceed contract
price; it does not help decide how much utility, if any, the goods had between the
contract price and the price for which they could have been resold on the market. More
important, inferences about the ceiling will not always be true. The defendant's breach
bestowed the value the seller attached to the goods on the date of the breach, which may
exceed the value she attached to the goods on the date of contract formation. While
there are reasons to believe that problem will not affect many cases, an effort to
determine utility directly still faces problems that make this approach less practical than
the proxy based on market price.
51. Where the monetary gain stems from a simple resale, we confront actual
avoided losses, not avoidable losses, thus permitting measurement without a proxy. Any
time the seller's benefit (in excess of avoidable loss) stems from more than a simple
resale, the seller will have employed other productive resources with the good----say, by
using it as a component part of another good or putting it into an attractive package.
The defendant provided only the amount of the benefit attributable to the original good;
amounts attributable to the other productive resources belong to the plaintiff and should
not be subtracted from the damage award. Cf, e.g., Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures
Corp., 309 U.S. 390 (1940) (discussing how much of the profit from a movie was
attributable to a stolen script and how much attributable to the defendant's other
contributions to the movie).
52. See, e.g., id.
53. The defendant bears the burden of proof under the avoidable consequences
doctrine. DOBBS, supra note 9, § 3.9, at 272. Whether the courts would allocate the
burden of proof in the same way if pursuing the expectation interest remains an open
question. Once the plaintiff has proven the amount of the loss caused by the defendant,
it would make some sense to insist that the defendant prove any assertions that the
breach benefitted the plaintiff. That seems to be the allocation of burdens under the
benefit rule in tort law. See Michael B. Kelly, The Rightful Position in "Wrongful Life"
Actions, 42 HASTINGS L. REv. 505,520 (1991). At the same time, at least some offsets
arguably related to the avoidable consequences doctrine are treated as part of the
plaintiffs burden to prove damages. See, e.g., O'Brien Bros. v. Helen B. Moran, 160
F.2d 502 (2d Cir. 1947). As long as the law treats the market price as the amount of
the offset, it may continue to insist that the plaintiff prove the market price as part of the
measure of damages. DOBBS, supra note 10, § 3.7, at 189.
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might make any reduction in the award impossible. 54
Faced with these difficulties, a lawmaker might indulge in the
presumption that the subjective value to the plaintiff equalled the
objective amount she could have obtained by reasonable efforts to sell
the benefit to others. 55
The law often tolerates---or even prefers---objective presumptions, Sometimes the law presumes that the
parties' subjective state of mind matches their objective actions. 56
Sometimes it declares that the subjective state of mind does not matter
because only objective manifestations have legal significance. 57 Thus,
the use of objective values as an estimate of subjective values poses no
serious obstacle to considering the merits of this theory. A lawmaker
implementing the expectation interest might reproduce the results of the
avoidable consequences doctrine without reference to the doctrine itself.
Our lawmaker, however, might also have found the amount of
avoidable loss a relatively accurate measure of the subjective benefit to
the plaintiff. 58 The market price of the goods accurately measures the

54. This concern echoes the concern in Kreps that taking a bank officer's statement
as dispositive might permit banks to win every case. See supra note 47. In fact,
certainty problems could prove dispositive either way, since the subjective nature of the
inquiry might prevent either party from producing evidence that would satisfy the
requirement. A requirement that systematically underestimates or overestimates the
amount of damages (depending on the party with the burden) will not satisfy the
expectation interest. The expectation interest seeks to take the benefit into account, not
to ignore it, as would occur if the benefit could not be proven with satisfactory certainty,
or to assume its greatest credible value, as would occur if testimony by an individual
became dispositive absent certainty that another figure was correct.
55. In fact, the reasonable lawmaker might choose to make that presumption
conclusive, without regard to efforts of either party to prove a greater or lesser benefit
in a particular case.
56. Tort law often assumes that parties intend the natural consequences of their
actions, without regard to whether they actually entertained that subjective intent. See,
e.g., Cummings v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 202 Cal. App. 3d 1407, 1416, 249 Cal. Rptr. 568,
573 (1988); see a/so RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1977) (party intends
consequences "substantially certain" to result from an action).
57. The objective theory of contract law purports to ignore subjective intent when
it differs from the manifestation of intent. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, § 3.13
& n.2. Constant references to "manifestations" of intent throughout the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts embody the objective theory. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS§§ 24, 27, 29, 33, 38, 164, ]75 (1979).
58. This portion of the argument will claim accuracy, but not precision. The
difficulties noted earlier, see supra note 43, will not disappear, but their significance may
diminish.
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benefit to the nonbreaching seller of retaining the goods. 59 Neither
party seems likely to raise a successful objection to the decision to
subtract the market value of the goods from the plaintiff's recovery.
Consider first the defendant's argument that market price underestimates the subjective benefit to the seller. One certainly can infer that
the seller kept the goods rather than reselling them because she valued
them more than the market price. But whatever subjective value the
plaintiff may attach to the goods, she could obtain that subjective value
by delivering the contract ioods to the defendant and buying substitute
goods at the market price. The defendant, by not taking delivery of
the goods, can claim responsibility for bestowing no more value than the
amount for which the plaintiff could have obtained the goods from
another. 61 Thus, the market price not only represents the minimum
value of the benefit to the plaintiff, but also represents the most that the
plaintiff would have paid to obtain that benefit. 62 The breaching buyer

59. For now, it will be simpler to deal with the example of a seller of goods suing
a buyer for breach. As shown later, the analysis applies more broadly. See infra Part
I.D.

60. This proposition assumes that the goods are not unique. If they are unique, the
market price will equal the plaintiff's subjective value. She will not sell for less. No
one else can sell for less because, by definition, no one else has these unique goods.
While it may be difficult to determine either plaintiff's subjective value or the market
price, they will be the same.
6 I. Where the plaintiff is a manufacturer or wholesaler, the amount of the benefit
arguably could be measured by her cost to replace the goods. This might be less than
the price for which she could sell the goods. A manufacturer could replace the goods
for the cost of the inputs to production, often less than the price for which it could sell
the goods (except in a perfectly competitive market). A wholesaler could replace the
goods at the wholesale price, but could resell them at the retail price. Once replaced,
the seller could enjoy the benefit as much as she could after the buyer's breach. The
plaintiff's decision not to resell, however, justifies inferring that she values the goods
more than the amount for which she could sell them, not just more than the cost to
obtain them.
62. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts confronts the same issue when
prescribing the measure of restitution recoveries. The discussion focuses on services,
since restitution of goods often can be accomplished by returning the goods themselves,
rather than assessing their value and awarding restitution in money. The analogy,
nonetheless, is instructive. The Restatement measures the benefit bestowed on one party
by the amount for which that party could have obtained the benefit from someone else,
apparently on the theory that the other party saved the beneficiary the cost of obtaining
the benefit elsewhere. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 37l(a) (1979). The
Restatement includes an alternative measure--the increase in wealth to the beneficiary--that may seem closer to the subjective value to the plaintiff. Id. § 371(b). The
comments, however, make it clear that the American Law Institute believed the
beneficiary's wealth often would increase less than the fair market value of the services
performed, not more, as the breaching buyer argues in this example. Nor do they
endorse a subjective measure of benefit, focusing instead on the increase in the market
value of the beneficiary's property attributable to the other party's serviceir-for
example, the increase in the value of the beneficiary's land because the other party built

196

[VOL. 33: 175, I 996]

Contract Remedies
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

has little equity in claiming the right to sell to the nonbreaching seller
at a price above market, thus capturing the nonbreaching party's
consumer surplus! 63
The seller's argument that market price overestimates the benefit to
her seems equally unpersuasive. The seller must contend that she values
the goods less than she values the market price, even though she did not
sell them at the market price. Unless the seller is irrational, this
argument necessarily implies that she underestimated the amount for
which she could sell the goods on the market. In that case, market price
may overestimate the actual benefit the seller received by keeping the
goods. 64 Neither irrationality nor mistake seems likely to arise often,
at least not with any credibility. 65 When they do arise, these errors
probably will be relatively small.
Sellers, especially merchants,
generally know the value of their wares within a reasonable margin.
While any given merchant may misjudge the amount that a particular
resale would yield, the errors seem likely to be so small or so infrequent
that they do not pose a substantial objection to the theory. Even
nonmerchants seem likely to have some idea of the market value of
goods before they enter into a contract to sell them. Thus, our
reasonable lawmaker might entertain relatively little concern that market

a house (or part of a house) on it. In addition, the Restatement limits breaching parties
to the lesser of the two measures, precluding a breaching party from capturing the
nonbreaching party's consumer surplus, if any. Id. § 371 cmts. a & b. In short,
restitutionary measures, focussed directly on measuring benefits to one party, endorse
market price as a measure of that benefit. A lawmaker reasonably could apply the same
technique for measuring benefits here and in restitution.
63. The buyer has the opportunity to sell her right to receive the goods back to the
seller instead of breaching. The seller would not agree to pay more than the market
price of the goods. Breach, which accomplishes the same transaction without the seller's
consent, should not impose on the nonbreaching seller a worse deal than she could have
made for herself.
64. We can infer that the seller valued the goods more than she valued the price
she expected to obtain for them. But where her expected price was below the market
price, the value to her might have been below the actual market price.
65. Claims of irrationality seem particularly doubtful. Strategic behavior seems
more likely than irrationality: a seller who valued the goods more than the market price,
but hoped to keep the goods and recover a larger than necessary damage award ( or
settlement) from the defendant. A lawmaker might trust juries to sort out these
incredible claims. Alternatively, a lawmaker could trust perjury statutes and Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 11 to deter false claims. Or a lawmaker reasonably could
avoid these problems and simplify factfinding by presuming that the market value
actually estimates the subjective value to the plaintiff, with an occasional small error that
undercompensates an irrational plaintiff.
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price would reduce recovery by more than the subjective value of the
benefit. Both the frequency and magnitude of any errors probably would
seem too small to require notice. Combined with concerns for the
accuracy and cost of the alternative (direct inquiry into subjective
value), 66 the lawmaker easily might prefer to estimate subjective value
by reference to avoidable losses.
Equally important, any errors affect sellers only if they assume that
efforts to resell (for more than their subjective value) will be futile
without testing the market. Sellers can protect themselves from
undercompensation by making reasonable efforts to resell. 67 Reasonable efforts to resell should reveal the actual market value and allow the
seller to make an informed choice. The seller who elects to keep goods
without making any effort to resell seems oddly placed to object that the
law undercompensated her by subtracting more than the actual benefit
from the award. 68 Her own mistaken estimate of the market value,
perpetuated by her own inaction by not trying to resell, created the error
in the first place. 69 In short, the proposed presumption probably comes
66. Epstein suggests that the entire effort to litigate issues concerning the avoidable
consequences doctrine should be avoided by fixing contract damages below full
compensation. This will encourage plaintiffs to minimize their losses even if no
avoidable consequences doctrine applies at trial. Since damages will not cover their full
loss, plaintiffs will benefit by keeping the loss as small as reasonably possible. See
Richard A. Epstein, Beyond Foreseeability: Consequential Damages in the Law of
Contract, I 8 J. LEGAL STUD. I 05 ( 1989). One may share the desire not to adopt rules
that require unnecessarily large litigation costs, even if one disagrees with Epstein's
proposal to make contract damages even more seriously undercompensatory than those
provided today.
67. Sellers can recover the cost of resale efforts as incidental damages. See U.C.C.
§ 2-710 (1995).
68. The point does not challenge existing law regarding the need to make efforts
the plaintiff knows will be futile. If the plaintiff correctly judges that reasonable efforts
will not reduce the loss, the failure to make futile efforts should not affect the award.
When reasonable efforts would not have produced any reduction in the loss, the amount
of loss avoidable by reasonable efforts is zero and, therefore, the offset demanded by the
avoidable consequences doctrine is zero, whether the plaintiff actually took those efforts
or not The text concerns a plaintiff who incorrectly believes that the efforts would be
futile------or, more precisely, underestimates the benefit she can obtain by making
reasonable efforts. (In effect, the plaintiff believes reasonable efforts to resell at an
amount greater than the value she attaches to the goods would be futile.) The law has
no desire to encourage futile efforts----which actually increase the damage recovery, since
incidental damages rise without any reduction in the loss. The existing law, however,
displays little sympathy for the person who fails to make efforts in the mistaken belief
that they would be futile. By using the standard of reasonable efforts, rather than a good
faith efforts test, the law reduces the recovery for one who honestly fails to make
reasonable efforts if the factfinder concludes that those efforts would have been
successful.
69. The point here is not that the seller has a duty to attempt resale or even a duty
to investigate the market price, but merely that the seller is not entitled to relief from the
effects of her own mistake about the market price of the goods. The failure to attempt
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very close to the actual value to the plaintiff by using market price as an
estimate of subjective value.
The analysis here will produce rules identical to the avoidable
consequences doctrine only if the lawmaker would adopt a conclusive
presumption. If the lawmaker exhibits sufficient concern for errors the
presumption creates, she might choose to create an evidentiary presumption. This would allow the parties to introduce evidence that, in a
particular case, the value of the benefit differed from the presumed
value. The finder of fact could then determine how much to subtract
from the award in order to offset the benefit. Much of the preceding
argument has been directed at this latter possibility. The concern for
certainty and objectivity in part explain why the lawmaker might choose
not to consider evidence about the subjective value on a case-by-case
basis. 70 Strategic behavior designed to encourage or to take advantage
of errors in the factfinding process presents another concern that
mitigates toward a conclusive presumption. 71 The cost-benefit analysis,
comparing the ability to reach better results with the cost of that
process--both in judicial resources consumed by the task and the cost
of attorney time to the parties---suggests that the evidence should not be
admitted. 72 In short, the argument above is intended to demonstrate
why the lawmaker would choose a conclusive presumption-a presumption that matches the existing rules generated by the avoidable consequences doctrine.
The arguments here do not demonstrate that the expectation interest
provides a better explanation of the results than the avoidable consequences doctrine. One can posit reasons why the avoidable consequences doctrine produces these results with more elegance. For example, one
might contend that the avoidable consequences doctrine explains the case
law directly because market price precisely measures the amount of loss
that could have been avoided. 73 That may seem preferable to a theory

resale does not alter the presumption; the same presumption (that seller values the goods
at least as much as she values the market price) applies whether she makes efforts or
not. Neither the seller nor the buyer, however, can challenge the presumption.
70. See supra text accompanying notes 45-47.
71. See supra note 65.
72. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
73. Market price, if we ascertain it with precision, arguably offers an exact
measure of the amount that the seller could have obtained if she had sold the goods to
minimize the loss. Market price, however, lacks the precision necessary to support the
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that relies on indirect analysis, using market price as an imprecise
estimate of some unknowable benefit. 74 If accepted, these arguments
might suggest that the avoidable consequences doctrine better explains
the origin of these results and the reasoning judges consciously used to
achieve them. Neither advantage, however, undermines the project here
for two reasons. 75
First, the measure employed in court need not perfectly match the
motive for employing the measure. Fuller and Perdue alerted lawyers
and scholars alike to the danger of assuming that the motive and
measure necessarily correspond, particularly in dealing with remedies. 76
I have expressed concern about their conclusion that measuring
claim. The advantage of an exact measure as opposed to an estimate fails if the socalled exact measure turns out to be nothing more than an estimate itself. Yet the very
fact that the seller did not resell (or did so in an unreasonable manner) deprives us of
any precise determination of market price in most cases. Except in a perfect market,
with perfect information and no product differentiation, market transactions may not
occur at a uniform price. Prices of identical goods vary from dealer to dealer even
within a relatively small market area. Alternative goods may not be identical to the
seller's and may come from other places, adding further variations to the price of
substitute goods. The U.C.C. recognizes and attempts to deal with other factors that
produce variation in market price, such as the date of purchase and place of the market
in question. See U.C.C. § 2-723 (1995). Even so, disputes about the appropriate time
can emerge. Depending upon whether the court decides the buyer repudiated, market
price could be calculated at the time and place of tender or the time the aggrieved party
learned of the repudiation. Compare id. § 2-708(1) with id. § 2-723(1). Neither time
seems well designed to produce precisely what the seller would have obtained on resale,
since a resale would occur sometime after the repudiation or rejection, subject to the
limitation that it occur within a commercially reasonable time. Id. § 2-706(2). As a
result, market price is an estimate that reflects a price in the middle of a range of market
transactions.
Variations in market price prevent it from measuring exactly what the seller would
have obtained in a reasonable resale. She may bave obtained the lowest price in the
market or the highest. Market price, viewed as a point somewhere in between, offers
an estimate of what the seller would have received. To attribute precision to this
estimate grants it qualities it does not really possess. Market price offers a perfectly
reasonable estimate of the amount the seller could have obtained with reasonable efforts,
not a precise measure of the amount that resale would have provided. See DOBBS, supra
note 9, § 3.9 n.5 (suggesting that indifference to the actual amount seller could have
obtained demonstrates that market measures differ from the avoidable consequences
doctrine). Thus, each explanation must resort to an estimate of the proper amount to
subtract. The correspondence between the measurement technique and the item to be
measured does not favor either explanation.
74. Ockham's razor urges us to prefer simpler, more direct explanations of
observable phenomena------a principle I noted while addressing the controversy between
the expectation interest and the reliance interest as guiding principles in contract
damages. See Kelly, supra note 6, at 1762 n.31. One should not resort to Ockham's
razor too quickly, lest one also act too simplistically. Id. Having heeded that
admonition in discussing the work of Fuller and Perdue, I hope others will grant me the
same latitude here.
75. That is, two reasons in addition to the discussion supra note 73.
76. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 6, at 66-67.
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expectation merely serves as a proxy for the reliance interest. 77 But
their approach, their realization that unstated principles may guide results
even if not identified as the rationale, remains important. The expectation measure is, at best, an imprecise proxy for the reliance interest. Yet
for more than fifty years that imprecise match has not caused scholars
to reject their work. 78 Nor did their need to assume a perfect market
in order to demonstrate the similarities rob their work of its power. The
two explanations of avoidable consequences offered here correspond at
least as closely as expectation and reliance.
Second, this Article contends only that the avoidable consequences
doctrine and the expectation interest are consistent. The law can abolish
the avoidable consequences doctrine without changing the results of
cases. As long as each theory adequately explains the results, the
relative elegance of each makes no difference. I do not argue that the
avoidable consequences doctrine does not exist; that thesis might require
an explanation of how the expectation interest explains results better than
the avoidable consequences doctrine. I argue only that the avoidable
consequences doctrine need not exist. 79 That thesis is not challenged
by arguments that the avoidable consequences doctrine provides a better
explanation of the result. As long as the expectation interest gets there,
we need not think of the avoidable consequences doctrine as an
exception to the expectation interest. That reconciliation will suffice.

3.

The Effect of Transaction Costs

If all applications of the avoidable consequences doctrine exhibit the
same susceptibility to the explanation presented here, then the expectation interest can produce the same results as the avoidable consequences

77. Kelly, supra note 6.
78. In fact, the work has been heralded as "our most significant article on contract
law." Robert Birmingham, Notes on the Reliance Interest, 60 WASH. L. REV. 217,217
(1985). Other accolades for the work are gathered in Kelly, supra note 6, at 1757 &
n.10.

79. Perhaps I should press a more forceful argument. The ability of the new
explanation to support assertions that scholars and courts have announced for decades
may give it some advantage. Similarly, the practical guidance it provides, as discussed
in Part III, infra, might support claims that we should abandon the avoidable
consequences doctrine. I will be satisfied, however, if the theory proposed here
improves our understanding of the offset for amounts the plaintiff could have avoided
losing.
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doctrine. Instead of denying recovery for losses the plaintiff actually
suffered, we can deny recovery for losses the plaintiff did not suffer by
taking into account the offsetting benefit. This Article shortly will
consider other applications of the avoidable consequences doctrine and
will show how similar analysis seems plausible in other settings. Before
embarking on that endeavor, however, I want to address some complicating factors that probe the basic assumption: that the amount the plaintiff
could have obtained by reasonable efforts represents the minimum
estimate of the value of the benefit she received from the breach. 80
Arguably, transaction costs complicate the picture. The cost of
reselling the goods would reduce the amount the seller would realize on
resale. Perhaps the seller does not value the goods as much as she
values the market price, but does value the goods more than the market
price minus the cost of reselling them. If so, the theory presented here
may overestimate the benefit the seller received by keeping the goods.
The seller, however, does not bear the transaction costs in any case
that comes to court. The transaction costs ofresale are recoverable from
the breaching buyer--either under the expectation interest (incidental
damages) or under the avoidable consequences doctrine (affirmatively
applied). 81 Thus, the seller's calculation of benefits of resale should
not include the cost of resale; that cost will be borne by the defendant.
The decision not to resell, therefore, reflects a direct comparison between
the benefits of keeping the goods and the benefits of reselling them. 82
Arguably, the timing of the transaction costs complicates the picture.
Even if recoverable in litigation, the recovery will occur years later,
while the costs of resale must be incurred today. Given that a benefit

80. I devote considerable attention to this topic because the appeal of the
explanation turns heavily on the similarity between the benefit and the offset. If the
amount the plaintiff could have received offers a fairly close approximation of the
benefit the plaintiff actually received, then it seems reasonable to suggest that the latter
may explain the calculation. If, however, the benefit to the nonbreaching party differs
substantially from the amount she could have obtained by reasonable efforts to avoid the
loss in a significant number of cases, then the assertion that the latter serves as a proxy
for the former loses much of its appeal.
8 I. U.C.C. § 2-710 (I 995) (defining incidental damages allowable under§§ 2-706
and 2-708 to include costs of resale and most other transaction costs one can imagine).
82. In a case where courts do not hear the matter because the cost of litigation
leads the seller not to bring suit in the first place, the decision not to resell would not
support the inference suggested here. But the law will not draw that inference (or
impose its equivalent via the avoidable consequences doctrine) in any case that does not
come to court. In cases that come to court--that is, in cases where the avoidable
consequences doctrine will be applied--the transaction costs become part of the recovery
and, thus, net out. (In cases that do not produce litigation, the nonbreaching party
almost certainly will minimize the loss, since without litigation the entire loss will fall
on her.)
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today is more valuable to most people than the same benefit next year,
the eventual recovery of transaction costs may not fully offset the
expenditure, If so, the seller may value the goods less than the market
price, but refuse to resell them because she values the goods more than
the market price minus the time value of the cost to resell the goods,
Again, however, the time value should be recoverable in litigation.
Most states permit recovery of prejudgment interest on ascertainable
claims. 83 Once the resale costs have been incurred, they seem fully
liquidated-at least to a sufficient extent to permit the award of
prejudgment interest. 84 Arguably, interest should be recoverable on
incidental damages without regard to ascertainability. 85 Thus, the time
value of money should not pose a serious obstacle to the presumption
suggested here. In addition, the time value of money may not amount
to a very large sum. Barring exceptionally long delays in recovery, the
interest would be less than the resale expenses themselves, which seem
likely to be a relatively small portion of the value of the goods. Thus,
the objection may dwindle into insignificance. The market price may be
a fair approximation of the value of the goods to the seller, even if it
slightly overestimates that value, thus reducing the award a little too
much. 86
One final complication arises from the uncertainty of litigation.

83. DOBBS, supra note 10, § 3.5, at 165-66; DOBBS, supra note 9, § 3.6(1), at 247.
84. In contract actions, where damages commonly are ascertainable, some courts
permit recovery of prejudgment interest as a matter of course. LAYCOCK, supra note 2,
at 195. Even if courts insist that incidental damages must be ascertainable in order to
qualify for prejudgment interest, see, e.g., Afram Export Corp. v. Metallurgiki Halyps,
S.A., 772 F.2d 1358, 1370-71 (7th Cir. 1985) (dicta concerning Wisconsin law), many
costs of resale will consist of out-of-pocket expenditures capable of clear proof.
85. The Restatement suggests that interest on expenditures made arranging
substitute performance is not subject to the normal rules on ascertainability. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 354 cmt. a (1979) (implying that interest on incidental
expenditures is itself an element of incidental damages, independent of rule limiting
prejudgment interest). The trend to liberalized views of ascertainability may improve
plaintiffs' ability to receive interest on the transaction costs necessary to minimize the
loss. See DOBBS, supra note 9, § 3.6(2).
86. The errors in the calculation may offset. The decision not to resell implies that
the seller values the goods at least as much as, and perhaps more than, the market price.
Thus, market price arguably represents slightly too small an offset. If denying interest
slightly decreases the plaintiff's recovery, perhaps that will move the award closer to the
mark, rather than further from it. While two wrongs do not make a right, perhaps two
almost rights will not be so far wrong that a reasonable lawmaker would abandon
avoidable loss as an estimate of the benefits of breach.
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Incidental damages and interest will eliminate the preceding objections
only if the seller recovers them. Perhaps the seller does not value the
goods as much as she values the market price, but values the goods
more than she values the market price minus the transaction costs plus
interest discounted by the chance of recovering them in the suit. 87
Even a case that seems like a sure-fire winner to· lawyers presents at
least some possibility of jury prejudice, passion, or misunderstanding. 88
Again, this possibility represents only a portion of the resale costs,
minimizing the magnitude of the error. 89 The market price thus
remains at least a reasonable proxy for the benefit to the plaintiff--especially in cases where the chance of prevailing seems relatively
high (which, we might hope, describes the vast majority of contract
cases brought before the courts). 90 Sellers who expect to win will
prefer to sell under these circumstances, since that will maximize their
benefit more often than not. 91 Only sellers who actually expect to lose

87. Lest the words prove confusing, let me lay the premise out with the
parentheses in the right place: Market Price > Value of Goods > Market Price - ((Cost
To Resell + Interest on Cost To Resell) X Probability of Losing Suit).
88. One rule of thumb from practicing attorneys holds that even a sure winner has
a 15% chance of losing in front of a jury.
89. In a case that seems like a toss-up, the market price would be discounted by
half of the transaction costs; in a very strong case, by only 15% of the transaction costs.
90. Gross and Syverud reported that plaintiffs recovered more than the highest
settlement offer in about 75% of the commercial transaction cases that proceeded to
judgment. See Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No.· A Study of
Settlement Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH, L. REv. 319,339
(1991) (sampling California Superior Court jury trial cases). Plaintiffs succeeded
somewhat more often (about 80%) for a broader range of contract actions, including
employment and real estate disputes. Id For our purposes, these results are merely
suggestive. Recovering more than the highest settlement offer does not necessarily mean
recovering all damages, including incidental costs and interest thereon. In addition,
cases that proceed to trial probably do not represent all cases filed. They may, however,
represent a fair approximation of cases in which the court or the jury must apply the
avoidable consequences doctrine. A seller considering whether to minimize the loss by
resale probably would look to these figures to decide how to act. A seller who looks
instead to settlement almost certainly will minimize the loss. Since settlement generally
requires a compromise, the plaintiff probably will recover less than her actual losses and,
thus, she has ample incentive to minimize the loss.
91. If seller wins the suit, she keeps the market price undiminished by the
transaction costs and interest, since she recovers them. Thus, she will be better off if
she has sold the goods for market price. If seller loses, she retains the market price
diminished by the transaction costs (which she did not recover), a worse situation than
retaining the goods. But since she expects to win more often than not, she should sell
the goods.
One can imagine exceptions. If Market price - Value of goods < Value of goods Transaction costs, then even though the seller expects to win most of the time (realizing
full market price), the magnitude of the downside might outweigh the likelihood of its
occurring. That is: (Value of goods - (Market price - Transaction costs)) X Chance of
losing> (Market price- Value of goods) X (1 - Chance of losing), even though chance
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will keep the goods (despite a preference for the market price), since that
will maximize their expected benefits. 92
Would a reasonable lawmaker seeking an appropriate measure of the
benefits of breach reject avoidable losses as a suitable proxy on this
basis? The estimate seems to work well in that vast majority of cases.
It seems odd to reject it because it may make small errors that disadvantage plaintiffs who fear they may lose their lawsuits. Those plaintiffs
receive less than full compensation due to their pessimistic lack of
confidence in the legal system.
That this approach might
undercompensate slightly those whose suits seemed weakest (to them)
ex ante by attributing to them too high a benefit might serve the
desirable end of discouraging the weakest of suit&--if the difference is
large enough to matter at all. If undercompensation occurs primarily in
these circumstances, the lawmaker might tolerate that
undercompensation. One can understand why a rule designed to subtract
actual benefit might risk undercompensation in these cases.

D.

The Benefits in Other Contract Contexts

The preceding discussion focuses heavily on the benefits to sellers of
goods. Other contexts, however, raise different issues that require
specific discussion. In order to establish a comprehensive theory of the
avoidable consequences doctrine, this section attempts to demonstrate
that benefits of breach apply in other typical settings where the doctrine
arises. Ideally, this section would demonstrate that every application of
of losing is less than 50%. This situation arises, however, only where the value of the
goods and the market price are relatively close--where a large percentage of the
difference between them is smaller than a small percentage of the transaction costs.
Thus, the objection arises in situations where the market price presents the closest proxy
for the value of the goods. Under these circumstances, while the inference that the
plaintiff valued the goods more than she valued the market price may fail, it fails
because she valued them at very nearly the same amount, making any error in attributing
the benefit estimated by the market price quite small.
92. Since she expects to lose more often than not, she should keep the goods
unless the market price exceeds the value of the goods by significantly more than the
value of the goods exceeds the market price minus transaction costs. The decision to
keep the goods, therefore, suggests that the market price and value of the goods do not
differ by enough to justify sale--again, suggesting that the market price remains a
relatively good proxy for the value of the goods, even though the normal inference from
plaintiffs decision to keep the goods does not exactly describe the relative values. Thus,
the cases where this approach seems likely to overestimate the plaintiffs benefit will be
those cases where the magnitude of the error in the estimate seems likely to be smallest.
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the avoidable consequences doctrine is susceptible to the same type of
explanation, that every breach creates a benefit roughly equal to the
amount the plaintiff could have realized from reasonable efforts to
minimize the loss. This section cannot establish that no exceptions exist.
By discussing examples typical of the contexts in which the avoidable
consequences doctrine becomes important, however, this section hopes
to demonstrate the plausibility of the claim.

1.

Discharged Employees

Discharged employees present the same issues discussed regarding
sellers of goods. The preceding sections often refer to sellers of services
(employees, for example) as well as sellers of goods. Most of the
analysis above applies with equal force to employees without any need
for additional comment. Discharged employees, however, illustrate some
useful elaborations upon the theory developed above. These elaborations
respond to two questions the reader already may have considered. First,
why should reasonable but unsuccessful efforts to minimize the loss
affect the estimate of the value of the benefit to the plaintiff? Second,
why is the value of the benefit to the plaintiff limited to the amount of
loss that could have been avoided by reasonable efforts, instead of
including the amount of the loss that could have been avoided by any
efforts, however extraordinary? The employment context offers an
opportunity to explore these issues.

a.

To what extent does the plaintiff benefit despite reasonable but
unsuccessful efforts to minimize the loss?

The benefit of leisure to a discharged employee, while a benefit not
sought by the employee, presents a fairly clear example of the need for
an offset. The breaching employer deprives the employee of wages.
But the employee could not have received those wages without working.
The benefit of not working requires some offset. 93 Perhaps one

93. Throughout this Article I refer to the benefit of leisure. This benefit can break
down into two subparts: the benefit of not working and the benefit of having time for
enjoyable pursuits. Avoiding the disutility of work is not necessarily the same as
receiving the utility of spare time. But both are inextricably bound up in a single
decision regarding employment. In taking a job, the employee accepts both the loss of
leisure and the disutility of labor. In discharging the employee, the employer bestows
both the freedom from labor and the freedom to do other things. While it may be useful
to recognize these theoretically distinct components of the benefit, no useful purpose
would be served by burdening the text with a lengthy and repetitive phrase that explicitly
mentioned both each time the benefit required mention. In the one place where
disaggregation is useful, I will more carefully distinguish these two aspects; otherwise,
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mystery of damage awards calculated under the expectation interest is
their consistent failure to mention the need to offset the leisure received
by the employee. A person who receives wages without working for
them clearly has been made better off than if the person had needed to
work for the same wages--the position the employee would have
occupied but for the breach.
In discussing sales of goods, the issue of reasonable but unsuccessful
mitigation efforts does not arise. The seller either kept the goods or
resold them. Either way, she obtained a benefit. For discharged
employees, this equates with assuming that they are either re-employed
or idle (that is, enjoying their leisure). Many employees fit neither
category. They engage in unsuccessful efforts to find a new job, at least
during part of the time they would have been employed under the
contract. That situation hardly qualifies as leisure. At the same time,
it does not qualify as alternative employment. In short, the employee
has neither pay nor time to devote to enjoyable pursuits. The job search
deprives the employee of the benefit of leisure without immediately
providing any substitute income.
In this regard, employees differ from sellers of goods. The time and
effort spent to seek out a new buyer for ~oods does not reduce the
benefit of the good retained by the seller. 4 Thus, a reasonable but
unsuccessful search for a new buyer leaves the seller with some
incidental damages (to cover the cost of efforts to resell), but does not
diminish the value of the good retained. 95 Employees, however, sell

I will use "leisure" to include them both.
94. Perishable goods may deteriorate while the seller seeks a new buyer, but their
value diminishes over time independently of the seller's efforts to resell. The goods will
perish even if the seller makes no effort to resell, or the seller might recover full value
for the goods following extensive efforts to resell. The efforts do not consume the value
of the goods the way an employee's efforts to find work consume the leisure time the
employer gave her.
95. If a seller attached zero value to goods and made diligent efforts to resell them
without success, arguably no subtraction would be appropriate under the avoidable
consequences doctrine. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 350(2) (1977).
At first glance, the U.C.C. appears to attribute the market value of the goods to the seller
even if the seller cannot resell the goods after Herculean efforts. At least § 2-708
includes no exception to the rule attributing market value to the seller. Section 2-709,
however, allows the seller to recover the full price of the goods if reasonable efforts fail
to produce a buyer willing to pay a reasonable price. U.C.C. § 2-709(l)(b) (1995). That
result recognizes the paradox of concluding that goods have a market value greater than
zero despite the fact that the seller's efforts could not produce a buyer willing to pay
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their time and effort. When they expend that time and effort in a job
search, they consume the very thing they retain in a way the seller of
goods does not. 96 Thus, the benefit retained by the employee decreases
as she attempts to find new employment. 97
Assuming for a moment that the employee conducts a reasonable job
search, the avoidable consequences doctrine produces fairly intuitive
results. The avoidable consequences doctrine permits recovery of full
wages during any period the employee makes a reasonable effort to find
substitute work. The avoidable consequences doctrine does not require
successful efforts to find new work, only reasonable efforts. 98 Thus,
no subtraction from the normal recovery (of full wages) would apply to
the period of the reasonable job search. In effect, the law assumes that
the amount the employee could have earned with a reasonable job search
equals $0. After all, she made reasonable efforts to find a new job, but
earned nothing despite those reasonable efforts. Apparently, reasonable
efforts would produce no income, leaving nothing to subtract from
wages. 99
The expectation interest can produce the same result. At the risk of
oversimplifying the problem, a job search is not leisure. Few people
undertake a job search as a way to spend a vacation or relax on the
weekend. A job search is work, just as much as the labor performed for
an employer. In effect, the employee who undertakes a job search

more than zero. Even under § 2-708, the absence of a market for the goods suggests
they have a market price of zero, allowing the seller full recovery without any offset for
the value of retaining the goods.
96. An employee who can relax while an agent finds substitute employment for
her resembles the seller of goods more closely. The discussion here deals with the more
common situation of employees who must find jobs for themselves.
97. Courts could prevent this result by including the value of the employee's time
spent in the job search as an item of the employee's incidental damages. Generally,
however, incidental damages include only the employee's out-of-pocket costs incurred
in the job search. See DOBBS, supra note 9, § 3.9 ("If the plaintiff actually expends
funds in a reasonable effort to minimize damages, the expenditures are recoverable .
. . .") (emphasis added). This approach reasonably prevents double compensation, which
would occur if the employee recovered both the wages lost and the value of the time
spent looking for a job, unless the award included an offset for the benefit of leisure.
Rather than conceptualize the recovery as wages lost minus the benefit of not working
plus the value of the time spent looking for a new job (plus any other incidental and
consequential damages), the avoidable consequences doctrine as now applied cancels out
(by ignoring) the benefit of not working and the value of the time spent looking for a
job.
98. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 350(2) (1979).
99. This resembles concluding that some goods have zero market value. See supra
note 95. In this case, part of the goods (the services for the weeks spent looking for
work) have zero market value to offset against the loss, even though later weeks might
have a greater market value (because the employee either did find work or would have
found work if the job search had been reasonable).
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receives no leisure, and thus receives no benefit to offset against the
award. She receives full wages because she works for them, just as if
she continued to report to her former workplace and put in a full
day.roo
With very little effort, we can characterize discharge in breach of
contract as an implicit modification of the contract between the
employee and the employer. 101 When an employer breaches a contract
by firing an employee, the employer implicitly requests the employee to
spend her time conducting a reasonable search for a new job instead of
working at the employer's business. 102 In exchange, the employer
agrees to pay the employee the promised salary until such time as the
contract expires or the employee obtains an equal or better job. 103
Normally, a modification would require the agreement of both parties.
Inferring assent by the employee may pose more difficulty. Her assent
to the original employment agreement may suffice, depending upon the

I 00. Allow me to defer, briefly, the issue of whether the disutility of working for
the former employer equalled the disutility of the job search. If either involved more
cost than the other, we might consider an adjustment to the award: an increase if the
job search was more laborious than the job duties; a decrease if the job search was less
laborious. This Article addresses that issue shortly. See infra text following note I 07.
10 I. I do not mean to imply that either the employer or the employee actually
agrees to the terms outlined in this paragraph. Nor do I contend that anyone actually
thinks of discharge as a modification of the employment contract. The law, however,
and particularly the avoidable consequences doctrine, arguably creates mutual obligations
between the breaching employer and the discharged employee that resemble a contract.
Identifying the similarities may illuminate some aspects of the avoidable consequences
doctrine and its harmony with the expectation interest.
102. Often employers make no explicit request. But every employer who pleads the
avoidable consequences doctrine as a defense to the employee's claim for lost income
affirms its desire that the employee conduct a reasonable job search following discharge.
Such post hoc ratification by the employer provides some indication that the employer
expected or desired such efforts by the employee from the start. Thus, the law fairly can
infer the employer's assent to this term.
I 03. The promise to pay wages following discharge is only partially fictional. The
entire discussion of remedies for breach assumes a valid contract that obligates the
employer to pay the employee for a specific period of time. That promise is quite real;
the law need not imply any obligation to pay wages, but can impose it based on an
actual, explicit promise by the employer. Employers who fire employees may feel they
have the right to do so or, at least, may hope that they will not have to pay the employee
even if the discharge is wrongful. But the employer's mistake about the effect of the
promise or the likelihood of a successful suit by the employee should not obscure the
promissory nature of the obligation to pay wages. While the bargain in the text presents
an obligation the employer hopes never to perform, it arises from a real promise by the
employer.
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terms of that contract. The employer might have the prerogative to
assign the employee to look for new work as her daily job assignment.104 If so, an implied agreement by the employee to use good
faith efforts 105 to look for new work poses no enigma; it inheres in her
agreement to perform the work the employer assigns. Absent express
provisions to the contrary, courts might be willing to find an implied
term in employment agreements that would allow an employer, who no
longer desired the services of an employee, to assign her to look for a

l 04. Contracts providing that the employee "work as directed" by the employer
seem broad enough to include that prerogative.
l 05. I use the phrase "good faith efforts" here because, within a contract, the
employee has an inherent obligation to act in good faith to do the tasks assigned by the
employer. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 205 (1979). Arguably, good
faith demands less of the employee than the "reasonable efforts" required by the
avoidable consequences doctrine. A person, in good faith, might make efforts that, when
viewed objectively, seem unreasonable. See, e.g., Mattei v. Hopper, 51 Cal. 2d 119,
123-24, 330 P.2d 625, 626-27 ( 1958) (distinguishing reasonable efforts from good faith
efforts). Reasonable efforts arguably involve a greater burden, insisting upon efforts that
a reasonable person would take without allowance for persons subjectively (but not
vindictively) unreasonable. Within an ongoing contractual relationship-especially an
employment relationship--good faith efforts seem sufficient. The employer's ability to
specify the employee's tasks and to supervise performance permit the employer to ensure
that the employee makes reasonable efforts, as long as the employee follows the
employer's direction in good faith. The avoidable consequences doctrine demands more
of employees, perhaps because the employer has no opportunity to specify how the
employee should look for work or to supervise her compliance with those specifications.
The avoidable consequences doctrine may require both reasonable efforts and good
faith efforts. See Smith-Wolf Constr., Inc. v. Hood, 756 P.2d 1027, 1030 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1988) (announcing but not applying the rule that U.C.C. § 2-715 "will not prevent
or reduce recovery if the buyer's actions are reasonable and undertaken in good faith"
(emphasis added), a requirement that may flow from the universal requirement of good
faith in U.C.C. § 1-203). An employee could go through the motions of a reasonable
job search, but could do so in bad faith. An employee who hoped not to find a job
might communicate that preference to prospective employers subtly but effectively.
Under these circumstances, the absence of a bona fide job search might induce a court
to subtract wages the employee could have earned if she had conducted the search in
good faith. Cf Brady v. Thurston Motor Lines, 753 F.2d 1269, 1277 (4th Cir. 1985)
( equating willful misconduct that led to plaintiffs' discharge from substitute work with
failure to use "reasonable and good faith efforts to maintain that job once accepted").
Dicta in other cases suggest an employee must use good faith in the job search. See
Edgecomb v. Traverse City Sch. Dist., 67 N.W.2d 87, 90 (Mich. 1954); Tosti v. Ayik,
508 N.E.2d 1368, 1370 (Mass. 1987), cert. denied sub nom., United Auto Workers v.
Tosti, 484 U.S. 964 (1987); Furno v. Pignona, 522 A.2d 746, 752 n.6 (Vt. 1986)
(quoting jury instruction); cf Department of Civil Rights v. Horizon Tube Fabricating,
385 N.W.2d 685,688 (1986) (apparently equating good faith with reasonableness). The
difficulty in proving the employee's lack of good faith and the expense necessary just
to investigate her good faith probably will keep this issue from arising in very many
cases. Thus, the avoidable consequences doctrine understandably focuses on the
reasonableness of the employee's efforts.
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new job. 106 Thus, the employee looking for work does not enjoy
leisure, but simply continues to perform her duties to the employer,
though those duties have changed somewhat in their nature.
Recharacterizing the contract in this way may illuminate a possible
inconsistency between the avoidable consequences doctrine as now
applied and the explanation proposed here based on the expectation
interest. Not every reasonable job search will consume the same amount
of time that the employee's original job would have consumed. 107
While employment may require a forty-hour week (plus commuting
time), a reasonable job search may consume only thirty hours per week
(or less), leaving the employee with an apparent gain often leisure hours
per week. Arguably, the expectation interest would urge an offset for
the benefit to the employee of these ten additional leisure hours. 108

I 06. The law might want to encourage employers to pay employees while they seek
new work (and even to supervise the adequacy of the job search efforts) rather than to
fire them outright, at least when discharge would breach a contract. Employers might
continue to discharge employees, perhaps fearing that employees who continue to receive
weekly paychecks would not make good faith efforts to find new work. (That possibility
has not prevented some law firms from continuing to pay attorneys while they seek new
employment, thus helping them with the transition to a new job.) The law seems likely
to tolerate employers who prefer to assign a job search as the employee's daily
workload. That tolerance could take the form of inferring an employee's agreement to
perform job search duties as an implicit element (or modification upon discharge) of the
contractual employment relationship that existed.
l 07. The text could as easily discuss effort instead of time-----the qualitative disutility
of work (vs. the job search) rather than the quantity of time spent in each pursuit. Some
jobs may demand activities far more draining than those required to conduct a reasonable
job search. If so, the employee arguably benefits by expending less energy (on the job
search) than she would have needed to expend (on the job) if the contract had been
performed. For simplicity, the text will continue to address only the difference in time.
Differences in energy present the same issues. They do not justify repeating the points
with different terminology.
l 08. To the extent that the theory requires this result, it fails to explain existing law.
The avoidable consequences doctrine permits no reduction in the award as long as the
employee conducts a reasonable search for a new job. A reasonable job search might
or might not require the employee to spend as much time looking for work as she would
have spent working if the breach had not occurred. See Orzel v. City of Wauwatosa Fire
Dep't, 697 F.2d 743, 756-57 (7th Cir. 1983) (during two years, plaintiff "secured one
part-time job and applied for another, full-time position ... [and] placed his name on
file with the Wisconsin Job Service in an effort to seek whatever employment was
available"), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 992 ( I 983); Sprogis v. United Airlines, 517 F.2d 387,
392 (7th Cir. 1975) (applying for one job and obtaining another temporary job
constituted reasonable diligence); cf Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d
149, 158-60 (7th Cir. 1981) (upholding reduction of award where plaintiff testified he
spent 24 hours per week seeking work, in part based on concerns for the plaintiff's
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If, however, the discharge amounts to an implicit request that the
employee conduct a reasonable job search, the additional leisure time
does not require offset. In effect, the leisure is a gift from the employer
to the employee, just as if the employer had told the employee to take
the rest of the day off or to read a novel at the workplace that afternoon.
An employer who gives such release time to employees cannot offset the
pay without the employee's consent. 109 The employee, by doing all
that the employer asks, becomes entitled to the pay the employer
promised. Similarly, an employee who conducts a reasonable job search
does all that the breaching employer implicitly asks (via the legally
imposed avoidable consequences doctrine), thus becoming entitled to full
compensation as the employer promised (via the legally imposed damage
remedy for breach of contract). 110

credibility), overroled by Coston v. Plitt Theatres, Inc., 860 F.2d 834 (7th Cir. l 988)
(overruling Syvock's standard for willful age discrimination under 29 U.S.C. § 626(b)
but not modifying Syvock's avoidable consequences rule).
Some may applaud the expectation interest theory for having unearthed a flaw in the
avoidable consequences doctrine. I am not convinced that correcting this flaw (that is,
reducing recoveries when employees spend less than full time looking for work) would
produce better results. Thus, the text considers ways in which the expectation interest
might explain the results reached under the avoidable consequences doctrine.
I 09. That conclusion may depend on the contract. In the construction trades, for
example, employers often pay only for time worked by employees. When conditions
make work impractical, employers may send employees home or not call them in (a near
equivalent of the text's "take the rest of the day off') without any obligation to pay for
the time the employees could have worked. An employer with that amount of discretion
under the contract, however, rarely will face a claim for breach of contract such as the
one envisioned in text. How could-or, equally telling, why would-an employer
discharge an employee (in breach of a contract) if the employer had the power to pay
the employee nothing (by not calling the employee to work on a job) without
discharging her? Answers exist, particularly if the employer's ability to avoid paying
for the employee's time depends on external conditions (such as weather conditions at
the worksite) or is limited by the obligation to act in good faith. Perhaps fringe benefits
or worker's compensation insurance premiums would motivate discharge in breach of
contract instead of simply not calling the employee to work. The variety of factual
settings that might give rise to discharge here evince the futility of attempting to address
every possible contract setting in which the avoidable consequences doctrine might arise.
For now, the text will continue to address the more common situation where an
employer must pay the employee a certain amount each week, even if the employer
cannot find enough work to keep the employee busy for the entire week.
110. We could infer the same implicit contract between the buyer and seller of
goods, but it serves no useful purpose in that setting. The benefit retained by the seller
exists independent of efforts to resell it. The law does not care at all whether the seller
keeps the goods or resells them, as long as the value of the goods to the seller offsets
the recovery. In fact, a buyer might prefer for the seller to keep the goods; incidental
damages will be lower if the seller makes use of the goods instead of conducting
expensive efforts to resell them. Presumably, the seller has no incentive to devote the
goods to an inefficient use (that is, a use less valuable than the use other buyers could
make of the goods).
The same arguments apply to discharged employees if we recognize the benefit of

212

[VOL. 33: 175, 1996]

Contract Remedies
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

Efforts to measure the value of leisure to the employee produce the
same result without recourse to fictional post-discharge duties. The
employee's decision to spend her time looking for a new job reveals a
subjective assessment that she prefers wages to leisure-that she values
the money she expects or hopes to make from a new job more than she
values the leisure time. A good faith job search implies the employee
will accept a job reasonably similar to her prior job-presumably
including similar time and effort requirements. Thus, the employee's
search, if in good faith, indicates a willingness to part with all of the
spare time the employer so generously bestowed upon her, not just the
spare time she actually spends looking for work. 111 The decision to
look for work, therefore, undercuts the inference about the value of the
benefit (the leisure) the employee received. While it may have some
value, that value may not equal the amount she could have earned by
reasonable efforts. As long as the employee conducts a reasonable job
search in good faith, we cannot infer how much value she attached to
the leisure she received. 112
These same arguments could apply to a bad faith job search, but with

leisure. But the more complicated setting-where the efforts to mitigate consume the
assets to be sold--makes that recognition more difficult and requires more intricate
analysis to work out the ramifications. See supra note 97. The discussion of a modified
contract is not meant to supplant the notion of actual benefits conferred on the employee,
but to help illustrate the ways to evaluate the benefit.
111. The time required to look for work may differ from the time required to
perform work for reasons outside the employee's control, such as the scheduling
constraints of interviewing personnel managers or the number of ads for suitable
positions published in a given region. The employee's decision not to spend 40 hours
per week actively pursuing work may reflect the futility of additional hours rather than
some preference for leisure.
112. In this respect, the expectation interest does not reject subtracting the value of
the leisure in theory, but despairs of measuring it. If we could measure and evaluate the
utility of leisure directly, the expectation interest might justify an offset. The
impossibility of such measurement, see SPENCER, supra note 48, at 341, makes offset
impracticable without some objective indication of the value of leisure to the plaintiff.
The lack of an adequate measure explains an even more extreme case: the employee
who does not look for work because the search would be futile. This employee certainly
receives leisure as a result of the breach. But courts cannot estimate the value of that
leisure. The amount she could have earned if she had conducted a reasonable job search
equals zero since, by hypothesis, the job search would have been futile. Thus, while we
know she values her leisure at least at zero, we have no evidence concerning whether
(or by how much) she values leisure more than zero. In this respect, expectation
analysis again duplicates the result dictated by the avoidable consequences doctrine. See
DOBBS, supra note 9, § 3.9, at 272.
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somewhat different results. The employee who conducts a job search
with no desire to find new work fails to satisfy either prong of the
analysis. She breaches the implicit contract suggested above by failing
to perform her duty (to seek work) in good faith. 113 Damages for that
breach presumably would be measured by the amount the employee
could have earned if she had looked for work in good faith. Alternatively, one could simply ask whether the employee's bad faith search
supports the inference that she valued work more than the leisure. Her
failure to seek work in good faith implies that she prefers not to find
work. The unwillingness to find new work suggests the employee
actually values leisure----even that portion of leisure remaining after
going through the motions of a job search--more than she values the
wages she could obtain by working. The motions of looking for work
show a preference to obtain both leisure and wages. 114 But that
preference looks very much like the employer's hope to discharge the
employee and not pay wages, despite the employment contract. Neither
hope deserves much weight in legal decisions determining the effect of
the parties' conduct. Once a court determines that the employee failed
to seek work in good faith, the expectation interest demands an offset of
the wages the employee could have earned (as an estimate of the value
of the leisure}--the same result dictated by the avoidable consequences
doctrine. 115

113. Because the employee did not act in good faith, her breach of duty occurs
regardless of whether her efforts may be reasonable. See supra note I 05. Every
contract includes the obligation to perform in good faith. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 205 (1979). Failure to act in good faith is a breach of that obligation.
The nonbreaching party (a paradoxical way to refer to the breaching employer) can
recover damages caused by the employee's breach of good faith. This approach equates
the avoidable consequences doctrine with a counterclaim by the employer, much as any
claim for breach of the "duty to mitigate damages" resembles an implicit counterclaim,
though not generally so treated for purposes of the rules of civil procedure. See infra
text following note 261.
114. An allusion to "having one's cake and eating it, too," seems in order here. At
least one plaintiff showed unusual candor by testifying that he treated the first few
months following discharge as a vacation, "enjoying [his] lay-off." See Syvock v.
Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d 149, 159 (7th Cir. 1981), overruled on other
grounds by Coston v. Plitt Theaters, Inc., 860 F.2d 834 (7th Cir. 1988). The court
ultimately disbelieved his testimony concerning the diligence of his job search efforts,
concluding that "[w]hat the plaintiff did, in essence, was take a sabbatical and collect
unemployment compensation." 665 F.2d at 160 n.14.
115. I may be too hasty in assuming the avoidable consequences doctrine produces
this result. Certainly it will if courts interpret it to require both reasonable and good
faith efforts, as suggested earlier. See supra note 105. The conclusion will also apply
if courts treat lack of good faith as inherently unreasonable. Good faith may impose a
less demanding standard; honest but unreasonable conduct may meet a good faith test.
Some courts may treat unreasonableness as a lesser included offense inherent in the
finding of lack of good faith. Only if courts recognize the possibility of reasonable
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The two approaches arguably could differ if we conclude that the
employee conducted an unreasonable job search, but did so in good
faith. In these circumstances, the avoidable consequences doctrine
allows an offset for wages the employee could have earned if she had
made an objectively reasonable search. 116 The expectation interest,
however, might not compel an offset. The employee did not breach the
implied obligation to look for work, since she did so in good faith. Nor
did she evince a preference for leisure over work, since her good faith
search evinced a willingness to relinquish all of the leisure. Thus, a
focus on the benefit might conclude that the employee subjectively
valued the leisure received less than she valued the wages she could
have earned if she had made a reasonable job search. As such, she
received a benefit that we cannot measure.
The problem resembles one confronted in the preceding section, that
subjective mistakes by the plaintiff may not fit the presumptions implicit
in the evaluation ofbenefits. 117 Like the seller who underestimates the
market value of goods, the employee who conducts an unreasonable
search may find the court subtracting more than her subjective value of

efforts conducted in bad faith, and hold that the avoidable consequences doctrine does
not permit reducing the award by the amount of the loss the plaintiff could have avoided
if she had conducted the reasonable efforts in good faith, will the two approaches
diverge here. In any situation in which the former seems plausible, the latter seems too
remote to deserve extended attention.
116. Dobbs suggests that courts may apply a somewhat subjective standard in
assessing the reasonableness of the victim's efforts to minimize the loss. See DOBBS,
supra note IO,§ 3.7, at 188. He may mean only that the assessment of reasonableness
takes into account the plaintiff's individual circumstances, much as tort law considers
(for example) the reasonably prudent five-year-old. If, however, courts take into account
the plaintiff's subjective state of mind, then the avoidable consequences doctrine and the
expectation interest may not differ here. The avoidable consequences doctrine might
allow recovery when the job search seemed reasonable from the plaintiff's point of view.
That seems like a minimum description of a good faith job search. The plaintiff can
hardly claim good faith when performing a job search that she did not think was
reasonable at the time. Thus, any efforts that satisfy this subjective version of
reasonableness also satisfy a good faith requirement. This suggests that the reasonableness requirement serves largely as a proxy for a good faith requirement, perhaps because
lack of good faith is so difficult to prove. Because the subjective nature of the avoidable
consequences doctrine is not clear, the text addresses the alternative possibility: that the
avoidable consequences doctrine requires objectively reasonable efforts. Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 9 I 8 cmt. c ( I 977) ("The factors determining whether an
injured person has used care to avert the consequences of a tort are in general the same
as those that determine whether a person has been guilty of negligent conduct .... ").
117. See supra Part I.C.2.
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the benefit. Again we can ask how a reasonable lawmaker seeking to
offset the value of the benefit would choose to quantify that benefit.
A reasonable lawmaker plausibly could subtract the amount ofloss the
plaintiff could have avoided by good faith efforts to minimize the loss.
Dobbs even suggests that the avoidable consequences doctrine, as
applied, varies the definition of reasonable efforts to accommodate
individual traits, bordering on a subjective good faith test. 118 Indeed,
we probably would see very little change in the avoidable consequences
doctrine or case results if the law changed today to incorporate a good
faith test in place of the existing reasonableness test.
For several reasons, however, a lawmaker trying to measure the value
of the benefit might prefer the amount of loss avoidable by reasonable
efforts. Several of these reasons have already been discussed in a
different context. The law may infer subjective good faith from
objective evidence--just as courts sometimes infer bad faith from
evidence that the acts of one party were unreasonable. 119 A finder of
fact should have less difficulty determining whether the plaintiff acted
reasonably than it would have determining whether the plaintiff acted in
good faith. 120 Good faith and reasonableness seem likely to correlate
rather highly, producing few cases where an accurate determination of
reasonableness will differ from the more difficult determination of good
faith. The cost of determining subjective good faith may exceed the
benefit of better results in those cases where reasonableness and good
faith do not correlate. 121 But in this context a new reason seems
particularly important.
The decision to subtract the amount that could have been avoided by

118. See supra note 116.
119. Some courts seem to equate good faith with reasonable conduct as a matter of
law. See. e.g., Bushmiller v. Schiller, 368 A.2d 1044 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977); Roger
C. Henderson, The Tort of Bad Faith in First Party Insurance Transactions: Refining
the Standard of Culpability and Reformulating the Remedies by Statute, 26 U. MICH. J.L.
REF. I, 40-41 & n.167 (1992). But see Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. Gatoil
(U.S.A.), Inc., 607 F. Supp. 1422, 1425 (D.D.C. 1985) (granting summary judgment
against defendant on ground that failure to make reasonable efforts breached the
obligation to make good faith efforts), rev'd, 801 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (in cases
governed by U.C.C., good faith requires honesty in fact, not necessarily reasonable
efforts). Even where courts hold to the definition of good faith as "honesty in fact,"
U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1995), it may be impossible to demonstrate bad faith without
recourse to evidence of unreasonableness. Good faith requires a determination of the
party's subjective state of mind. Only the party has first hand knowledge of that state
of mind. To litigate the issue of good faith at all, the unreasonableness of the party's
conduct must be admitted into evidence, if only to challenge the credibility of the party's
claim that she honestly held an unreasonable belief.
120. See supra text accompanying note 47.
121. See supra note 66.
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reasonable efforts has two uses: it provides no subtraction if the plaintiff
makes reasonable efforts to avoid the loss, and it provides a measure for
the subtraction when the plaintiff fails to make reasonable efforts. While
a good faith test seems fairly well suited to the first of these uses, it
seems virtually unmanageable in the second. Determining whether the
plaintiff's efforts were made in good faith seems within the capability
of a jury, but we may expect some errors. On the other hand, determining the amount of loss that could have been avoided by good faith
efforts seems horribly speculative in a case where the plaintiff did not
make good faith efforts. If the plaintiff had sought a new job in good
faith, what efforts would she have made? Can the finder of fact presume
that the plaintiff would have acted reasonably if she had made good faith
efforts? Since the plaintiff could have achieved a zero offset without
acting reasonably, that presumption is not, theoretically, required. Good
faith can describe a range of efforts, from extraordinary to unreasonable.
Can the plaintiff contend that, even if she had acted in good faith, she
would not have acted reasonably? 122 If so, can she claim that she
would not have found a new job or would have found one that would
have paid less than the job that she could have located with reasonable
efforts? How can the fact finder identify efforts that would have
satisfied good faith even though the efforts were unreasonable? What
evidence would be probative on that issue?
A reasonable lawmaker might decide to avoid these issues by
presuming conclusively that the plaintiff valued leisure at least as much
as the amount she could have earned by reasonable efforts to find new
work. Perhaps the law could surmount these obstacles; the rhetorical
questions can be answered, though the answers may not inspire
confidence. A reasonable lawmaker, therefore, could choose a good
faith standard despite these difficulties. But the choice seems a toss-up
at best. The difference between good faith efforts and reasonable efforts
does not seem dispositive evidence that the law pursues a goal other than
evaluating benefits of breach. Rather, the expectation interest could
produce the same rule now followed by the avoidable consequences
doctrine.

122. The image of a plaintiff trying to look as dumb as possible while testifying,
"Gee, I never would have thought to try that while looking for work," probably
exaggerates the picture, at least slightly. The plaintiff, after all, does not want to seem
so dumb that the jury decides the discharge was justified.
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In short, the normal damage rules can explain the inference that the
employee received a benefit she valued more than a new job from the
fact that she made insufficient efforts to find new work. In a few cases
that inference may not match the subjective values of the specific
plaintiff-just as the objective theory of contracts may find agreements
in some cases where the parties (or one of them) subjectively never
intended to make a binding commitment. 123 But on balance, the errors
involved in this presumption seem likely to be small. 124
b.

Why limit the value of the benefit to the amount of loss that could
have been avoided by reasonable efforts?

An attack might emerge from the other direction. Even if persuaded
that the reasonableness standard does not overestimate the value of the
benefit, one might argue that it underestimates the value. Arguably, the
plaintiff values the benefits of the breach more than she values the
amount of loss she could avoid by any means, no matter how burdensome. Otherwise she would have taken the burdensome measures and
avoided the loss. At least as long as the burden of the measures is
compensable in the damage award, the decision not to take those
measures seems to reflect a preference to retain the benefits rather than
relinquish them by finding a substitute transaction.
In the context of employment contracts, this objection presents a most
unpalatable alternative. It suggests that a discharged employee may not
recover wages if she could have avoided the loss by taking employment
in another state; the burden of relocating plays no role in the inference,
only in the calculation of incidental damages. It suggests that the award
to a discharged professional should be reduced by the amount that could
have been earned dancing naked or cleaning bedpans because the
humiliation of other employment does not impede the inference. It
suggests that the employee cannot recover amounts she could have
earned working in a coal mine because the risk of the alternative
employment does not alter the inference. The avoidable consequences
doctrine explicitly negates an offset for actions that involve undue risk,
burden, or humiliation. 125 If we focus instead on evaluating the

I 23. See, e.g., Embry v. Hargadine-McKittrick Dry Goods Co., 105 S. W. 777 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1907); FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, § 3.13.
124. The presumption suggested here is the opposite of the presumption Dobbs
suggests applies to the avoidable consequences doctrine. See supra note I I 6. Just as
courts may soften the requirement of reasonable efforts in light of a plaintiff's subjective
circumstances, a court may impose results that do not exactly match the plaintiff's
subjective state of mind based on the objective evidence.
125. RESTATEMENT (SECOND} OF CONTRACTS§ 350 (1979).
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benefit, we must examine why risk, burden, or humiliation-----or any other
factors that make a decision not to pursue alternative employment
reasonable-defeat the inference that the employee preferred leisure.
Intuitively, the results achieved by the avoidable consequences
doctrine seem explainable in terms of the benefits. When an employee
decides to refuse work in another locale, that decision may not reveal a
preference for leisure. The preference revealed may relate more to the
benefit of living in this community-a benefit that the employer did not
bestow by breaching the contract--rather than to the benefit of idleness.
The same intuition seems to apply when the characteristics of the other
job are at stake. Whether the alternative employment involves substantially greater labor, substantially greater risk, or substantial costs to
reputation or self-esteem, a decision to reject the job seems more related
to those factors than to any preference to remain idle. We can
understand why a reasonable person who truly preferred wages to
leisure, nonetheless, might refuse the jobs involved.
Perhaps we can clarify that intuitive point if we separate the two
components of leisure: the utility of play and the disutility of work. 126
When we infer that the employee values leisure more than earnings, we
actually infer that she values play more than the net value of earnings
less the disutility of working. 127 The benefit bestowed by the employ-

126. I use the word "play" simply to contrast the utility of time for one's own
pursuits with the disutility of work. Leisure may generate utility from a number of
activities that we would not trivialize as play.
127. We might express the formula as Play ;,: Earnings - Work. The equivalent
expression, Play + Work ;,: Earnings, is also true. Note that Work, in these formulae,
is a positive number--perhaps better called the benefit of not working-rather than a
negative number, as one might assume from the rhetorical formulation "the disutility of
work." Anyone who prefers to picture the disutility as a negative number may do so by
simply changing the operators(+ and-) in the formulae. (Since Work reduces the value
of earnings, it would be misleading to subtract a negative value of work from a positive
value of earnings, since that would increase the total rather than decrease it. Only if job
satisfaction exceeds the disutility of work, such that the employee might work even
without pay, would it be accurate for the right side of the first formula to be greater than
earnings. Let me assume that, for the vast majority of employees discharged in breach
of contract, work involves some net disutility.)
The different rhetorical formulations do not affect the basic identity of the value Work.
Whether viewed as the benefit of not working or the disutility of work, the value will
be the same distance from the zero point, but in a positive or negative direction
(respectively). The disutility of work takes not working as the base line, assigning it
zero value. (Any positive value of free time has been included in the separate element
Play.) Working moves one's position in a negative direction. The benefit of not
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er, however, is limited to the disutility of working at the original job
(plus play). Relieving the employee of that disutility, which she would
have endured if the employer had performed, is a benefit to the
employee. As long as the disutility of any alternative employment does
not exceed the disutility of the original job, rejection of the new job
supports the inference that the employee preferred leisure to the
earnings. 128 But if the disutility of the new job exceeds the disutility
of the original job, the inference no longer follows logically. Even if the
employee would have preferred the earnings of the new job to her
leisure if it involved the same disutility as the original job, she might
refuse the job because the disutility of the new job reduces the net
earnings below the value of her leisure. 129
"Undue risk, burden, or humiliation" seems an apt attempt to capture
those cases where the new job involves substantially greater disutility
than the old job. Risk of bodily harm (or other injury) and the indignity
or humiliation of a new job are among the disutilities of that job. Some
burdens, such as significantly more taxing job duties, also constitute
disutilities of the job. The burden of moving to a new city often will
involve disutilities attributable, at least indirectly, to the new job. 130
At least some burdens, however, may raise a different concern.
Burdens may refer to the burden of the job search or the transition to the
new job. For instance, an employee might be able to find work in a

working takes the labor as the base line. Not working relieves one of the disutility,
moving in a positive direction. But, for any given job, the gap between working and not
working covers exactly the same distance regardless of whether we move from not
working to working or from working to not working.
128. Rejecting a job (or failing to include that job in a search) establishes that Play
+ WorkN ;;, EarningsN. (The subscript N indicates the new job; the subscript O will
designate the original job.) Where WorkN .s: Work0 , we also can infer that the benefit
from the breach equals or exceeds the earnings of the new job: that is, that Play +
Work0 ;;, EarningsN.
In this respect, the relative disutility of the two jobs does not differ in principle from
the role fringe benefits play in the calculation. Throughout, I have taken earnings here
to include the entire compensation package, including health benefits, retirement benefits,
and the like. Sometimes non-salary aspects of the compensation can play a critical role
in an employee's decision to accept a position. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458
U.S. 219, 222 (1982) (employees refused job with former employer because offer did
not include seniority to original hire date). While calculations may become more
difficult as we move from health insurance packages to seniority, to amenities (for
example, an office with a view), to more burdensome work requirements, the differences
have the same effect on the net benefit of employment by raising or lowering either the
earnings or the disutility of work.
129. In short, knowing that Play+ WorkN;;, EarningsN, does not allow the inference
that Play + Work0 ;;, EarningsN, if WorkN > Work0 • Since the benefit of the breach is
Play + Work0 , no inference about the value of the benefit is available from the decision
to reject the new job.
130. The disutility of the new location would count as a disutility of the new job.
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better city. The burden of moving. to a new city---or even the burden of
a longer commute--may be "undue" within the meaning of the avoidable
consequences doctrine, 131 even though no disutility attaches to the new
location. The avoidable consequences doctrine generally does not
subtract amounts the employee could have earned in other locations-anq reaches that result without expressly comparing the relative
attractiveness of the two living environments. 132 This suggests that the
burden of the transition, rather than the disutility of the new location,
explains the existing rule.
The expectation interest might require an offset for losses the plaintiff
could have avoided by incurring substantial transitional burdens. The
expense of the move seems entirely an issue of transaction costs. If the
law will compensate the employee for the transaction costs, then the
employee's decision not to incur them arguably implicates the value the
employee attaches to leisure itself. 133 Part I.C.3 attempts to demonstrate that, at least with regard to the cost of resale, transaction costs do
not undermine the inference that the plaintiff valued the benefit more
than she valued the amount she could have gained in a substitute
transaction. 134 Other job search expenses also might seem undue to a
jury-for example, the cost to dress for success. Where those burdens
are large enough to be unreasonable, but tangible enough to permit

131. The general rule that a discharged employee need not accept employment "in
another community" may overstate the issue slightly. The definition of the community,
like geographic market in antitrust cases, may turn on the reasonableness of seeking
employment in a place rather than on city or county lines drawn for different purposes.
Dobbs suggests that for some professions, mobility may be the norm, thus making a
willingness to relocate reasonable under the circumstances. DOBBS, supra note I 0,
§ 12.25, at 926. Nonetheless, some cases imply a very limited search may suffice to
avoid an offset. For instance, public school teachers may contend that "their former
employer is the only employer in town." Shiffer v. Board of Educ., 224 N.W.2d 255,
258 (Mich. 1974).
132. See, e.g., Byrne v. Independent Sch. Dist., 117 N.W. 983 (Iowa 1908); DOBBS,
supra note 10, § 12.25, at 926. While this might reflect a conclusive presumption that
every employee lives in the city they love better than any other in the world, it seems
better not to assume that the law embodies such an unrealistic presumption. More likely,
the rule presumes that the relocation costs themselves are an undue burden that makes
rejection of jobs in other locations reasonable. The same rule need not apply where the
cities are close. The burden of a longer commute may or may not make reasonable a
decision to reject (or not to look for) a job in a nearby city.
133. The preceding paragraph sought to remove the relative utility of the two
locations by hypothesizing a job in a better city.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 80-92.
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calculation, the law could choose to compensate the plaintiff for them
and preserve the inference that she prefers leisure if she does not incur
them. Since the avoidable consequences doctrine does not take this
approach, some reconciliation remains. 135
The preceding discussion of transaction costs, however, relies in part
on the relatively small amount involved. 136 Neither the transaction
costs themselves nor the interest on them seems likely to be very large,
either as an absolute amount, as a percentage of the harm the costs
would avoid, or as a percentage of the plaintiff's resources. Thus, when
recoverable, the plaintiff's need to wait until trial to recover them seems
unlikely to influence the decision about whether to avoid the loss. That
confidence diminishes when the transition costs refer to extraordinary
efforts rather than reasonable efforts. The cost of moving to a new city
may not be small in any sense of the word. Indeed, the burdens under
discussion are by definition undue, implying that they represent a fairly
large amount, at least in proportion to the amount of loss they will
prevent. 137 In these circumstances, the plaintiff's concern over these
costs may enter the decision concerning whether to minimize the loss by
extraordinary efforts. If these elements enter into the calculation, then
the inference that the decision not to act reflects a preference for leisure
becomes uncertain. Once we cannot assert that the decision not to act
reflects the value the plaintiff attaches to leisure, the expectation interest
need not (and perhaps cannot) assume that the amount of loss the
plaintiff could have prevented by taking those measures equals the
benefit of the breach. Thus, the expectation interest, like the avoidable
consequences doctrine, can treat extraordinary efforts to minimize the
loss differently from reasonable efforts to minimize the loss.
Another practical constraint stems from the resources available to the
plaintiff. If the law begins to reduce recoveries where employees failed

135. We might attempt the reconciliation by modernizing the avoidable consequences doctrine. A blanket rule that negates a duty to move to another city, appropriate in
an era when the population was more static, may be obsolete in the era of the global
village. The reasonableness of decisions not to move may have changed; courts may
need to catch up. Yet at some point the avoidable consequences doctrine tolerates the
conclusion that the burdens of transition are undue, a conclusion that the expectation
interest must explain.
I 36. See supra text following note 85.
137. Thus, the argument in text is not limited to the example of moving to a new
city. Any undue burden seems likely to involve amounts sufficiently significant to
implicate the arguments concerning transaction costs. If the expenses involved are
reasonable rather than undue, then they do not fall into the category now under
discussion. The avoidable consequences doctrine and the expectation interest treat
reasonable expenses alike, by expecting the plaintiff to incur them and by compensating
her for them if she does.
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to incur substantial (previously "undue") expense in the job search, the
employee with limited savings may be caught in a vice. The employer
has deprived the employee of regular pay, which might have been used
to meet the expenses involved (in addition to the employee's living
expenses). Yet the employer complains that the employee did not incur
significant expenses during a job search. The law's normal presumption
that everyone has easy access to capital markets--that is, that the
employee could borrow money to cover the expenses-----seems singularly
ill-adapted to cases involving discharge from employment. 138 It would
be extremely unrealistic for the law to assume unemployed people can
borrow money at will. Thus, an employee's limited means impede the
inference that the decision not to incur substantial expense in the job
search reveals a preference for leisure.
Third, employers again seem unlikely to raise the issue very often---especially when the costs involved are large-because employers
would need to pay them as an element of damages. If the employee did
incur the costs, however large, they become incidental damages the
employer must pay. 139 The employer will benefit from this argument

I 38. In fact, some avoidable consequences cases do not require plaintiffs to incur
expenditures beyond their means. See. e.g., Valencia v. Shell Oil Co., 23 Cal. 2d 840,
147 P.2d 558 (1944) (defendant damaged plaintiff's truck; plaintiff, who did not have
$222 in order to pay mechanic for repairs to the truck, recovered $4,416 for loss of use
of a truck while it sat in a shop subject to a mechanic's lien); DOBBS, supra note 9,
§ 3.9.
139. If the law does not permit the employee to recover incidental damages that are
unreasonably large, then the inference (that failure to incur them reflects a preference
for leisure) fails from the outset. The lawmaker faces two choices: (!) to allow
recovery of the substantial burdens and to subtract the earnings that would have followed
those efforts; or (2) to reject the inference that leisure motivated the decision not to incur
the burdens during the job search, thus rejecting the inference that the employee valued
leisure more than she valued the wages she could have earned if she had made a more
burdensome job search.
Arguably, the employee should not recover for unreasonably large expenses incurred
in the process of minimizing the loss because the employer could not foresee that the
employee would incur such large damages. See Wonnell, supra note 31, at 490. One
might quibble over whether foreseeability requires that the magnitude of the loss be
foreseeable at the time of contract formation or merely that the type of loss be
foreseeable. One also might quibble that since job search expenses arise naturally from
the breach, the requirement of special notice at the time of contract formation should not
apply to them. The issue does not affect the substance of the argument here. If the
extra expenses are not recoverable, for whatever reason, the law cannot infer that the
employee who failed to incur them preferred leisure to the amount she could have earned
if she had incurred them. At best, the law can infer that she valued leisure more than
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only if the amount the employee could have earned following a
burdensome search would have exceeded the burdens by more than the
difference between the original salary and the amount the employee
could have earned following a limited search. While such cases may
exist, they seem unlikely to outnumber the cases where the employer
loses because the employee fails to find work (or sufficiently valuable
work) after incurring the unduly large expenses. On the whole,
employers and employees both seem likely to prefer the predictability of
the more limited rule. A reasonable lawmaker concerned with benefits,
therefore, might never be asked to choose to include consideration of
jobs that the employee could have obtained only by unduly expensive
efforts. Rather than include the undue burdens in the recovery, the
lawmaker might prefer to reject the inference of a preference for leisure
in cases where the alternative employment or the job search involve
undue risk, burden, or humiliation.
A final set of practical difficulties may doom the argument for
compelling plaintiffs to incur unduly large transition expenses.
Sometimes, the law will not be able to tell whether the decision not to
move to a different city represented concern for transitional costs or
concern for the disutility of living in the new city. If the argument
concerning the latter, disutility, has been persuasive, the expectation
interest cannot infer that the decision not to relocate reflected the value
the plaintiff attached to leisure. The inability to distinguish decisions
based on the disutility of the new location (or new job) from decisions
based on the cost of the move or a mixture of the two motives might
induce our lawmaker to prefer a single rule governing both problems.
A single rule would help an employee to know how much the law
expects of her in a job search. 140 Wonnell provides the usual answer
under the avoidable consequences doctrine: the law expects the
employee to do as much as she would if she were acting (reasonably) on
her own account--that is, if she were not able to claim damages from
her employer. 141 If the demands of the law may differ depending on
the earnings less the unrecoverable costs that would have been necessary in order to
obtain the earnings. Since that implementation still requires that the amount of the offset
be reduced by the amount of the extra expenses, the theory advanced here neither
requires nor permits an offset of potential earnings divorced from recovery of the
expenses necessary to obtain them.
140. Heriot comments on the usefulness of rules (as opposed to standards) as
devices for guiding individual behavior in cases where litigation may not occur. See
Heriot, supra note 47.
141. Wonnell, supra note 31, at 494. Wonnell here focuses on the concern for
moral hazard, which he terms the extortion value of a contract and the desire to reduce
waste. These rationales underlie the traditional formulation of the avoidable consequences doctrine, but are not as obviously related to the concern for benefits of the breach.
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whether the burdens involve disutilities or transaction costs, the
employee-even after consulting a lawyer-may have little ability to
know what she must do in order to protect her recovery in the event that
her job search proves unsuccessful.
The expectation interest does not compel courts to reduce an
employee's recovery because she failed to take extraordinary measures
to find new work. No one seems likely to propose that result in any
event. Even if proposed, the permissible inferences from the plaintiff's
decision not to incur substantial burdens, either in the transition or in the
new job, do not justify the conclusion that the employee's inaction
reveals a preference for leisure over the wages she could have earned by
those efforts. The rules generated under the avoidable consequences
doctrine, therefore, are completely consistent with the results courts
could achieve pursuing the expectation interest. The harmony between
the expectation interest and the avoidable consequences doctrine remains
intact.

2.

Buyers of Goods

Buyers require another elaboration of the theory. A buyer who has
not fully performed retains money---the epitome of an avoided consequence, not an avoidable consequence. We do not need the theory
expounded here to explain why the value of money retained is a fair
approximation of the value of the benefit bestowed by the breach; 142
it is as exact a measure as the law of damages (which measures
everything in terms of money) can achieve. Neither do we need the
avoidable consequences doctrine to explain this result. We are not
subtracting the amount of loss that the buyer could have avoided by
reasonable action, but the amount that she did avoid by not paying the
balance of the price. The expectation interest explains this subtraction
quite satisfactorily.

Part III will take up the consistency (and perhaps the identity) of the two sets of
concerns.

142. Since the savings involved here do not consist of the unpaid portion of the
price, the analysis that follows applies regardless of whether the buyer has fully
performed (by paying the price). The benefits hypothesized reflect subsequent savings
or gains which will or will not accrue regardless of how much of the price the plaintiff
has paid. Naturally, the portion of the price paid to the seller will figure into damage
calculations, but does not affect the analysis of benefits pursued here.
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Benefit analysis can explain why a buyer who covers with better
goods than those the seller promised should not recover the full
difference between cover price and market price. When the plaintiff
receives better goods, she receives benefits that she would not have
received if the seller had performed. But this has very little to do with
the project at hand; the law does not treat cover with superior goods
under the avoidable consequences doctrine. Rather, the law relies
directly on normal damage rules, the desire not to put the plaintiff in a
better position than she would have occupied if the defendant had
performed. 143 While calling this difference a benefit of breach might
alter the vocabulary slightly, it would not alter the rationale for this
result.
For buyers, however, the avoidable consequences doctrine often enters
the picture when considering consequential damages, such as the profit
lost on resale of the goods or losses caused by delayed production or
construction when a critical component did not arrive on time. 144 The
buyer who promptly covers with substitute goods may avoid or minimize
these losses. 145 The buyer who does not cover may find she cannot
recover the actual consequential damages because she failed to take
reasonable efforts to avoid them. 146 Here, the lack of an immediately
apparent benefit cuts against the explanation based on the expectation
interest. This rule seems designed to measure the loss that could have
been avoided, not some mysterious gain that actually accrued to the
buyer as a result of the breach.
In order to identify the benefit to a buyer from the seller's breach, we
must consider why a buyer who could avoid or minimize losses with
reasonable efforts would choose not to pursue those efforts. 147 Nor-

143. See, e.g., Thorne v. White, 103 A.2d 579 (D.C. 1954).
144. See, e.g., S.J. Groves & Sons v. Warner Co., 576 F.2d 524 (3d Cir. 1978)
(contractor sought damages for delays caused by subcontractor's failure to deliver
required amounts of concrete in a timely manner).
145. Cover is the most obvious way for buyers to minimize the loss, but not the
only way. For convenience, the text often will refer to "cover" rather than the more
cumbersome phrase "cover or other efforts to avoid or to minimize the loss."
146. U.C.C. § 2-715 (1995) (buyer may recover consequential damages "which
could not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise"). The trial court in S.J.
Groves had reduced the plaintiff's recovery on this ground, but was reversed on appeal.
576 F.2d at 530.
147. Where the buyer does pursue reasonable efforts to minimize the loss, no further
inquiry is needed. The avoidable consequences doctrine does not require any offset,
since any damages that could have been avoided by reasonable efforts presumably were
avoided by the plaintiff's reasonable efforts. (The Restatement does not allow the
defendant to second-guess the plaintiff's choice of which reasonable measures to pursue;
as long as the plaintiff acts reasonably, no reduction in damages occurs. RESTATEMENT
{SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350(2) {1979).) Since the plaintiff did not choose to forego
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mally, plaintiffs will prefer to avoid losses today rather than to recover
for the losses after months of negotiation or years of litigation, Thus,
even a buyer unaware of the avoidable consequences doctrine should
prefer to prevent or to minimize the loss, 148 An informed buyer would
take reasonable steps to minimize the loss because she could not count
on recovering the loss later; the avoidable consequences doctrine would
deny recovery for losses the buyer could have avoided, Thus, a rational
buyer generally will prefer to cover and, thus, avoid the loss the breach
otherwise might cause,
In some cases, however, the seller's breach may benefit the buyer by
opening up some new, more valuable opportunity, By breaching, the
seller frees the buyer from having to use the goods, The buyer saves
some time and effort that otherwise would have been devoted to the
performance of the contract. Instead, the buyer can devote her resources
to other projects, which may prove more profitable than the project in
which the goods would have been used, 149 The benefit may consist of

reasonable measures that would have reduced the loss, the expectation interest does not
hypothesize a benefit from the breach------or, at least, has no basis upon which to set a
value upon any benefits.
148. Wonnell notes this as a powerful force motivating employees to seek new
work. See Wonnell, supra note 31, at 490. While some buyers may have sufficient cash
flow to await repayment, the time value of money suggests most prudent business people
will avoid losses rather than count on recovery.
149. The breach frees resources for any buyer, regardless of unused capacity. If the
buyer, like the lost volume seller, could have performed under this contract (or covered)
and pursued the other venture, then the other venture is not a benefit bestowed by the
breach of the contract. A buyer with unused capacity, however, could pursue cover in
addition to the other project. Thus, the existence of unused capacity enables the buyer
to cover, but does not explain why a rational buyer would not cover when faced with
consequential losses. Thus, a claim that unused capacity allowed the buyer to pursue
both ventures does not require a different application of the expectation analysis. When
the buyer with excess capacity chooses not to use it to cover, one cannot easily dismiss
the idea that she obtained benefits from the breach-such as the benefit of cutting short
a losing venture.
If the plaintiff would have lost money on the venture, neither benefit analysis nor the
avoidable consequences doctrine is necessary to explain the result. The breach did not
cause consequential losses, but prevented them. In these cases, normal damage rules
based on the expectation interest should preclude recovery without any reference to the
avoidable consequences doctrin(}-1ls long as the defendant can establish the losses with
reasonable certainty. (Restitution may produce a different result. For a persuasive
argument that restitution should not alter the expectation interest in this situation, see
Kull, supra note 32.) We could treat the loss prevented as a benefit of the breach. The
characterization seems quite apt, but one does not need to characterize this fortuity as
a benefit of the breach in order to reach the appropriate result. Nonetheless, the decision
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as little as the time it would take a clerk to write a check and a receiving
department employee to direct the goods to the right place. Consequential damages seem more likely, however, in cases when the cost of
dealing with the goods is larger. 1so A buyer who plans to resell the
goods may save the effort or expense of its sales and delivery forces.1st A buyer whose operations must shut down because a critical
component does not arrive may save the effort or expense of operating_ 1s2
As in the case of the nonbreaching seller, we can estimate the value
the buyer attaches to the benefit by looking at how much she could have
saved by covering. The gain from devoting resources to other projects
may be intangible or difficult to identify directly. The alternative uses
of her resources illuminate the amount of benefit she expects to
receive 1s3 from the use she actually selects. 1s4 A buyer who elects
to devote her resources to transactions other than cover must expect to

of a buyer not to cover when cover was reasonably available might alert courts to the
possibility that the project would not have been as fruitful as alleged. Going forward,
this section assumes that the buyer can establish the existence of consequential losses.
Only then will the avoidable consequences doctrine be necessary in order to reduce the
award.
150. Normally, consequential damages arise when the absence of goods jeopardizes
some project in which the goods are essential. When no such project exists (that is,
when goods will be delivered and sit with no further input of effort from the buyer), no
savings may result, but neither do consequential damages result. The loss consists
merely of not having the goods, the lost value of the goods themselves. That loss
generally is measured by the contract/market differential.
I 5 l. Variable costs--such as delivery if the buyer hires independent carriers rather
than using employees to deliver goods-may produce direct cash savings. When the
expense is temporarily fixed, as by annual contracts with the sales and delivery
personnel, the savings may take the shape of less work for the staff. The most obvious
benefit of reduced workload is time to devote to other projects. But even without
additional projects, a lighter workload may produce subtle benefits, such as higher
morale, a better work environment, or fewer mistakes on remaining projects.
Some may find these benefits rather speculative or even ethereal. I make no claim
that the specific benefits identified here have ever motivated a buyer not to cover. I
claim only that if a buyer decides not to cover when reasonable efforts would minimize
the loss, she normally has some reason for that decision. If other reasons fail to explain
the conduct, perhaps benefits similar to those identified here really exist.
152. Again, the savings may take the form of money (by not paying the employees
for days not worked) or time and effort (by paying the employees and having their time
available for other projects).
153. The amount of benefit actually realized by employing the resources in any
particular alternative pursuit is irrelevant. The expected benefit at the time the buyer
decides whether to devote those resources to cover or to another project estimates the
benefit of the breach.
154. Cf RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW§ 6.11 (3d ed. 1986)
(discussing evaluating redundant a homemaker-spouse's services by reference to the
amount she could have earned at an alternative occupation if she had chosen to pursue
it instead of remaining in the home).
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benefit from those transactions. If the buyer could reduce losses by
cover, she must expect the alternative uses ofresources to produce gains
large enough to offset the losses she could have avoidedY 5 Thus, the
buyer provides a fair estimate of the value to her of being freed from the
contract. That value equals the gains she expects from the alternative
use of her resources. Presumably, if cover (or other measures to
minimize the loss) will save more money than alternative projects will
gain, the buyer will devote the energies to cover. Only when the
alternative projects seem likely to generate a net gain will the buyer
forego cover and pursue another project instead. 156
The law could seek to attach a value to these savings directly. The
U.C.C. allows offsets for "expenses saved in consequence of the ...
breach." 157 When the savings take the form of time or effort, however,
the cost to attach a value to these savings-or even to prove that the
savings occurred--may exceed the benefit of offsetting them in the
award. 158 The amount of loss that could have been prevented offers
a much more manageable figure. Evidence about that amount is easier
to obtain-especially for the defendant, who bears the burden of proof
under the avoidable consequences doctrine. 159 The amount is measured in dollars instead of utils. In many cases, the estimation will be
preferable to direct efforts to measure the value of the breach to the
buyer.
Arguably, the benefits discussed here consist of the benefit of not
covering, not the benefit of the breach. If the benefit of not covering

155. This statement assumes that buyers are rational economic actors. A buyer fails
to cover, even though she expects cover to save more money than alternative activities
would gain, presents an enigma. The situation seems so counterintuitive that a
reasonable lawmaker concerned with measuring benefits realistically could adopt rules
based on the assumption that it does not occur at all. To some extent, assuming that the
buyer's actions accurately indicate her subjective value would accomplish this result.
See supra text accompanying notes 45-57.
This Article addresses intentional
externalization of costs shortly. See infra notes I 89-90.
156. The word "only" here may claim too much. As noted below, a buyer may
decide not to cover for several reasons other than the desire to pursue a different project.
See infra text accompanying notes 161-204. I do not intend the word "only" to reject
those other possibilities. However, when choosing between two projects (cover and an
alternative), a rational buyer will choose the alternative only when the expected gain
from the alternative exceeds the expected gain from cover (or other mitigation efforts).
157. U.C.C. § 2-712, -713 (1995).
158. See supra note 66.
159. See DOBBS, supra note 9, § 3.9.
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consisted only of the time saved by not calling other suppliers, that
might be true. But cover, when effective, puts the buyer in almost the
same situation regarding performance that she would have faced if the
seller had delivered. To prevent consequential damages, the buyer must
proceed to use the substitute goods in the same manner she would have
used the original goods. Thus, the decision not to cover implicates the
value of the resources that would have been employed to utilize the
substitute goods, not merely the resources that would have been
employed to obtain the substitute goods. 160 The former clearly
represent benefits of the breach. The latter are not benefits of the
breach, but rather incidental damages, recoverable in the damage award.
As a result, they should net out of the buyer's calculation, being no net
loss whether she covers or pursues other opportunities. 161 Thus, the
decision to pursue other opportunities rather than cover reflects the
benefits of the breach (the resources needed to use the goods once
delivered), not the benefits of avoiding cover.
Not all buyers long for sellers to breach so that they can abandon their
original projects in favor of new, more profitable projects. Often buyers
will be perfectly happy with their original projects and will be rather
upset with the seller for making those projects harder to pursue. In these
circumstances, however, buyers seem almost certain to make reasonable
efforts to prevent consequential damages by obtaining the goods
elsewhere or otherwise salvaging the project. Buyers have no incentive
to allow acceptable projects to die when reasonable efforts can save
them and no better alternatives exist. 162
In cases where the breach offers no benefits, we would expect to find
that the buyer has undertaken reasonable efforts to cover or otherwise
minimize the loss. Where she has not made reasonable efforts to

160. Where nondelivery has no consequences other than loss of the benefit of the
goods, this entire discussion does not come into play because the avoidable consequences
doctrine does not affect the recovery.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 80-86.
162. For this reason, we would expect very few cases to employ the avoidable
consequences doctrine to reduce the consequential damages available to buyers of goods.
Contract damages generally undercompensate successful plaintiffs. See Wonnell, supra
note 31, at 482; Stewart Macaulay, The Reliance Interest and the World Outside the Law
Schools' Doors, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 247, 250-53; Kelly, supra note 6, at 1811. Epstein's
analysis suggests that undercompensatory damages will lead most contract plaintiffs to
take any reasonable opportunity to avoid the loss rather than accept an inadequate award.
See Epstein, supra note 66. On one hand, this implies that the avoidable consequences
doctrine applies only rarely, making its abolition rather insignificant even if normal
damage rules did not produce the same result. More significantly, however, the
incentive to minimize losses suggests that when buyers do not take reasonable efforts to
minimize the loss, they must have some reason for that decision---and the damage award
seems an unlikely motivation.
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minimize the loss, an inference that the buyer benefitted from the breach
seems sufficiently plausible for the law to offset the damage award by
the nearest estimate of that benefit----the amount of the loss that could
have been avoided by reasonable efforts. A buyer might try to explain
that failure in a way that negates the inference that she chose to make
better use of her resources. The most plausible explanations deserve
attention. If the explanations undermine the inference that the buyer
benefitted from the breach in the amount of the avoidable loss, then
perhaps the presumption should be rebuttable in particular cases. The
discussion below concludes that the plausible explanations do not require
subjective inquiries into the buyer's motivations.
Where the buyer attempts to explain the decision not to cover, the
buyer still has received benefits from the breach. The buyer's resources
(that would have been consumed by using the goods) have been freed
for disposition at her will. The ability to deploy those resources to other
endeavors is a benefit to the buyer, much as the ability to decide how to
spend one's time was a benefit to the employee. 163 Where the breaching seller offers direct proof of the amount of the benefit, the U.C.C.
may take that into account. Absent direct evidence, however, inferences
about the value of the benefit may be impossible to draw. 164 Thus, the
court will lack sufficient basis to subtract any particular amount from the
award. Interestingly, the benefit analysis finds it difficult to assess the
amount of the benefit in precisely those cases where the avoidable
consequences doctrine does not require a reduction in damages.
For example, a buyer may decide not to cover because cover is

163. The buyer might have chosen to abandon the original project even after
performance by the seller. That decision would entail not only the cost of paying for
the goods, but of storing them, insuring them, or otherwise dealing with them until they
could be resold or the original project could be resumed. The benefit of breach at least
equals those saved costs. The expectation interest, however, provides a more direct
reason for denying consequential damages in any case where the buyer would have
abandoned the project even if the seller performed: the breach did not cause any
consequential damages. Any profits lost on the original project would have been lost
anyway, since the buyer would have shifted resources in another direction even if the
seller had delivered. The text considers the situation where the fixed costs of paying for
and storing the goods would have persuaded the buyer to proceed with the original
project despite a preference to shift to another project that, but for those fixed costs,
would have produced greater return for the buyer. Under those situations, the ability to
choose the alternative project really does result from the breach, not from the buyer's
ability to redirect resources independent of seller's conduct.
164. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
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impossible. Under these circumstances, the avoidable consequences
doctrine requires no reduction in the award. The plaintiff literally could
not prevent the loss by cover because she could not cover. In this case,
benefit analysis also requires no subtraction. While the plaintiff has
freed resources, we cannot estimate their value. The decision not to
cover tells us nothing about their value to the plaintiff. Since zero losses
could have been avoided by cover, we can infer only that the plaintiff
values those resources at least at zero.
Similarly, if cover is possible but will not avoid the consequential
losses (say, because timing was critical and the loss cannot now be
avoided), neither theory requires a reduction in the award. The plaintiff
could not have avoided the loss, so the avoidable consequences doctrine
subtracts nothing. Benefit analysis suggests only that the buyer valued
the freed resources at least at zero, offering no basis for subtracting more
than zero.
The preceding paragraphs do not undercut the basic inference
proposed here because they do not address the basic question: why
would someone who could prevent losses with reasonable efforts choose
not to take those efforts? Rather, the situations above reflect circumstances where the buyer could not prevent the loss with reasonable
efforts. In each of these situations, we understand why the buyer might
choose not to minimize the loss without hypothesizing some benefit
from the breach. To find a case that the normal damage rules treat
differently from the avoidable consequences doctrine cases, however, we
must explain why a plaintiff who could minimize the loss would choose
not to do so when no benefit accrued from the decision not to cover.
Three plausible explanations merit discussion. First, a buyer might
find efforts to avoid the loss unduly burdensome. In this situation, the
avoidable consequences doctrine will not reduce the loss despite the
failure to mitigate 165-but the expectation analysis might. 166 Second,

165. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 350 (1979) (undue risk, burden,
or humiliation not required in order to avoid the loss). The U.C.C., which governs the
sale of goods, employs the phrase "could not reasonably be prevented by cover or
otherwise." U.C.C. § 2-715 (1995). The comments provide no elaboration on what
makes particular efforts reasonable or unreasonable. It seems fair to infer that if efforts
to reduce the loss involve "undue burden," a court would determine that those efforts
were not reasonable within the meaning of the U.C.C.----that is, that the loss could not
reasonably have been prevented, but could only have been prevented by extraordinary
or unreasonable efforts. The decision not to compensate the buyer for unduly large
expenses to effect cover supports the inference that the code does not require buyers to
incur unduly large expenses as a condition for recovering consequential damages. The
definition of buyer's incidental damages uses a form of the word "reasonable" three
times in its single sentence. Id. § 2-715(1) (the most directly pertinent limitation limits
recovery to "commercially reasonable charges, expenses or commissions in connection
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a buyer might decide not to cover (or to take other measures to minimize
consequential damages) if she did not realize that consequential damages
would follow if she failed to cover. Under these circumstances, we
cannot assume the buyer expected to benefit from other, more profitable
projects. 167 Rather, the buyer simply underestimated the importance
of mitigation efforts. Third, a buyer might decide not to cover if she
hoped that decision would increase the damages she could collect from
the breaching seller. 168 Acting either out of ignorance of the avoidable
consequences doctrine or in the hope that the judicial system might
apply it imperfectly, the buyer might seek to externalize costs rather than
prevent them.

a.

Extraordinary Efforts

The avoidable consequences doctrine does not prevent recovery of
losses that could have been avoided only by unreasonable efforts. 169
Benefit analysis must work to explain this result. Arguably, the benefit
of freed resources exists. Abandoning the project suggests that the buyer
values the freed resources more than she values the losses they could
prevent. But where the losses could be prevented only by exceptional
effort-such as by diverting resources from other important projects into
the mitigation effort-then perhaps the inference has less to do with the
value the buyer attaches to the resources freed by the breach and more
to do with the value the buyer attaches to the additional resources

with effecting cover").
166. This possibility, too, does not really explain why a party who could minimize
the loss with reasonable effort would refuse to do so. Undue burden implicates the
reasonableness of the effort. As long as the estimate of the value of the benefit includes
only those losses that the plaintiff could have avoided by reasonable effort, benefit
analysis will match the avoidable consequences doctrine. The discussion below, like the
preceding section for employees, attempts to explain why the normal damage rules
would limit the estimate of the value of the benefit to the amount of the loss avoidable
by reasonable effort.
167. Like cases where cover would be futile, the buyer here believes mitigation
efforts will save zero because she does not realize that damages will result unless she
takes efforts to prevent them. Thus, the only inference we can draw about her subjective
valuation of the benefit of the breach is that it at least equals zero.
168. Wonnell labels this the extortion value of a contract. See Wonnell, supra note
31, at 490-91, 494.
169. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350 (1979).
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necessary to accomplish the mitigation. 170
The analysis here does not differ greatly from the discussion of the
employment context, though the specific facts that make loss reduction
unreasonable differ in this context. 171 As a result, a reasonable
lawmaker concerned with benefits might choose a different rule for sales
of goods than for employment contracts. Specifically, a reasonable
lawmaker might choose to infer that the buyer valued the resources freed
by the breach at least as much as she valued the amount of loss the
buyer could have prevented by extraordinary efforts, as long as the buyer
can recover the cost of those extraordinary efforts from the breaching
seller. If, however, the lawmaker prefers not to allow recovery for
extraordinary costs, the decision not to avoid the loss justifies only the
more limited inference that the buyer values the resources freed by the
breach more than the amount of loss she could have avoided by
reasonable efforts (those for which she can recover). 172 Thus, the
scope of the inference depends on the scope of incidental damages the
law allows the plaintiff to recover.
A reasonable lawmaker might choose to limit recoverable incidental
damages by a reasonableness standard. A reasonableness limit can
protect the foreseeability cap on damages. 173 At the time of contract

170. These two sets of resources are cumulative, not alternative. If the buyer
diverts resources in order to cover, the breach will not free resources. Any resources
that would have been used to deal with the original goods still must be used to deal with
the substitute goods. The resources necessary to effectuate cover add to the total
resources devoted to the project, offset only when (and it) damages have been recovered
from the breaching seller. Similarly, when cover goods differ from the original goods
in some significant detail-including details extrinsic to the goods themselves, such as
the delivery date----the resources necessary for the buyer to complete the project may be
greater than they would have been if the original goods had arrived as promised. Even
when cover requires no significant effort, the loss may be avoidable only by significant
diversion of resources committed to other equally important projects.
171. For example, a typical buyer facing consequential damages may have better
access to capital markets than the typical discharged employee looking for work.
172. The transaction cost problem noted earlier, see supra text accompanying notes
80-86, precludes the inference that the plaintiff values the benefit more than the loss she
could avoid, unless the transaction costs are recoverable. The analysis applies regardless
of whether the costs are the incidental costs to effect cover, increased costs for the
original project caused by the breach (as, for example, overtime to complete the project
on time despite delays caused by the breach), or costs that initially affect other projects,
but that would not have been incurred but for the seller's breach. (The last category
frequently will consist of opportunity costs of effecting cover, such as losses on other
projects caused by diverting resources to cover.) A rational buyer will need to consider
all of these costs in deciding whether to minimize the loss, so a rational lawmaker must
consider all of these costs in deciding what to infer from the buyer's decision not to
minimize the loss.
173. See Wonnell, supra note 31, at 490. Of course, foreseeability itself might
deserve reexamination, but that project lies beyond the scope of this Article.
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formation, and perhaps even at the time of breach, a seller may not
foresee that the buyer will incur unreasonably large expenses in an effort
to mitigate the loss. More important, an inquiry into the recoverability
of unreasonably large expenses will require substantial amounts of
judicial resources, perhaps more than the result justifies. 174 For
instance, if the law retains any concern for moral hazard-the plaintiff
who intentionally allows losses to mount because she expects to recover
them from the defendant--abolishing the reasonableness cap will require
at least an inquiry into the good faith of the plaintiff in expending more
than a reasonable amount. 175 In addition, allowing recovery for losses
the defendant caused to other projects (by forcing diversion of the
resources the plaintiff could devote to those projects) threatens to expand
the scope of the litigation. Instead of (or in addition to) demonstrating
profits lost on the project to which the defendant's performance related,
the inquiry will focus on some other project. 176 Generally, the law
seeks to avoid creating sideshows. 177 Yet in order to ascertain the

174. See Epstein, supra note 66.
175. This Article seeks to justify the existing rule without too much emphasis on
factors extraneous to the benefit analysis. Moral hazard is so intimately related to
traditional explanations of the avoidable consequences doctrine (such as the effort to
discourage waste) that its inclusion here threatens to undermine the independence of
benefit analysis. Yet it would be a very strange law that allowed the plaintiff to recover
any amount she claims to have spent in an effort to reduce the loss without some inquiry
into whether she actually made the expense and, if so, whether it actually related to
minimizing the loss in some way. The expectation interest, uninfluenced by issues of
waste or moral hazard, would inquire whether the plaintiff would have incurred the
expense if the contract had been performed. (In a case of obvious moral hazard, the
answer might be, "No, I incurred that expense only because I thought the defendant
would be required to reimburse me for it as part of the damages for breach.")
Reasonableness obviates the inquiry into subjective individual motivations and shortcuts
the inquiry into whether the breach caused the expenditure.
176. The other project will arise instead of the first when the diversion avoids all
losses in the directly affected project but allegedly caused losses to the other project.
The other project will arise in addition to the first when the diversion did not avoid all
of the losses to the first project--either because the efforts failed or because they merely
reduced the losses. In those situations, the losses to both projects-or if diversion
affected more than one other project, all of the affected projects--would be recoverable.
177. One reason the Federal Rules of Evidence reject many assertions of past
conduct is to prevent diverting attention from the allegations of wrongdoing that
allegedly caused the harm at issue in the specific case into the general character of the
alleged wrongdoer or the truth of the allegations of other misconduct unrelated to the
harm. FED. R. Evm. 404 & cmt. Other projects allegedly harmed by the breach are not
a sideshow in quite the same sense. If the allegations are true, the breach at issue
caused the harm, deserving compensation. Nonetheless, a lawmaker concerned with
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appropriate offset against damages, the law might need to examine the
plaintiff's entire business operation, not merely the projects directly
affected by the defendant's breach.
Even if transaction costs are recoverable, a reasonable lawmaker might
prefer not to infer that a plaintiff values the benefits of the breach more
than the amount of avoidable loss to the extent that minimizing the loss
requires exceptional efforts. The buyer cannot recover the cost of
effectuating cover (or other mitigation measures) immediately. When
she does recover them, the loss of use of those resources may be
compensated at the legal prejudgment interest rate. 178 If she otherwise
could employ her resources to generate profits that exceed the prejudgment interest rate, a reasonable buyer might choose not to shift them out
of a more productive use into a less productive use. The buyer's
analysis will be more complex: the buyer must decide whether the loss
that she could avoid (on the project where seller breached) exceeds the
losses affecting the other productive use (from which she must draw
resources to accomplish mitigation) minus the portion of that loss that
she can recover (as incidental expenses and prejudgment interest) and
minus the value of the resources freed by the breach. 179 The introduction of these other elements into the computation removes any confident
conclusions about the value to the buyer of the freed resources. While
a buyer who does not make reasonable efforts to minimize the loss must
have valued the benefit of the breach more than she valued the amount

reasonably efficient operation of the judicial system might seek to achieve the proper
level of compensation at the least cost. Opening the damage inquiry to evidence of harm
to other projects in order to permit the jury to award unreasonably large incidental
expenses, only to offset the recovery by the amount of harm those unreasonable expenses
avoided (or could have avoided), seems difficult to justify-particularly when neither the
expenses nor the harm avoided will be actual. The avoidable consequences doctrine
reduces awards when the plaintiff did not make efforts to avoid the loss. Therefore, the
jury will need to reduce the award by the amount it believes the plaintiff could have
avoided. First, the jury would need to assess some unreasonably costly measures the
defendant argues the plaintiff should have taken to minimize the loss. Then, jurors
would need to reduce the offset by the amount that it concludes the plaintiff would have
spent (or lost) if the plaintiff had taken those hypothetical measures, including any losses
to other projects that might have been affected. If the entire inquiry seems a little
speculative, perhaps that is sufficient indication that a reasonable lawmaker would prefer
to limit recoveries to reasonable incidental expenses.
178. If the resources fall within the provisions permitting prejudgment interest at
all, the court will calculate the loss of use at the prejudgment interest rate. This seems
likely when the resources consist of money used to buy other goods. Where the
resources consist of time or other resources, courts may balk at calling the amounts
"liquidated" or "ascertainable" within the meaning of doctrines limiting the availability
of prejudgment interest. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
179. The computation would be even more complex if the buyer might claim the
losses on the other project as consequential damages---a rather unlikely possibility in
light of foreseeability doctrine.
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of loss she could have avoided by reasonable effort, a buyer who fails
to make unreasonably large efforts, even if compensable, may not have
valued the benefit as much as the total amount of the loss that could
have been avoided by resort to extraordinary efforts.
The normal approach to damages can clarify this result. If the seller
had performed the contract, the buyer could have pursued both projects,
not just one, with the resources available. 180 Normal damage rules
must seek to restore the financial equivalent of that position. The breach
forced the buyer to commit additional resources to accomplish that
result. Where such resources are reasonably available to the buyer----say,
through the capital markets or unused capacity-presumably courts will
find it reasonable to expect the plaintiff to devote them to avoiding the
loss. 181 Sometimes, however, resources necessary to minimize the loss
will exceed the resources available to the plaintiff without sacrificing one
of the projects. Since normal damage rules require courts to restore the
benefit of both projects to the plaintiff, the decision is not whether to
secure to plaintiff the benefit of both projects, but how to do so. The
law faces a choice: it may refuse to reduce the recovery by amounts
that plaintiff could have avoided only by sacrificing other projects, thus
permitting the plaintiff to continue with the project that has been flowing
smoothly and confining the losses to the project the breaching party has
jeopardized; or the law may compensate for the losses imposed on the

180. Where this is not true, the seller can avoid paying consequential damages by
showing that the plaintiff could not have completed the project even if the seller had
performed. Since the expectation interest does not allow plaintiffs to achieve a position
better than the one they would have achieved if the defendant had performed, the court
will deny recovery of the damages independently of the avoidable consequences doctrine.
181. This may not accurately describe the case law. Some cases hint that the
avoidable consequences doctrine will not require the plaintiff to pay more than a trivial
amount to minimize the loss. See Unverzagt v. Young Builders, 215 So. 2d 823, 827
(La. 1968) (questioning whether $ 1000 "is such a nominal sum which a nondefaulting
party should be required to expend to mitigate damages" and noting no precedent
requiring expenditure of more than $200); Schneidt v. Absey Motors, 248 N.W.2d 792
(N.D. 1976) ($1000 not a "trifling sum"). The cases seem to focus on the size of the
expense rather than the reasonable availability of resources to meet the expense. The
cases cited may simply misread the legal encyclopedias (on which a surprising number
of cases rely as authority for details concerning the avoidable consequences doctrine).
See 15 AM. JUR. Damages§ 27 (1938) (plaintiff"is bound to protect himself if he can
do so with reasonable exertion or trifling expense"). Subsequent editions qualified this
proposition, stating that "trifling" may vary with the amount of the consequential losses
that can be prevented and with the availability of funds to the plaintiff. See 22 AM. JUR.
2D Damages§ 501 (1988); 25 C.J.S. Damages§ 33 (1966).
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other portions of the buyer's business as a consequence of the breach.
Courts, via the foreseeability doctrine, effectively choose the former
alternative. Since the defendant arguably could not foresee that breach
would lead a plaintiff to make extraordinary efforts to minimize the loss,
resulting in consequential losses to other projects, courts probably will
reject damages for those remote losses. 182 Thus, when a plaintiff
decides not to make extra efforts to minimize the loss, the expectation
interest requires compensation for the full loss incurred. Courts can
accomplish this by assessing the value of the benefit at the amount of
loss that the plaintiff could have avoided by reasonable effort, without
regard to whether extraordinary efforts could have prevented even more
of the loss.

b.

Unforeseen Losses

The second possibility-the buyer who does not expect consequential
losses------poses less difficulty. Consequential losses the buyer did not
expect probably cannot be recovered regardless of the avoidable
consequences doctrine. The plaintiff cannot recover unforeseeable
consequential damages. 183 In fact, the consequential losses must be
foreseeable to the defendant at the time she enters the contract. If the
plaintiff could not foresee the consequences at the time of breach, it
seems implausible to conclude that "the seller at the time of contracting
had reason to know" of them. 184 Thus, neither theory needs to explain

182. In some cases the defendant might pay less damage if the court did not employ
the foreseeability doctrine in this way. Assume the plaintiff accurately decides that she
will suffer less loss by sacrificing another project in order to minimize the loss to the
project the defendant's breach jeopardized. If the law precludes recovery of losses to
the other project as unforeseeable, then the plaintiff may not take that action. If she
recovers losses to the project defendant jeopardized (as well she might, since those direct
losses are more likely to be foreseeable), she recovers more than she would have without
the foreseeability bar. Nonetheless, opening lawsuits up to arguments about which
project defendant actually harmed probably would consume more in litigation costs than
it would save in these unusual situations. See Epstein, supra note 66. The opportunity
for strategic behavior by plaintiffs, such as trying to link the worst project to a remote
breach by the defendant, also urges caution.
183. U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a) (1995).
184. Id. The language of§ 2-715 permits one quibble that might challenge the
conclusion here. It requires that the seller have reason to know of the buyer's "general
or particular requirements and needs," not necessarily that she know that these needs will
produce losses in the event of breach. Id. Theoretically, then, a seller could know of
the buyer's needs even in a case where the buyer, at the time of breach, did not realize
that those needs would involve losses unless she covered. That situation seems unlikely
to arise in reality. In addition, it seems quite at odds with foreseeability as generally
understood. Notice of the needs should permit the seller to recognize the importance of
performance and take an appropriate level of precaution to ensure performance in
accordance with those needs. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Steven Shavell, Information
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these circumstances. While courts plausibly could invoke the avoidable
consequences doctrine instead of foreseeability doctrine in this situation,
mitigation is merely cumulative and unnecessary in order to achieve the
result. Similarly, the foreseeability doctrine will produce this result even
if expectation analysis fails to posit a benefit in these cases. 185
Nothing in this Article will make unforeseeable consequential losses
recoverable.
This problem may conceal another possible objection. If the buyer
underestimates the amount of consequential losses that the breach will
cause, her decision to forgo mitigation reflects a benefit that exceeds the
underestimate, not a benefit that exceeds the actual amount of consequential losses that would have been prevented by cover. By using the
loss avoidable by reasonable effort to estimate the value of the benefit
to the buyer, this approach may assume too large a value for the benefit.
The objection has already been discussed in connection with the seller's
remedies. 186 Normal damage rules seem justified in conclusively
presuming that the buyer's behavior accurately reflects the subjective
value of the benefit. The buyer seems the best person to foresee and
estimate the value of the project jeopardized by the seller's breach.
Ordinarily we would expect any mistakes to be fairly small. 187 When

and the Scope of Liability for Breach of Contract: The Rule of Hadley v. Baxendale,
7 J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 284,285 (1991). Arguably, that requires that the seller
actually foresee the magnitude of the loss the buyer may suffer (at least within a
reasonable range), since the amount of precaution reasonably necessary may vary with
the amount of loss precaution will prevent. For example, White and Summers urge that
even a defendant who can foresee (generally) that breach might cause the plaintiff to
lose profits on resale might not be liable for "extra profits" plaintiff could have earned
on an "unusually lucrative resale contract ... unless it had reason to know of that
contract." JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT s. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ I 0-4 n.21 (3d ed. 1988). In situations where the defendant realistically should have
realized the nature of the consequential losses the plaintiff would suffer, courts may not
strictly require notice of the amount of the loss. Realistically, though, foreseeability
requirements, however phrased, seem likely to prevent recovery of damages that the
plaintiff herself could not foresee at the time of breach.
185. Expectation analysis could resort to the presumption that the buyer did foresee
consequences that she should have foreseen, in effect assuming a benefit equal to the
losses she (objectively) could have avoided even though she (subjectively) did not
foresee the loss and therefore did not make a subjective decision to retain the benefit of
breach rather than minimizing the losses. The advantages of avoiding subjective inquiry
in this context have been detailed elsewhere. See supra text accompanying notes 45-57.
186. See supra note 63.
187. If foreseeability limits the plaintiff to the amount of loss the defendant
reasonably could foresee, then the plaintiff may not recover for these losses regardless
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the buyer's mistake causes the presumption to reduce the value by more
than the benefit, perhaps the buyer should bear the consequence of her
mistake. That allocation of the burden of the error seems particularly
important considering the possibility that buyers might intentionally seek
to impose higher losses on the seller. If courts allow buyers who
eschew reasonable mitigation efforts to excuse their decision based on
their own poor judgment about the amount of loss they anticipated, they
create an opportunity for buyers to externalize losses that should have
been avoided in the first place. Taking into account the possibility of
strategic behavior by litigants, a reasonable lawmaker would seem
perfectly justified in adopting a rule (estimating the benefit at the amount
of loss that could have been avoided) rather than requiring independent
inquiry into the size of the buyer's (subjective) expected benefit in each
case. 188

c.

Moral Hazard

The last possibility-the plaintiff intentionally allowing the loss to
increase-borders on the irrational. No matter which rationale one
prefers, the law clearly rejects recovery of damages the plaintiff could
have avoided by reasonable efforts. Thus, a rational buyer has little
incentive to allow damages to mount in the hope that doing so would
exact a larger toll from the breaching party. A buyer unaware of the
avoidable consequences doctrine might act in this way out of ignorance.189 A buyer aware of the doctrine must also hope that a jury will
err and award more damages than she deserves. 190 In either event, the

of the existence of the avoidable consequences doctrine or the benefits of the breach.
In fact, the plaintiff would not raise this issue, since doing so virtually would concede
the foreseeability defense. Since U.C.C. § 2-715 does not explicitly require that the
amount of the loss be foreseeable, the discussion cannot rest on this point. U.C.C. § 2715 (1995).
I 88. Dobbs argues that remedial rules often employ such generalizations. See
DOBBS, supra note I 0, § 1.2, at 5. He identifies such generalizations at work in the
benefits rule as applied to contract cases and notes the close similarities between this
application and the avoidable consequences doctrine. Id. § 3.6, at 183. Thus, in
tolerating this kind of general rule, this approach does not deviate from existing practice.
189. Both ignorance and a desire to externalize the cost seem necessary to explain
this behavior. A buyer unaware of the avoidable consequences doctrine nonetheless
would cover or otherwise minimize the loss unless she had some reason to prefer
incurring the loss and seeking to shift it to the defendant in litigation. That reason must
overcome the time value of money (less any recoverable interest that our ignorant buyer
expects to recover), the cost of litigation (including attorneys' fees, unless our ignorant
buyer also believes those will be recoverable), and the possibility of an imperfect result
to litigation (either victory for the defendant or undercompensation of the loss).
190. A buyer might externalize losses if the finder of fact either underestimates the
amount of damages that could have been avoided by reasonable efforts or erroneously
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decision not to avoid the loss does not seem to reflect a benefit to the
vindictive buyer as a result of the breach. Rather, these possibilities
challenge the assumption that the value of the benefit equals the amount
that the buyer could have saved by covering.
Again, a reasonable lawmaker concerned with benefits justifiably may
resort to the presumption that the plaintiff's objective behavior reflects
the subjective value of the benefit to her. Neither ignorance nor
willfulness challenges the existence of the benefit. In each case, the
buyer does not devote the time and effort necessary to cover or
otherwise to avoid the loss. 191 In each case, the buyer saves the time
and effort of completing work on the project for which the goods were
ordered. 192 The expectation interest requires some accounting for those
benefits. The buyer's motivation, at most, undercuts the inference
regarding the amount of the benefit, not the existence of the benefit.
The presumption seems a reasonable method of accounting for the
benefit, even in this context. 193 The presumption may overestimate the
value of the benefit in these cases, but that possibility does not
necessarily require rejection of the presumption if it reaches appropriate
results in most situations. 194
The buyer who chooses to allow avoidable losses to occur may receive
a different sort of benefit, the value of which exceeds the losses she
could have avoided. The buyer seems to anticipate a r,sychological
benefit of exacting vengeance from the breaching seller. 95 Although

concludes that mitigation would have required unreasonable efforts. Even where the
facts are close, the game seems irrational, since attorneys' fees are not recoverable in
most contract cases.
191. The buyer might go through the motions of attempting to cover in an effort to
increase the chance that a factfinder will decide those efforts were reasonable and,
therefore, award full damages without reduction for avoidable consequences. It seems
unlikely that a buyer intent on not covering would devote the same energy to the search
that she would devote if she really wanted to cover.
192. Those savings accrue to the buyer because she does not cover. They exist
regardless of the buyer's motivation for not covering.
193. Plaintiffs do not present a sympathetic case by alleging that they were too
ignorant or too vindictive for the presumption to apply to them.
194. As an empirical matter, perhaps cases involving moral hazard outnumber cases
in which the presumption of benefits produces appropriate results. I am disinclined to
assume that this is true.
195. The benefit discussed here is not actual vengeance, but the anticipated
vengeance. The buyer has not chosen vengeance at the price of bearing the loss; the
vengeance exists only if she does not bear the loss. But the possibility of vengeance
seems worth the cost of the possibility of bearing the loss. The mere prospect of
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not taking reasonable action to minimize the loss, the buyer expects (or
hopes) that the damage award against the seller will cover the full loss
anyway. The buyer who acts with an awareness of the avoidable
consequences doctrine must anticipate some glee from exacting
vengeance. She would not risk bearing the loss herself unless the
benefit of externalizing it, multiplied by the probability of externalizing
it, exceeded the avoidable portion of the loss, multiplied by the
probability of bearing that cost herself. 196 Buyers who choose not to
avoid the loss must attach great value to vengeance. 197 A presumption
that the benefit exceeds the cost avoided seems acceptable in this
context. 198

vengeance benefits the buyer in a way (and to an extent) for which the buyer seems
willing to pay (by accepting the risk of incurring avoidable losses).
196. Lest the language be unclear, let me attempt a formula. The buyer may decide
not to avoid the loss, despite reasonable means to avoid the loss, if V, x p >Lax (l-p).
Where p is the probability that the factfinder will decide not to reduce the buyer's
recovery under the avoidable consequences doctrine, v. represents the value to the buyer
of hurting the breaching seller, and La represents the loss that the buyer could have
avoided by reasonable efforts. Perhaps the formula should include, either within La or
as a separate factor, the litigation cost necessary to succeed. At least part of that cost
may be inevitable if the buyer would need to sue the seller in order to recover the
unavoidable portion of the damages. Without the mitigation issue, the litigation costs
might be lower, either because the lower claim would settle earlier or because the
expense of litigation increases slightly with each additional issue that requires legal
research or testimony from witnesses. At least the incremental cost seems chargeable
within L., since the buyer could have avoided those fees by successful cover.
197. If the buyer expects a 50-50 chance of persuading the factfinder not to reduce
the recovery under the avoidable consequences doctrine, then we know the value of the
benefit (the joy of hurting the seller) exceeds the cost she will bear if she does not
succeed in shifting the loss. If the buyer expects less than a 50% chance to shift the
loss, then the psychological benefit must exceed the loss she may bear by an even
greater margin to make up for the relatively small chance of shifting the loss. If the
buyer believes she probably can shift the loss to the seller, then we cannot conclude the
benefit exceeds the avoidable loss. But a buyer aware of the avoidable consequences
doctrine seems unlikely to expect to shift the loss to the seller more than half of the
time. Again, unless our reasonable lawmaker wants finders of fact to accept and
evaluate virtually unverifiable evidence of the buyer's perceived likelihood that the jury
would reduce the award based on the avoidable consequences doctrine, the law cannot
separate those cases where the buyer received an actual psychological benefit exceeding
the loss from those where she did not.
198. I have avoided suggesting that other policy goals might urge the same result
in order to keep the benefit theory independent (to the extent possible) of concerns for
minimizing wasteful conduct and other motivations traditionally associated with the
avoidable consequences doctrine. These policies might play a secondary role with
respect to the choice between a presumption and individualized factfinding without
jeopardizing that independence. If that seems plausible, the argument on all three issues
in this section becomes much easier. The law might prefer not to encourage laziness,
ignorance, or vindictiveness by allowing persons with such motives an opportunity to
rebut a presumption that applies generally to plaintiffs who do not suffer these character
traits (or flaws). Because reliance on these policies might pollute the benefit analysis,
the text will continue to avoid those explanations.
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The psychological benefit postulated here does not fit into the model
perfectly. The opportunity for vengeance does not resemble the usual
benefit of the breach. Yes, but for the breach, the buyer would not have
an opportunity for vengeance. But by the same token, but for the
breach, the buyer would not have a taste for vengeance (against the
seller, at least). Vengeance would not be a benefit at all. This is not
like a buyer who, ex ante, might have pursued either of two ventures,
each with a potential benefit, and now finds herself with an opportunity
to pursue the road not taken initially. This is a new taste, created by the
breach. It seems odd to use as a benefit fulfillment of a taste that the
breach created, even though the breach simultaneously created the
opportunity to pursue that taste.
On the other hand, the buyer's joy in anticipating large damages
against the seller would not exist if the contract had been performed.
Thus, to allow the buyer to retain this glee without any offset in the
damage award would leave the buyer better off than if the contract had
been performed. In effect, this analysis asks that we take into account
all benefits, not just those benefits that fit the normal commercial
mold. 199 This resembles a proposition rejected in the tort context: that
we should offset actual pecuniary losses by calculating incommensurable
nonpecuniary benefits. 200 The likelihood of excessive offset seems

199. The same reasoning might suggest that the law should compensate for all costs,
including psychological costs arising ftom the breach. See Pettit, supra note 6, at 419-20
& n.9 (concluding that measurement problems preclude awards for disappointment). In
some cases, contract law will compensate for emotional distress. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353 (1979) (denying recovery unless the breach caused
bodily injury or was "of such a kind that serious emotional disturbance was a
particularly likely result"). The foreseeability standard in this section is both looser and
stricter than the normal foreseeability rule: looser in that it seems to involve what the
breacher can foresee at the time of the breach, since the characteristics of the breach
allow recovery for emotional distress, but see DOBBS, supra note 9, § 12.3 (suggesting
that foreseeability restricts emotional distress because the defendant's promise did not
include a guaranty against distress); stricter in that emotional distress must seem
particularly likely, which may demand more than just "a probable result." See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351 (1979). The limitation to serious
emotional distress seems likely to prevent claims for mere disappointment. The degree
to which this type of recovery may expand in the future has recently been addressed
elsewhere. Douglas J. Whaley, Paying for the Agony: The Recovery of Emotional
Distress Damages in Contract Actions, 26 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 935 (1992).
200. When the law expressly takes benefits into account, it normally refuses to mix
pecuniary and nonpecuniary components of the harm and the benefit. Thus, the
Restatement (Second) of Torts subtracts benefits only if they affect the same interest as
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controlled in this context. Instead of asking the jury to assess how much
distress an individual suffered or how much glee she felt in the abstract,
we simply assume the glee equalled or exceeded an objectively
observable quantity: the amount of loss the plaintiff could have avoided
by reasonable efforts. 201
The buyer unaware of the doctrine poses a different problem. She
does not realize that she risks suffering this loss herself. 202 Thus, the
assertion that the psychological benefit offsets the loss falters. But the
law encounters difficulty treating the ignorant buyer differently from the
malicious buyer. In part the problem is evidentiary. Courts cannot
distinguish the ignorant from the malicious with any ease. 203 Thus,
different treatment may permit the malicious to pretend to be merely
ignorant in order to take advantage of different treatment. 204 Public
policy points the same direction. The law does not want to encourage
ignorance by rewarding it. Thus, a rule presuming that the ignorant
received benefits like the malicious might encourage informed behavior.
Opening the door to individualized evaluation of benefits--here or in
other contexts--poses serious dangers. Objective measures avoid absurd
results. For instance, a buyer who retained $70,000 of the purchase
price could not be allowed to claim she valued the money at less than
$70,000 (despite evidence that the marginal utility of money may vary
among people). Nor could a seller who retained property demonstrably
worth $70,000 be allowed to make such a claim. Even if either party
the interest harmed. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 920 (1977). "Interests" may
not divide pecuniary from nonpecuniary harms, see Alexander M. Capron, Tort Liability
in Genetic Counselling, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 618, 638-39 & n.91 (1979), though that
seems the better reading of the Restatement provisions. See Kelly, supra note 53, at 521
& n.73; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 cmt. b, illus. 4-6 (1977). This can
prevent intangible and incalculable benefits (such as emotional benefits) from obliterating
substantial and certain pecuniary losses.
20 I. The door to measuring distress might better be left uncracked. Yet the two
contexts differ sufficiently to permit the different applications urged here.
202. In effect, her ignorance of the avoidable consequences doctrine leads her to
expect to recover the avoidable losses I 00% of the time, perhaps the most plausible
example of a person who might estimate the chance of shifting the loss at greater than
50%.
203. See supra note 47.
204. Perhaps if the law develops a perfect method of finding facts, including facts
regarding a party's subjective state of mind, this concern will disappear. Those with
absolute faith in the jury systelfr--Or those willing to pretend such faith because they
share the prejudices juries are likely to exhibit----may prefer to open these issues to the
jury. Today, the avoidable consequences doctrine does not present these issues, since
it imposes a duty on the plaintiff to minimize the loss-----a duty ignorance does not
excuse. The expectation interest can perpetuate that result via the presumption urged
here, which establishes the thesis of this Article. Whether the courts should open the
issue of intent up to factfinding after they accept this thesis, I will leave for others to
discuss when that day comes.
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showed they traded the money or property for a stick of chewing gum
(or any other thing worth much less than $70,000), the subsequent
conduct of the party does not change the value of the benefit actually
bestowed by the breach. Demonstrating that the other party could have
reduced the loss by $70,000 if she had engaged in reasonable conduct
requires the same treatment. Prospectively, viewed at the time of the
breach, the plaintiff gained an opportunity not previously available to use
resources (undelivered goods, services, property, money, productive
capacity, or the like) in alternative ways to offset the loss. What she
actually does with those resources is irrelevant. At the time of the
breach, they have value. That value belongs to the plaintiff; the breach
relinquished the defendant's claim upon the resources. That plaintiff's
mistakes might lead her to underutilize those resources is not legally
significant. It resembles any other decision by a party to pay too much
(or to ask too little) for one's property.
In each case, a reasonable lawmaker concerned with accounting for the
benefits seems justified in employing an objective rather than a
subjective analysis. When asking why the buyer would decide not to
take reasonable measures that would have minimized the loss, the law
reasonably can presume that the decision reflects some benefit the buyer
valued more highly than the loss she incurred by not covering, or
otherwise minimizing, the harm from the breach. While that presumption does not perfectly explain every individual's subjective reaction, it
explains the most plausible cases quite adequately and can justify its
deviation in the exceptional cases.
3.

Summary

The avoidable consequences doctrine duplicates the results the
expectation interest would require if courts consciously addressed the
benefits that flow from breach of contract. Thus, courts could refocus
their attention from concern for the losses the plaintiff could have
avoided to the benefits the plaintiff actually received. Those benefits
often may require indirect measurement by reference to the losses that
could have been avoided. In addition, courts may need to adopt
pnisumptions that the plaintiff acted reasonably in order to avoid
entanglement in unmanageable subjective valuations. The expectation
interest does not require courts to open the door for plaintiffs to pretend
their subjective value differed from the value their conduct implies.
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Rather than encourage vindictive plaintiffs to hope for erroneous
judgments or manipulative plaintiffs to seek post hoc rationalizations for
their wasteful conduct, courts can encourage plaintiffs to become
informed and to act rationally to minimize waste by employing a
conclusive presumption that breach benefits the plaintiff in at least the
amount that the plaintiff could have avoided losing with reasonable
effort.
This brief survey of contractual contexts cannot encompass all of the
different ways contracts might be breached and avoidable consequences
might be raised as a defense. 205 But in each of the contexts discussed,
the general principles sketched at the outset have similar and analogous
applications. That result should not surprise anyone. Wonnell has
demonstrated quite convincingly that the same fundamental principles
govern all contracts. 206 The generality of the avoidable consequences
doctrine may exceed Wonnell 's claim, since the avoidable consequences
doctrine also applies to noncontractual actions. While one may find
cases that do not conform neatly to the paradigms offered here, the range
of cases explainable by the expectation interest suggests a realistic
generality to its ability to duplicate the results produced by the avoidable
consequences doctrine. In fact, the generality may extend beyond the
realm of contract law and into tort law--but that requires a different
article.
II.

THE INDEPENDENCE OF BENEFIT ANALYSIS

The analysis in Part I depends on the inference that the amount of loss
the plaintiff could have avoided by reasonable effort approximates the
value of the benefits the plaintiff received as a result of the breach. That
inference, in tum, depends on the conclusion that a plaintiff who could
avoid losses by reasonable effort would do so absent some benefit she
valued more highly. That conclusion, however, may depend on the
existence of the avoidable consequences doctrine, creating a chicken/egg
problem. If the benefit analysis proposed here must assume the
existence of the avoidable consequences doctrine in order to explain how
that doctrine actually estimates the benefits of breach, then benefit
analysis lacks any independent significance. This section explores the
independence of benefit analysis.
To demonstrate the problem, imagine a world in which the avoidable
consequences doctrine does not exist. Assume that the law awards

205. Additional illustrations could be presented, but would simply serve to lengthen
an already ponderous article.
206. Wonnell, supra note 31, at 493-94.
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plaintiffs in contract cases their expectation interest-including incidental
damages and an offset for any losses actually avoided--but does not
offset any amount for losses that the plaintiff could have avoided but did
not avoid.
In this world, the plaintiff's failure to avoid losses does not imply that
she valued a benefit of the breach more than the reasonably avoidable
loss. The plaintiff will receive her full expectation regardless of whether
she actually avoids the loss. If she does not avoid the loss, she receives
payment in full from the defendant. If she does avoid part of the loss,
she receives the same total amount, but less of it comes from the
defendant.207 As a result, if the benefit of the breach exceeds zero, the
plaintiff will refrain from avoiding the loss. For example, a seller of
goods might decide to keep the goods rather than resell them as long as
she valued them more than zero. Even a $1 value would leave the
plaintiff better off than if she resold the goods, since she can keep the
$1 if she does not resell, but will lose it (via a lower damage award) if
she does resell. Similarly, even if a discharged employee attached
virtually no value to leisure, any positive value would induce the
employee to refrain from substitute work. If she takes substitute work,
she receives her expected pay (part from new employment, part from
damages) plus zero leisure; if she remains idle, she receives her expected
pay (entirely from damages) plus a small value of leisure. 208
The argument does not attack the existence of a benefit. The decision
not to minimize the loss demonstrates that the plaintiff did value the
benefit more than zero. Thus, courts applying the expectation interest
logically should seek a means to evaluate that benefit and offset it
against the recovery. But the inference that the plaintiff values the
benefit as much as or more than the amount of loss she could have
avoided no longer follows. It might be true, but one cannot demonstrate
its truth in any particular case without independent evidence. Without
this inference, the courts arguably could not generate the avoidable
consequences doctrine as a means of estimating the benefits of breach.
Instead, the court would need to examine evidence of the value of the

207. Wonnell refers to this as a 100% tax on the savings. Id. He also points out
that various exceptions to the avoidable consequences doctrine can create the same
incentives under existing law. Id. at 494-95.
208. The need to eat every day, rather than in the long run, may preclude employees
from actually pursuing this option. See id. at 494-96.
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benefit or, if such evidence was not available, ignore the benefit for
failure of proof.
The inference that the benefit equals the amount of avoidable loss
remains valid in a world that applies the avoidable consequences
doctrine. If courts offset the award by the amount of the loss the
plaintiff could have avoided, the plaintiff will not recover her full
expectation unless she makes reasonable efforts to minimize the loss.
In that situation, she will not refrain from reasonable efforts unless the
advantage of refraining (the benefit she expects from not continuing to
perform) exceeds the amount of loss she can avoid----a point discussed
in agonizing detail above. Thus, at least initially, the inference appears
to depend on the prior existence of the avoidable consequences doctrine.
The benefit analysis proposed here would retain some importance even
if we ultimately concluded that it depends on the prior existence of the
avoidable consequences doctrine. At the very least, this Article
identifies an additional, previously unrecognized function that the
avoidable consequences doctrine performs. In the future, discussion
about how to apply the avoidable consequences doctrine would need to
consider not only the purpose of preventing waste, but also the purpose
of offsetting any benefit of the breach. In addition, the analysis here
reconciles the avoidable consequences doctrine to the expectation
interest. Instead of seeing the avoidable consequences doctrine as an
exception to expectation recoveries, we can recognize how the two
doctrines work hand in hand to produce the position the plaintiff would
have occupied if the defendant had performed. In short, our understanding of the law and its workings improves once we recognize this subtle
role the avoidable consequences doctrine plays in contract remedies.
As the title of this Article implies, however, I hope to establish a more
ambitious claim: that we could dispense with the avoidable consequences doctrine. This section will approach that task in two ways. First, the
inference at issue here is self-justifying. Once the law proclaims that the
award will be offset by avoidable losses, the inference arises. The law
can dispense with the original reason for offsetting avoidable losses
without undercutting the inference, as long as the law continues to offset
avoidable losses against the recovery. Thus, whatever the historical
origin of the decision to offset the award by avoidable losses, the law
could dispense with the avoidable consequences doctrine and ground the
offset entirely on the benefits.
Perhaps more satisfying, this Article also will argue that the common
law could have developed the offset of avoidable losses even if it never
developed the avoidable consequences doctrine. This conclusion
eliminates the chicken/egg problem, arguing that the avoidable consequences doctrine logically need not precede the inference regarding the
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value of the benefit. In order to establish this point, the Article will
introduce a new wrinkle to the expectation interest: the natural harm
caused by the breach. Natural harm seeks to distinguish those losses
caused by the breach from those caused by the combination of the
breach and the availability of a damage remedy. Losses the plaintiff
would not have suffered if the law provided no remedy seem an artifact
of the legal system rather than a loss defendants must compensate. A
common-law court might choose to implement the expectation interest
in a manner designed to remedy the natural harm caused by the breach,
without remedying the part of the harm created by reliance on the
availability of damages. If so, the court could have generated the offset
for benefits, as measured by the amount of avoidable loss, even if the
court ignored concerns for minimizing waste. The chicken/egg dilemma
may disappear once courts recognize the artificial set of incentives
introduced by the availability of damages.
A.

The Superfluous Avoidable Consequences Doctrine

The chicken/egg problem identified above implies that the courts could
not have created an offset for the amount ofreasonably avoidable losses
without referring to concerns for minimizing waste or other principles
underlying the avoidable consequences doctrine. Going forward,
however, the law could dispense with all concern for waste without
changing the offset for avoidable losses. The existence of the offset has
created circumstances that justify the inference that the plaintiff must
value the benefit more than the amount of loss she could avoid by
reasonable effort. Because courts do subtract the amount of avoidable
loss, the plaintiff who chooses not to take reasonable measures that
would reduce the loss must value some benefit of breach more than the
amount of avoidable loss. As long as the law continues to subtract the
amount of avoidable loss, the inference continues to hold. Thus, the law
could dispense with all reference to the avoidable consequences doctrine
without changing any case results. By changing the explanation for the
offset, but continuing to measure the offset in the same way, the law can
implement the lessons of benefit analysis and dispense with the concept
of avoidable consequences.
Two objections to this explanation immediately arise. First, it smacks
of ipse dixit. The inference (that the amount of avoidable loss equals
the benefit of the breach) works because we subtract the avoidable losses
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from recovery; we do not subtract the avoidable loss because the
inference works. The argument appears to suggest that the law should
impose an offset that lacks any prior justification209 simply in order to
justify an inference that it otherwise could not make. Second, saying we
can dispense with the rationale for the avoidable consequences doctrine
does not establish that we should dispense with it. Since minimizing
waste has some value to society, there seems no intrinsic benefit to
dispensing with that rationale for the offset.
The full response to the second objection must await Part III. The law
might not be any worse off if it subtracted avoidable losses in order to
discourage waste than if it subtracted avoidable losses in order to
account for benefits of the breach. The effort to establish the independence of benefit analysis is not born of antipathy to the goal of
minimizing waste. But Part III will suggest that existing rationales for
the avoidable consequences doctrine leave the doctrine in an uncomfortable position. They fail to explain some very useful assertions about the
doctrine. Specifically, existing rationales do not explain why the
plaintiff does not have a duty to minimize the loss or why the doctrine
is not simply a manifestation of contributory negligence. 210
The expectation interest can explain these assertions about the
avoidable consequences doctrine. If benefit analysis remains parasitic
upon the avoidable consequences doctrine, however, benefit analysis
seems to take a back seat to the primary rationale for the doctrine.
Benefit analysis, instead of offering a powerful explanation of the law,
offers an interesting side effect that may or may not deserve consideration when deciding how to apply the avoidable consequences doctrine.
Explanations of the doctrine based only on the secondary rationale may
not have sufficient power to displace the concepts of duty and contributory negligence.
Benefit analysis seems more likely to generate improvements in the
application of the avoidable consequences doctrine if it can explain the
doctrine independently, without falling back on the justifications that
have tied the doctrine so closely to contributory negligence. If normal
damage rules can generate the offset without reference to the avoidable
consequences doctrine or its underlying rationale, then benefit analysis
can claim an equal footing with the existing rationales for the avoidable
consequences doctrine. Thus, this section seeks to establish that we can
dispense with further reference to the avoidable consequences doctrine,
209. The avoidable consequences doctrine has other justifications, but I can hardly
rely on those justifications in explaining why we can dispense with them.
210. Commentators offer explanations for these points, but Part III argues that those
explanations are not persuasive.
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but not necessarily that we should do so. Once that has been accomplished, we can assess whether benefit analysis can improve the
application of the avoidable consequences doctrine without fear that the
weakness of the proposition will undercut its usefulness.
The first objection-that the inference is ipse dixit-reflects intellectual uneasiness more than logical concern. The inference is the effect of
the offset, not its cause. We can infer that the benefit equals the amount
of the avoidable loss only because we decree an offset in damage
recoveries; the decree provides parties the incentive to minimize the loss,
upon which we base the inference that the failure to mitigate must reflect
a benefit. Since the offset must exist (apparently for other reasons)
before the inference becomes valid, it seems odd to tum the table---to
treat the effect (the inference) as the reason (or cause) for its own
continued existence, even if we dispense with the original cause or
reason.
The phenomenon is familiar in the law. Doctrines often outlive their
original purpose. Punitive damages once served to compensate for
emotional distress, which was not compensable at the time. 211 That
rationale no longer applies. Yet punitive damages persist. The law has
discovered other uses for them. Perhaps, however, punitive damages
survive because they serve a new underlying purpose, not merely
because the law declares that they survive.
A closer analogy arises in the doctrine of consideration. Consideration
originated based on just this kind of self-fulfilling declaration. At one
time the law refused to enforce promises exchanged for other promises
until one party had performed, at least in part. Until one party had
begun to perform, the other party had not received anything in exchange
for the promise. In other words, no consideration existed until the party
had received part of the performance; receiving the promise itself was
not consideration. 212
If a promise itself has value, of course, then merely giving a promise
in exchange for another promise may constitute consideration. A
promise has value if it is enforceable. 213 Thus, if a court could decree

211. See, e.g., Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive
Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 12-20 (1982).
212. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, § 1.5, at 15.
213. A promise can have value even if it is not enforceable. As a moral obligation
or a chance that the other party will perform despite the absence of legal coercion,
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the return promise enforceable, then it would be consideration for the
promise. Each party's promise would be enforceable from the moment
it was made if the other party's promise were enforceable from the
moment it was made. The circularity should sound familiar: we could
subtract the amount of avoidable loss based on the inference that the
benefit of the breach equals the amount of avoidable loss, an inference
that is justified if we subtract the amount of the avoidable loss.
The law surmounted that problem and today declares that a promise
can be consideration for a promise. 214 But how the law got here from
there remains somewhat cloudy. One suspects a self-fulfilling declaration. Once the court declares that promise-for-promise does satisfy the
requirement of consideration, then promises have value and, therefore,
they do satisfy the requirement of consideration. We might express
some intellectual discomfort with the process by which the law reached
this point. 215 Yet the result presents no problem going forward. 216
An enforceable promise does have value. Something that has value,
including an enforceable promise, can be consideration for another
promise. Prospectively, the propositions justify the result, even if they
might not have justified the result at the time the courts originally
announced the result.
The same paradox exists here; the same way out is available. In a
world that did not offset awards by the amount of avoidable loss, we
might not infer that the plaintiff valued benefits of breach more than the
amount of loss she could have avoided. 217 But once a court declared
that it would subtract the amount of avoidable loss from the recovery,
a rational plaintiff would minimize the loss unless the benefits of the
breach exceeded the avoidable loss. Thus, the inference would become
true after the decree, even though it was not true before the decree.
Going forward from that point, courts could evaluate the benefits of the

people might attach value to unenforceable promises and even be willing to pay for
them. That explanation, however, has not been reported as the rationale for moving
from nudum pactum to promise-for-promise. In a day when consideration needed to be
adequate in order to justify enforcement, the mere possibility that the other party might
perform out of personal integrity seems unlikely to have produced the consideration
courts demanded.
214. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§§ 71, 75.
215. Farnsworth notes the circularity of the explanation. FARNSWORTH, supra note
2, § 1.6, at 17.
2 I 6. I do not mean to discount concerns that the law should not enforce promises
until some reliance has occurred. See, e.g., PATRICK s. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL
OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 1-7 ( I 979). But we have no trouble explaining to our
students that an enforceable promise has value and, thus, can be consideration for
another promise even before either promise has been performed.
217. Part 11.B, infra, argues that we could still draw the inference.
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breach based on the amount of the avoidable loss. The decree creates
its own rationale.
This Article need not urge courts to take a step that would not be
justified until after they took it. Courts have already taken the first step;
they already reduce damage awards by the amount of loss that the
plaintiff could have avoided by reasonable efforts. Thus, the most
uncomfortable portion of the process--the initial decree without a priori
justification--has already occurred. 218 The inference, thus, is valid.
Going forward, we can continue to offset awards as a necessary step to
prevent overcompensation under the expectation interest. We could
continue to offset awards, even ifwe concluded that there was no public
policy to discourage waste. The expectation interest, refined to include
an account for benefits of the breach, would justify the continued
application of the offset, even if it never could have justified the offset's
initial application.
This section hopes to have established that we can dispense with all
references to the avoidable consequences doctrine without changing the
outcome of cases now decided under the rubric of the avoidable
consequences doctrine. One could try to squeeze more import out of the
argument, seeking to establish that the common law would have
generated this offset independently of the avoidable consequences
doctrine. Common law courts apparently were willing to take a step that
lacked advance justification, but that would be justified once taken.
Such a court could create the offset for avoidable losses based entirely
on the expectation interest. The next section, however, hopes to
establish a more persuasive basis for that conclusion--one that does not
rest on the assumption that a court would be willing to take selfjustifying action.

B.

Generating the Offset Without the Avoidable
Consequences Doctrine

This section requires that we step into a hypothetical world in which
the law has decided to employ the expectation interest as the remedy in

218. To the extent that the avoidable consequences doctrine has independent
grounds for its existence, such as discouraging waste, the courts may have had an a
priori justification for the decree. That eliminates the discomfort associated with that
first step, but does not alter the validity of the second step.
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contract cases, but has not yet decided whether to reduce damage awards
by amounts that plaintiffs could have avoided by reasonable efforts. A
reasonable lawmaker might first consider whether the decision to employ
the expectation interest required or, at least, favored the reduction of
awards by the amount of loss avoidable.
The concern for benefits of the breach represents one consideration
that might influence the decision to deny recovery of losses that the
plaintiff could have avoided by reasonable efforts. Failure to account for
those benefits (when they exist) would overcompensate the plaintiff,
leaving her better off than if the defendant had performed the contract.
As already noted, however, the inference that the plaintiff values the
benefits of breach at least as much as the amount of avoidable losses
would not necessarily follow from her decision not to avoid those losses.
If we posit a lawmaker creating a new system of rules before any
conduct governed by them has occurreci--,i realistic prospect in creating
a new civil code----perhaps the lawmaker could simply choose a rule that
produced the appropriate inference, as suggested in the preceding
section. Instead, let us consider a common-law judge ruling on the issue
as a matter of first impression: no one has decided whether to subtract
avoidable losses because no one has ever decided a case where the
defendant proved the plaintiff failed to take reasonable action to avoid
part of the loss. How should the reasonable common-law judge decide
the case?
The expectation interest provides a well-defined target for the judge:
the position the plaintiff would have occupied if the defendant had
performed (her rightful position). 219 To state the matter another way,
the expectation interest requires the court to award the difference
between the plaintiff's rightful position and the position the plaintiff
would have occupied if the defendant had breached. The rephrasing
expresses a previously implicit aspect of the expectation interest. It is
not sufficient, in awarding damages, to specify the target; one must also
specify the baseline. Only then can the court measure the distance
between the two points and calculate an award sufficient to span that
distance.
The rephrasing uses a curious construction to identify the baseline:
"the position the plaintiff would have occupied if the defendant had
breached." The defendant did breach; otherwise the court would not

219. The "rightful position" is Douglas Laycock's convenient shorthand for the
position the plaintiff would have occupied if the wrong had not occurred. LAYCOCK,
supra note 2, at 15. When discussing the expectation interest, the rightful position
becomes the position the plaintiff would have occupied if the defendant had performed
the contract--the target we seek to achieve.
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need to calculate a remedy. Thus, the award arguably can be calculated
based on the difference between the rightful position and the position the
plaintiff now occupies. In effect, the position the plaintiff would have
occupied if the defendant had breached can be equated to the position
the plaintiff does occupy following the defendant's breach. The actual
position substitutes for the hypothetical position, lending certainty to the
factfinding at that end of the spectrum. 220
The expectation interest, however, does not dictate that substitution.
Expectation dictates the target, not the baseline. Thus, calculations of
the expectation interest can take into account other variables that might
make the position the plaintiff now occupies different from the position
the plaintiff would have occupied if the defendant had breached.
Specifically, this section will explore the significance of the position the
plaintiff would have occupied if the defendant had breached and no
damage recovery was available to the plaintiff.
"Natural harm" is a phrase that aptly describes the difference between
the plaintiff's rightful position (the position the plaintiff would have
occupied if the defendant had performed) and the position she would
have occupied if the defendant had breached and no damage recovery
was available to the plaintiff. That difference measures the harm that
would have occurred in the state of nature, uninfluenced by the existence
of legal institutions and damage awards. If the plaintiff's actual position
differs from the position she would have occupied if the breach had
occurred in this state of nature, our reasonable lawmaker might consider
whether the difference exists because the law introduced some artificial
incentive that has exaggerated the amount of harm the plaintiff suffered.
A reasonable lawmaker might devote some attention to the concept of
natural harm. The law seeks to remedy the loss caused by the
breach. 221 Losses that would not have resulted from the breach if no

220. Uncertainty may affect the calculation at the other end, as when the evidence
does not reveal precisely what would have occurred if the defendant had performed. But
at least the court can determine with precision the situation that does exist.
221. While causation is not always mentioned as an element of contract damages,
it is implicit in the expectation interest. Losses that had causes independent of the
breach-----that would have occurred even if the defendant had performed--are not
included in recoveries. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, § 12. I, at 841. The
target-the position the plaintiff would have occupied if the defendant had performed--will be lower when some losses would have occurred despite the breach.
Given the origins of contract law in tort law, Id. § 1.6, it should not surprise anyone to
find that causation plays a role in contract actions.
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damage award had existed seem somewhat tenuously linked to the
breach, just as losses that would have resulted even if the defendant had
performed have little connection to the breach. Even when the plaintiff
actually did suffer the loss----that is, she actually occupies a position
worse than the one used to calculate natural harm------the decision to hold
the defendant liable for the difference between the natural harm and the
actual harm requires some justification. The lawmaker can award the
amount of natural harm without much discussion. Any amount in excess
of natural harm requires more deliberation.
The natural harm will not include any amounts that the plaintiff could
have avoided by reasonable efforts. If no damage recovery is available,
a rational plaintiff will make reasonable efforts to minimize the loss.
Any losses she does not avoid will fall on her, providing ample incentive
to minimize losses whenever reasonably possible.
That incentive will not produce mitigation efforts if the plaintiff
received benefits from the breach that offset the losses she could have
avoided. If she valued goods retained more than the market valued
them, she might retain them rather than minimize her loss by reselling
to another. If she valued leisure more than the market valued her labor,
she might not take alternative employment despite the availability of
other work. If she had other more valuable projects available, she might
not cover with substitute goods despite her ability to prevent consequential losses by doing so. But when the loss would not be borne by the
defendant, she would not refrain from reasonable efforts to minimize the
loss unless she anticipated some benefit that would offset more of the
loss.
Thus, a court focused on natural harm could draw the inference
proposed in Part I of this Article: that the plaintiff valued the benefits
of breach at least as much as she valued the amount of loss that she
could have avoided by reasonable efforts. 222 Natural harm excludes

222. Transaction costs might intercede here. A plaintiff who could not obtain a
remedy would not choose to avoid the loss if the benefit of breach equalled the amount
of loss avoided minus the cost to avoid the loss. Thus, the law can only infer that the
plaintiff valued the benefit as much as the net amount of avoidable loss. Without a
damage remedy, transaction costs will not drop out of the equation. Yet this still
matches the result the avoidable consequences doctrine produces. Even if a plaintiff
does not actually incur incidental costs in an effort to minimize the loss, the law will
subtract the amount of loss she could have avoided minus the cost to avoid that loss.
See DOBBS, supra note 9, § 3.9, at 271. Dobbs suggests that this application is not
firmly established. One can imagine reasons the law might want to allow recovery of
incidental damages that the plaintiff did incur, but to penalize plaintiffs who did not
attempt to minimize the loss by denying recovery (or offset) for the costs they would
have incurred if they had made reasonable efforts. Nothing in the avoidable consequences doctrine, however, suggests a punitive purpose. The doctrine limits the damage award
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avoidable losses.
The plaintiff might urge a different result in one of two ways. First,
the plaintiff might object to the concept of natural harm, urging that the
actual harm provides the proper baseline for measuring damages.
Second, the plaintiff might attempt to explain reasons that she would not
have minimized the harm even if no remedy was available. Neither
prospect seems particularly likely to succeed-except to the extent that
the latter prospect persuades a court that the plaintiff did in fact take
reasonable measures to minimize the loss. 223
The argument in favor of actual harm as opposed to natural harm must
first establish that actual harm differs from natural harm. Actual harm
has some initial appeal. A plaintiff left worse off than if the contract
had been performed seems relatively more deserving than a breaching
defendant. But the law cannot easily assume an award of natural harm
would leave the plaintiff worse off than if the contract had been
performed. If the plaintiff really did receive benefits that exceeded the
avoidable losses, actual harm equals (or may even be less than) natural
harm. Thus, the mere fact that the plaintiff has not avoided losses that
she could have avoided by reasonable efforts does not establish an actual
harm different from natural harm. Sympathy for the injured victim
seems premature until we can assess the extent of the injury. 224

against the defendant to the amount that would have been assessed if the plaintiff had
made reasonable efforts to minimize the loss. The cost of those efforts would have been
included in the target damage award. The avoidable consequences doctrine provides no
reason to award a plaintiff less than she would have received if she had made reasonable
efforts.
223. In effect, this transforms the second argument into reasons that the measures
she could have taken to minimize the loss were unreasonably risky, burdensome, or
humiliating. When the plaintiffs explanation takes this form, it does not really reject
the inference, but the application of the inference to the facts of a given case. The court
could still infer that the failure to take reasonable efforts revealed a benefit of the
breach. By explaining the unreasonableness of the efforts under discussion, the plaintiff
avoids the conclusion without challenging the rationale for the inference.
224. One might argue that uncertainty should be resolved against the breaching
defendant. See Bigelow v. RKO Pictures, 327 U.S. 251 (1946). Even Bigelow,
however, conceded that the fact of damage must be certain in order to support recovery.
Earlier doctrine insisted that damages must be certain "both in their nature and in respect
to the cause from which they proceed." See SEDGWICK, supra note 10, at 23. While
it is clear that the natural harm proceeds from the defendant's breach, that is not as
certain for any additional harms claimed. The certainty doctrine exists largely to compel
the plaintiff to overcome uncertainty before the court allows recovery. Modem
application, while somewhat more generous in formulating a requirement of reasonable
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Efforts to demonstrate that actual harm exceeds natural harm edge into
the second category of arguments. Each argument the plaintiff raises to
demonstrate that she did not receive a benefit faces an immediate
inquiry: "Why, then, didn't you take reasonable efforts to reduce the
harm?" Substantive arguments that the goods, leisure, or alternative
projects lacked value may never be conclusive until an explanation of
the failure to reduce the loss occurs. 225
Explanations for the decision not to reduce the loss, however, seem
rather difficult to devise. The obvious choice is moral hazard: the
plaintiff may claim that she did not minimize the loss because she
expected the defendant to pay without her having to minimize the loss.
That argument, however, steps slightly outside the hypothetical. We
posited this case as one of first impression: no court has yet decided
whether to compensate for losses incurred when the plaintiff could have
avoided them by reasonable efforts. Thus, the plaintiff had no justification for believing that she could recover these losses. This makes the
plaintiff's explanation unlikely, in the sense that few plaintiffs seem
likely to have made a conscious choice not to minimize the loss based
on a projection that they would recover the full amount in the damage
award. But the argument is not impossible to credit; a plaintiff may
have made this mistake. The mistake does differentiate natural harm
from actual harm: the plaintiff would not have made this mistake in a
world where no damage recovery was possible. 226
Other mistakes might explain the same result. The plaintiff may have
mistakenly believed that reasonable efforts would not have minimized

certainty, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 352 (1979), hardly justifies
reversing the obligation to overcome uncertainty.
225. The defendant seems ill-positioned to present evidence that the plaintiff really
did attach substantial value to goods, leisure, or alternative projects. These values (and
the alternative projects themselves) seem peculiarly within the knowledge of the plaintiff.
Thus, the suspicion that we simply cannot discover the real benefit remains to undermine
the argument that no such benefits exist.
226. The explanation might go further: the mistake would be entirely reasonable
if the background assumptions in the community or the business included the assumption
that the breaching party would pay the entire loss, including losses the plaintiff could
have avoided. That the law had not considered the issue before is not necessarily an
indication that the issue had not been considered and resolved in numerous dealings
among people. A common-law court faced with evidence of conventional practice in the
community would seem likely to embody that practice in the discovered law. Perhaps
the common law's reluctance to ask landowners to seek new tenants following a breach
was not based on the unique nature of interests in land, but an underlying assumption
that breaching parties should pay the full actual loss, moral hazard notwithstanding.
While I have not researched the business mores of the period when the avoidable
consequences doctrine originated, I have some doubt about the realism of this
assumption. The law's reluctance to apply the same rule to non-land cases suggests a
unique reason, rather than one of general applicability.
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the loss---that efforts would have been futile or that efforts would have
required unreasonably large expenses.
A reasonable lawmaker deciding the issue as a matter of first
impression, however, might choose to infer that benefits explain the
difference between natural harm and actual (or apparent) harm. The
court faces two decisions: first, it must decide whether the plaintiff
really made such a mistake or, alternatively, whether the plaintiff
actually received a benefit and now seeks enrichment (rather than
compensation) from the damage award; second, it must decide what
legal effect to give the mistake-whether actual harm in excess of
natural harm deserves compensation when caused by the plaintiff's own
mistake.
Attacking the second threatens to lapse into fault arguments. Since the
plaintiff's own failure to minimize the loss proximately caused those
losses, the plaintiff (not the defendant) should bear them. Relying on
fault to choose the baseline, however, comes perilously close to tort
concepts, such as contributory negligence and the duty to minimize the
loss. If possible, this Article would rather explain the offset without
relying on those principles.
This Article has discussed the alternative explanation before. 227 A
common-law court might prefer not to inquire into the reality of the
mistake. The mistaken plaintiff does not rebut the existence of benefits.
The breach relinquished the defendant's claim on the plaintiff's
resources, which the plaintiff could have used to reduce the loss. (If no
loss was avoidable, the issue of whether to offset the recovery does not
arise.) Thus, at the time of the breach the plaintiff received resources
she could have exchanged for a dollar value: the amount of avoidable
loss. A reasonable lawmaker could (and probably should) assess the
value of that benefit based on what the plaintiff could have received for
it, not necessarily what she actually received for it. 228 The mistaken
plaintiff claims that she did not realize the value of the benefits she
possessed. But at the moment of breach she possessed that value. To
allow her to recover damages as if she could not have exchanged those
227. See supra Part I.C.
228. This judgment is reflected in existing law. When a seller does not resell after
buyer's breach, damages are offset by the market value of the goods at the time of the
breach. U.C.C. § 2-708 (I 995). An actual resale is irrelevant, unless reasonable. Id.
§ 2-706 ("made in good faith and a commercially reasonable manner"). A seller
recovers based on objective market conditions, not subjective mistakes about the value.
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resources for value would unjustly enrich her--not only in the cases
where she actually did (or still can) dispose of the assets for value, but
also in the cases where she did not and cannot realize the value any
longer. Plaintiff may decide to dispose of her assets by letting them
deteriorate; that is a prerogative of ownership. She cannot claim that she
never had the value when she, through inaction, exercised that prerogative in a way that did not exchange it for a monetary equivalent. The
issue is not fault, but timing. The breach bestowed a benefit which, at
the time of breach, had value. The plaintiff would be unjustly enriched
to recover damages (without offset) and retain the asset. That property
values declined thereafter, making the asset less valuable, is a risk that
falls on the owner, not the person who relinquished ownership.
Concern for the plaintiff injured if the presumption proves false may
not command much weight---particularly if the court considers the
implications for the decision going forward. 229 Once the court announced the decision, people would adjust to the law by minimizing
losses when reasonably possible. Natural harm will, in fact, equal actual
harm for parties aware of the rule. Thus, even if the rule might involve
an injustice in the one case now before the court, the rule might achieve
better results in future cases than a rule that compelled an inquiry into
the bona fides of the plaintiff's decision not to minimize the loss in
order to separate cases of actual harm from cases of extortion.
None of this purports to identify the historical origins of the avoidable
consequences doctrine. This Article seeks to direct attention to a role
that doctrine has played rather than to the reasons it came into being.
The avoidable consequences doctrine serves a valuable function in
preventing awards from enriching the plaintiff in cases where breach
creates benefits. That function is sufficient grounds for continuing to
offset awards by the amount of avoidable losses in the future, even if the
law changes its mind entirely about the importance of minimizing waste
or combatting moral hazard. This Section argues further that the role of
preventing enrichment could have generated an offset for avoidable
losses even if the law had not created the avoidable consequences
doctrine for other reasons. Having established the independence of the
benefit rationale, this Article will proceed to discuss the advantages of
viewing the avoidable consequences doctrine as a corollary of the
expectation interest rather than as an exception to it.

229. Of course, the rule might easily have been announced in a case where the court
strongly believed no injustice would result in the first place. Once announced, even in
a form limited to cases where unjust enrichment seemed likely, the result could influence
behavior by plaintiffs and by other courts until it evolved into a conclusive presumption.
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III.

Advantages of Rethinking Avoidable Consequences

The preceding sections offer more than an interesting intellectual
exercise. The legal basis for the avoidable consequences doctrine has
some practical significance. That significance does not necessarily take
the form of different results in cases. Indeed, the effort above has been
directed largely at explaining how the two approaches produce similar
or even identical results. Measuring benefit by reference to the amount
of avoidable loss arguably should not change the result of any case that
now subtracts the amount of the avoidable loss. Nonetheless, recognizing the avoidable consequences doctrine as a corollary of the expectation
interest can alter case outcomes by clarifying how and when the
avoidable consequences doctrine should apply to cases. Perhaps it is
unnecessary to recharacterize the avoidable consequences doctrine in
order to reach the best results in the cases discussed below. Courts
might manage to avoid these mistakes by thinking through the implications of the avoidable consequences doctrine as it exists. Yet the reasons
these results seem wrong are much clearer and more persuasive in light
of the analysis above.
Reconceptualizing the avoidable consequences doctrine also has some
significance for legal theory-not only the theory of academics, but also
theory at the level practitioners apply it. 230 The theory presented here
permits us to simplify discussions of damages. By deriving remedies
from a single fundamental principle, rather than requiring a separate
doctrine to present the exception, the law dispenses with unnecessary
complication. 231 Clarifying the harmony between the expectation
interest and the avoidable consequences doctrine can eliminate the
perceived conflict between them and obviate efforts to resolve that
conflict. Thus, argument in actual cases can focus more clearly on the

230. Few practitioners go to court with arguments based on the work of H.L.A.
Hart, Robert Nozick, or John Rawls. Yet, in my experience, practitioners do present
arguments to the court based on the rationale for and purpose of particular doctrines.
And they do evaluate the consistency of rationales with the results their opponents
propose.
231. In this way, Ockham 's razor may cut in favor of benefit analysis. See supra
note 74, for a definition of Ockham 's razor. The advantage, however, may be slight.
The proposed approach requires the same reference to the amount of loss that reasonably
could have been avoided. Thus, in practical effect, all the same calculations must be
done whether we derive them from a general principle or a specific one.
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facts that make an offset useful or important in that case.
Part A will discuss both types of advantages---theoretical consistency
and case outcomes----in a single context. The avoidable consequences
doctrine, as now discussed, borders on the doctrine of contributory
negligence. In fact, the avoidable consequences doctrine looks like
nothing more than contributory negligence as applied to contract cases.
Even the language we use to discuss avoidable consequences---the duty
to mitigate damages----relies on the tort concept of duty and is reinforced
by the reasonableness standard employed to determine when that duty
has been breached. Scholars have rejected both the characterization as
contributory negligence and the language of duty. But the reasons they
provide are not very persuasive. Moreover, their conclusions do not
prevent courts from treating the avoidable consequences doctrine as if
it embodies the principles of duty and contributory negligence. As a
result, courts have refused to apply the doctrine in cases where the
avoidable consequences doctrine seems perfectly appropriate. Part A
will try to demonstrate that viewing the avoidable consequences doctrine
as a corollary of the expectation interest can clarify the error. By
explaining the doctrine without recourse to duty or contributory
negligence, the approach may prevent courts from rejecting the doctrine
in cases where the plaintiff appears to owe no duty to the defendant.
The same type of advantage may arise whenever courts must work
through intricate applications of the avoidable consequences doctrine.
This Article will conclude with one example of the perplexing problems
courts might confront: the problem of discharged employees who find
substitute work for more pay. When an employee could have earned
higher compensation, 232 the employee is better off following the
breach. Whether the court should reduce the damages the employer
must pay requires some careful analysis. The language of the avoidable
consequences doctrine does not really help courts resolve the difficult
question of how to treat this surplus. The expectation interest, on the
other hand, defines the critical inquiry rather clearly.
Thus,
recharacterizing the avoidable consequences doctrine in a manner
consistent with the expectation interest permits the courts to focus on the
issue in a productive manner that is unavailable if the avoidable
consequences doctrine is seen as an exception to the general rule.

232. I use compensation rather than pay to allow for differences in benefit packages.
A job with higher take-home pay may not actually provide more compensation if
reductions in insurance and other benefits exceed the increase in pay.
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A.

The Avoidable Consequences Doctrine as
Contributory Negligence

The similarities between the avoidable consequences doctrine and
contributory negligence have been recognized for most of this century,
if not longer. 233 Two similarities deserve attention here and should
suffice to illustrate the case for unity between the two doctrines. First,
the avoidable consequences doctrine, like contributory negligence,
determines which of two parties should bear a loss when each of them
committed a wrong that caused the loss, at least in a "but for" sense.
Second, each doctrine allocates the entire loss to the plaintiff when each
party contributed to causing it. Neither doctrine looks to the relative
fault of the parties in determining which should bear the loss. Rather
than presume that the reader fully accepts these generalizations, a brief
discussion of each seems appropriate.
The doctrines come into play when each party has committed a wrong
that caused the loss. The wrong involved is negligence, generally
defined by the standard of reasonableness. The negligence label is
axiomatic in a finding of contributory negligence. The avoidable
consequences doctrine imports negligence principles by limiting damages
only when the plaintiff unreasonably failed to minimize the loss. The
requirement of unreasonable conduct implies a negligence standard. 234

233. See SEDGWICK, supra note I 0, at 73-74.
234. The Restatement (Second) of Torts explicitly defines reasonableness under the
avoidable consequences doctrine by reference to the standards applicable in negligence
actions. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 918 cmt. c (1977). The Restatement
(Second) of Contracts does not make explicit reference to negligence. Some might argue
that the phrase "without undue risk, burden, or humiliation" does not exactly equate with
unreasonable conduct. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 350(1) (1979).
The word "undue" suggests at least a negligence standard. It is difficult to imagine a
risk, burden, or humiliation that could be called undue if an ordinary reasonable person
under similar circumstances would have accepted that onus in order to minimize the loss.
To the extent that this language differs from negligence at all, it may require a higher
degree of fault: undue burden may imply something more than merely an unreasonable
burden. Also, the words "risk, burden, or humiliation" may limit the types of concerns
that excuse the failure to minimize the loss: undue risk, burden, or humiliation justify
a failure to minimize damages, but other reasons for inaction, even if reasonable, do not.
Again, it is difficult to imagine any explanation that would make the plaintiffs conduct
reasonable but would not fall within the exception for undue risk, burden, or humiliation.
Since I cannot illustrate the second possibility, I am inclined to reject that interpretation
of the language. Once that possibility disappears, the avoidable consequences doctrine
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Negligence constitutes a wrong. In addition, the plaintiff's negligence
must have caused the damages, at least in a "but for" sense. The
contributory negligence label would make no sense if negligence that did
not cause (or contribute to causing) the accident precluded recovery. 235
The avoidable consequences doctrine produces the same result. In
subtracting damages because the plaintiff could have avoided them by
reasonable precautions, finders of fact necessarily imply that, but for the
plaintiff's failure to act reasonably, the loss would not have occurred.
The defendant's wrong also constitutes a "but for" cause of the loss. If
the defendant's wrong did not cause the loss, the plaintiff could not
recover damages for that loss anyway. 236 Thus, the avoidable consequences doctrine confronts two parties, each of whom committed a
wrong that caused the loss.
Labelling a failure to minimize the loss a "wrong" may seem
anomalous. Arguably, the plaintiff wronged no one but herself. After
all, the failure to prevent the loss causes her to suffer the loss, at least
initially. In this, however, the avoidable consequences doctrine again
resembles contributory negligence.
The plaintiff's contributory
negligence, to the extent it breached a duty to anyone, must have
breached a duty to herself. 237 In each case, however, one must assume
the existence of the doctrine in order to negate a wrong to the defendant.
The loss falls on the plaintiff only because these doctrines preclude
recovery of the losses to which the plaintiff's negligence contributed.
begins with fault (at least negligence) on the part of the plaintiff.
Even if the reader credits the second alternative interpretation of§ 350(1), § 350(2)
quickly clarifies that no reduction in damages occurs if the plaintiff acted reasonably,
even if unsuccessful. The conclusion that the plaintiff unreasonably failed to minimize
the loss, even if not explicitly labeled negligence, certainly implies that the plaintiff did
something wrong.
235. See, e.g., Martin v. Herzog, 126 N.E. 814 (N.Y. 1920) (dicta); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 463 (1977).
236. The causation requirement is well known in tort law. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS§§ 430-62 (1977). Causation enters contract remedies more subtly
through the expectation interest. Contract law seeks to put the plaintiff in the position
she would have occupied if the defendant had performed. FARNSWORTH, supra note 2,
§ 12.1, at 840; MURRAY, supra note 2, § 117; CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 24,
§ 14-4. (Contract law does not achieve this result, in large part because of limitations
on recovery of litigation expenses, especially attorneys' fees. See Wonnell, supra note
31, at 482; Macaulay, supra note 162, at 250-53.) The goal dictates denying recovery
for losses that would have occurred even if the defendant had performed. FARNSWORTH,
supra note 2, at § 12.1. Thus, plaintiff recovers only those damages caused by the
breach, those that would not have occurred but for the breach. See Kelly, supra note 6,
at 1801.
237. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 463 (1977) (discussing plaintiffs failure
to take adequate care for her own safety). I leave aside the case where an accident
injured both parties. Contributory negligence can apply even if the defendant was not
injured in the accident.
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Without the avoidable consequences doctrine or contributory negligence,
the cost of the wrong would fall on the defendant, whose wrong also
caused the loss. If the plaintiff unreasonably acts (or fails to act) in a
way that causes monetary harm to the defendant (who foreseeably will
pay the damage award), the plaintiff arguably wrongs the defendant. 238
Particularly since the avoidable consequences doctrine generally operates
only after the plaintiff knows about the defendant's wrongful conduct,
the plaintiff's decision not to prevent some losses could comprise a
wrong against the defendant. 239 The avoidable consequences doctrine
cannot claim the absence of a duty because the plaintiff wronged only
herself. Rather, the plaintiff wronged only herself because the avoidable
consequences doctrine imposes a duty to protect the defendant's interest
by keeping the loss as small as possible.
The avoidable consequences doctrine, like contributory negligence,
makes the plaintiff bear the entire loss for which the parties share
responsibility. Contributory negligence applies when the accident2 40
might have been prevented entirely if one party or the other had acted
reasonably-say, by defendant driving at a lawful speed or by the
plaintiff looking both ways before crossing the street. Because each
party contributed to the entire injury, contributory negligence deals with
the entire injury. This amounts to barring the action. Because the
plaintiff's negligence contributed to causing the accident, the plaintiff
bears the entire loss that resulted from the accident. 241

238. Since the hann to the defendant might consist entirely of a loss of money (the
need to pay damages), recovery in tort might be precluded by the economic loss
doctrine. See, e.g., Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. MN Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir.
1985) (en bane), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 903 (1986). Ifwe characterize the requirement
of physical injury or property damage as a limitation on the duty to avoid unreasonable
conduct, perhaps the plaintiff indeed owes no duty to the defendant. Contributory
negligence, under these circumstances, would need to become either another exception
to the economic loss doctrine or an extinct limitation on recovery. The avoidable
consequences doctrine would face the same conundrum in tort law. Because contract
law allows recovery for purely economic loss, the difficulty is less acute in the context
most pertinent to this Article.
239. If contributory negligence consists of actions or inactions taken where the
defendant's negligence was not foreseeable, a duty to the defendant may be harder to
explain.
240. The word "accident" may slant this discussion heavily toward tort, even though
this Article focuses on the use of the avoidable consequences doctrine in contract law.
Nonetheless, in discussing contributory negligence, tort language seems the most natural.
241. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 467 (1977). Comparative negligence
differs by distributing responsibility among the parties who contributed to causing it in
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The avoidable consequences doctrine also imposes on the plaintiff the
entire loss for which the parties share responsibility, but does so in a
slightly different factual setting. 242
The plaintiff's unreasonable
conduct did not contribute to the occurrence of the accident, but to the
losses that resulted from it---and perhaps to only some of those losses.
Thus, after denying recovery for all of the losses for which the plaintiff
shares responsibility, some losses may remain attributable solely to the
defendant's wrong. Nothing in either contributory negligence or the
avoidable consequences doctrine suggests that the plaintiff should bear
a loss to which her negligence did not contribute. The portion of the
loss that the plaintiff could have avoided, however, is entirely unrecoverable. Although the parties share responsibility for causing that portion
of the loss, the loss falls entirely on the plaintiff.
The difference between the situations where the two doctrines apply
explains the superficial nature of at least one distinction often drawn
between the avoidable consequences doctrine and contributory negligence. No one misses the fact that contributory negligence bars
recovery while the avoidable consequences doctrine merely reduces
recovery. 243 This distinction between the procedural consequences of
the two doctrines has enormous practical significance. It does not,
however, carry much theoretical significance. We treat contributory
negligence as a total bar to recovery out of habit, not out of necessity.
The law could just as easily treat contributory negligence as an offset.
Because contributory negligence almost always arises in cases where the
plaintiff's negligence contributed to the entire injury, the offset usually
will be total. Thus, it is convenient to treat the doctrine as a bar to
recovery. But to explain why the avoidable consequences doctrine
differs from contributory negligence, we must discover a difference in
their function, not in the labels we normally attach to their procedural
effects.
Consider how easily contributory negligence could explain the seat
belt cases, if only we did not treat it as a bar to recovery. Each party's

proportion to their fault. Comparative negligence, like contributory negligence,
ordinarily deals with the accident as a whole rather than addressing discrete portions of
the injury.
242. Presumably, the law could apply comparative negligence principles to
avoidable losses, dividing them among the parties who contributed to causing them.
Problems such as increased litigation costs, decreased incentive for either party to
actually prevent the loss, and difficult comparisons between fault for causing the accident
as opposed to not curing the effects probably justify the complete inattention this idea
has received.
243. See. e.g., DOBBS, supra note 10, § 3.7, at 188; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS§ 918 cmt. a {1977).

266

[VOL. 33: 175, 1996]

Contract Remedies
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

negligence contributed to some of the injuries (those that could have
been prevented by wearing the seat belt). Any injuries a seat belt would
not have prevented are attributable only to the defendant; the plaintiff
did not contribute to the cause of those injuries. Thus, even if we
impose upon the plaintiff all of the injuries for which she shares
responsibility, the defendant remains liable for the unavoidable
injuries. 244 The difficulty with this explanation rests in the mechanical
habit of treating contributory negligence as a bar to the action because,
so often, the parties share responsibility for all of the injuries. 245 In
fact, contributory negligence may handle the seat belt cases more easily
than the avoidable consequences doctrine. The Restatement (Second) of
Torts limits the avoidable consequences doctrine to loss the plaintiff
"could have avoided by reasonable effort or expenditure after the
commission of the tort."246 Seat belts, to be effective, must be fastened
before the accident. 247 As a result, some courts have refused to apply
the avoidable consequences doctrine to the failure to fasten a seat
belt. 248 The difference again focuses on a procedural rather than
essential aspect of the two doctrines to determine whether they apply.
Taken together, the two procedural quirks suggest that the failure to
fasten a seat belt cannot affect a damage award--no matter how
unreasonable the conduct and no matter how much loss it could have

244. 1 do not propose this as the fairest result; dividing the jointly caused loss
among the two contributors might be fairer. But contributory negligence could be
applied to this type of case wiihout barring recovery.
245. Alternatively, the last clear chance doctrine may leave responsibility with the
defendant whenever her negligence comes after the plaintiff's. See, e.g., Shanahan v.
Patterson, 539 P.2d 1289, 1290 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975). But that doctrine, too, arose in
reaction to the perceived injustice of treating contributory negligence as a complete bar
to recovery. It might have less appeal in a case where the plaintiff recovered for injuries
the defendant alone caused, even if the plaintiff could not recover for injuries to which
her own unreasonable conduct contributed.
246. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 918 (1977) (emphasis added).
247. Where the tort involves defects in the plaintiffs car, such as product liability
or negligent repair, perhaps the tort also occurs before the accident--and before the
plaintiff should have fastened the safety belt. The drafters of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts, however, might prefer an interpretation that the tort occurs when the injury
occurs----the interpretation usually used for statute of limitation purposes and for
explaining why plaintiffs cannot recover nominal damages where defendants' negligence
causes no actual harm. That would accord with the idea that the plaintiff must minimize
the loss once she knows about the losses, but need not worry about minimizing losses
that might never occur in the first place.
248. See, e.g., Clarkson v. Wright, 483 N.E.2d 268 (Ill. 1985).

267

prevented. 249
Perhaps more revealing is the fact that the avoidable consequences
doctrine can bar the entire recovery. In a case where a plaintiff can
immediately and costlessly prevent the entire harm that the defendant's
wrong otherwise might cause, 250 the avoidable consequences doctrine
arguably permits no recovery of damages. 251 In such a case, the
difference between contributory negligence and avoidable consequences
disappears------unless we locate a difference more explanatory than the
superficial description of the consequences each doctrine produces.
When the avoidable consequences doctrine bars recovery, it works
exactly like contributory negligence in all aspects, right down to the
effects. If we have no better explanation for why contributory negligence and the avoidable consequences doctrine differ, we must call the
avoidable consequences doctrine contributory negligence in this case.
The minute we look beneath the surface, we confront the similarity of
the doctrines, not the differences: each allocates the entire loss to the
plaintiff when both parties' negligence contributed to the loss. 252
Other explanations offered to distinguish the avoidable consequences
doctrine from contributory negligence focus on equally superficial

249. The possibility of comparative negligence remains open, but faces difficulties
of its own. Comparative negligence differs from both the avoidable consequences
doctrine and contributory negligence by allocating losses on the basis of fault. DOBBS,
supra note 9, § 3.9, at 275. The avoidable consequences doctrine (and, as applied in the
text, contributory negligence) deals with discrete components of damage, allocating
losses entirely to one party or the other. For comparative negligence to work properly,
it would need to allocate the entire loss that a seat belt would not have prevented to the
defendant, then allocate the avoidable loss on the basis of comparative fault between the
two parties. The calculation could become more complex still if the defendant alleged
additional conduct by the plaintiff that contributed to the occurrence of the accident
itself.
250. A plaintiff sometimes can obtain a substitute contract on terms identical to
those provided in the contract with a defendant. Tort cases may be harder to
hypothesize, especially if they involve physical injury. In a fraud case, perhaps the
plaintiff learns of the fraudulent misrepresentation before the market and can sell the
stock in a faceless transaction at a gain sufficient to cover all transaction costs.
251. We can quibble about the role of nominal damages here, but nominal damages
have never been limited by the principle that we will not leave the plaintiff better off
than if the defendant had performed. The law keeps them small to keep its deviation
from the principle to a minimum.
252. Some scholars acknowledge the similarities, at least in tort law. See [Student
Vol.] w. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS§ 65, at
459 (5th ed. 1984). It is not clear whether all of the authors accept the similarity. The
distinctions discussed in this section are derived largely from Dobbs's discussion of the
avoidable consequences doctrine in his treatise on remedies. DOBBS, supra note 10,
§ 3. 7. The 1984 torts treatise may represent a change in his views since publication of
the 1973 remedies treatise. Dobbs's remedies treatise nonetheless serves as the best
compilation of the distinctions commonly drawn between contributory negligence and
the avoidable consequences doctrine.
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aspects of the doctrine. For example, one commentator argues that the
avoidable consequences doctrine must not be the same as contributory
negligence because the avoidable consequences doctrine applies in
contract cases and intentional torts, where contributory negligence does
not apply. 253 That, however, is the conclusion, not the rationale. If
the avoidable consequences doctrine and contributory negligence are
simply two names for the same principle as it applies to different
situations, then contributory negligence does apply to contract cases, but
under a different name. Pointing out that the law has changed the
doctrine's name does not help us determine whether the doctrine itself
differs or remains the same.
Similarly, the timing of the plaintiff's negligence does not establish the
difference between the doctrines. The Restatement (Second) of Torts
limits the avoidable consequences doctrine to plaintiff's conduct after the
tort. 254 But that simply describes the facts to which the doctrines
apply, not the workings of the doctrines themselves. The doctrines could
be identical despite the law's decision to use a different name in the two
contexts. Moreover, no reason is given for why the doctrines impose a
pre-tort or post-tort limitation. More recently, Dobbs has recognized that
the distinction is only "sometimes correct,"255 apparently a bow to seat
belt cases that apply the avoidable consequences doctrine to a plaintiff's
unreasonable conduct before the accident. 256 Dobbs also recognizes
that timing of the conduct "does not touch the essence of the difference"
between comparative negligence and the avoidable consequences
doctrine. 257

253. DOBBS, supra note IO,§ 3.7, at 187.
254. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 (1977).
255. DOBBS, supra note 9, § 3.9, at 275.
256. For this reason, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts rejects timing as a
distinguishing feature. That work distinguishes not the doctrines, but the facts to which
they apply: "[T]he distinction which exists is rather one between damages which are
capable of assignment to separate causes, and damages which are not." KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 252, § 65, at 459.
257. DOBBS, supra note 9, § 3.9, at 275. This does not rule out the possibility that
Dobbs believes the distinction explains the difference between the avoidable consequences doctrine and contributory negligence. Dobbs's new treatise addresses differences
between the avoidable consequences doctrine and comparative fault in a much more
satisfactory fashion. He recognizes the difference between apportioning a loss between
two parties, each of whom contributed to that loss (comparative negligence), and
assigning the entire loss to one party if that party contributed to the loss at all (the
avoidable consequences doctrine). Id. § 3.9, at 275-76. Dobbs does not address
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Similar difficulties plague discussion of the duty to mitigate damages.
Many commentators deny that such a duty exists, but they rely on a
single reason: since the defendant cannot maintain an action against the
plaintiff for damages caused by breach, no duty exists. 258 Again, the
argument focuses on the procedures through which we effectuate the
avoidable consequences doctrine, not the substance of the doctrine itself.
As a matter of procedure, the law elects to treat the avoidable consequences doctrine as a defense that offsets some of the plaintiff's
damages. But that election is neither inevitable nor central to the
workings of the avoidable consequences doctrine. 259
The tenuous link between duty and damages further weakens the
argument against the existence of a duty to minimize the loss. A duty
can exist even if no action for damages exists to enforce that duty.
Perhaps it makes little sense to speak of legal duties if no remedy exists
by which to vindicate the duty. 260 However, the avoidable conse-

differences between the avoidable consequences doctrine and contributory negligence in
the new edition.
Dobbs's original treatise also differentiates the avoidable consequences doctrine from
contributory negligence on the ground that negligence takes on a more subjective
meaning when dealing with the avoidable consequences doctrine. See DOBBS, supra
note 10, § 3.7, at 187-88. The Restatement (Second) of Torts declares that the same
rules govern negligence and the avoidable consequences doctrine. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 cmt. c ( I 977). Nothing in the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts suggests a different approach. Thus, the law on paper recognizes no greater
subjective component to reasonableness under the avoidable consequences doctrine than
other objective negligence rules. Dobbs's observation may reflect a difference between
theory and practice. This Article, however, attempts to explain the theory--the
justification of or the rationale for the avoidable consequences doctrine. Since the
American Law Institute does not choose to differentiate the two doctrines on this basis,
this Article will not consider the implications of this distinction. However, using an
objective standard in the avoidable consequences doctrine may produce unacceptable
results in tort cases. This latter concern will be addressed in my forthcoming work,
Living Without the Avoidable Consequences Doctrine in Tort Damages.
258. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 10, § 3.7, at 188; MCCORMICK, supra note 10,
§ 33, at 128.
259. An alternative procedure is outlined after the next two paragraphs.
260. The conclusion is not inevitable. Courts have denied damage remedies to
children injured by genetic counselling torts even when they have no difficulty
concluding that the defendant owed a duty to the child as a foreseeable victim of
careless conduct. See, e.g., Walker v. Mart, 790 P.2d 735, 739 (Ariz. 1990); Pitre v.
Opelousas Gen. Hosp., 530 So. 2d 1151, 1157 (La. 1988). See generally Kelly, supra
note 53. Horton and Alexander identify a range of ways the law can give force to
contracts between spouses without necessarily allowing a damage action. See Paul
Horton & Lawrence Alexander, Freedom of Contract and the Family: A Skeptical
Reappraisal, in THE AMERICAN FAMILY AND THE STATE 229 (1986). Similarly, even
though government officials have immunity from suit in some circumstances, we do not
say they have no duty to act within the law. Victims of their misconduct may not
receive damages or perhaps even injunctive relief. But the duty to act within the law
remains a useful concept. Perhaps the last example is inapt, since arguably the duty
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quences doctrine provides a remedy for the plaintiff's breach (of the duty
to minimize the loss), but not a remedy in the form of a damage action.
Rather, the defendant must accept an offset reducing his own liability to
the plaintiff. 261
The absence of an independent damage action is inevitable, even if we
recognize a duty. The harm to the defendant exists only if the plaintiff
shifts the losses caused by the breach to the defendant. Until the
plaintiff recovers damages from the defendant, the plaintiff's failure to
minimize the loss has not caused the defendant any harm. Thus, an
independent damage action by the defendant against the plaintiff makes
no sense. In effect, denying a cause of action reflects procedural
concerns for ripeness and compulsory counterclaims more than it reflects
the absence of a duty to minimize the loss. By limiting the defendant's
claim that the plaintiff breached a duty to minimize the loss to a defense
in the plaintiff's suit, the law resolves the two claims in a single action
rather than dealing with them separately.
In fact, it takes very little imagination to see the avoidable consequences doctrine as creating a counterclaim for the defendant. The
plaintiff seeks recovery for the defendant's wrong, which caused all of
the damages. The defendant counters by pleading that the plaintiff's
unreasonable conduct caused the damages to be higher than necessary.
We actually treat that pleading as an affirmative defense, but we could
treat it as a counterclaim. The court could enter judgment for the
plaintiff in the full amount of the loss. That done, the plaintiff's breach
has damaged the defendant by exposing her to a larger judgment than
necessary. The court then could enter judgment for the defendant on the
counterclaim, awarding the amount of avoidable losses that the plaintiff
negligently failed to avoid.
This procedural revision illustrates the weakness of focusing on the

remains, but flows to their superiors in the political hierarchy rather than to victims.
Nonetheless, courts decide the cases on the grounds of immunity, not on the basis that
no duty exists to these plaintiffs. Duty does not drop out of the picture merely because
the courts provide no remedy.
261. The distinction here makes no difference. The defendant's wealth improves
regardless of whether she pays less or receives more. Starting from the assumption that
the defendant must pay the plaintiff something (in exchange for what she received or as
compensation for the wrong she has done), paying less (by reducing the damages
awarded) is no different from paying more (by not subtracting avoidable consequences)
but receiving more in exchange (damages for the plaintiff's breach of the duty to
minimize the loss).

271

procedural embodiment of the doctrine in order to characterize its
essence. A counterclaim offers no advantages over the existing
procedures for embodying the avoidable consequences doctrine. It
would tum a simple, one-step offset into a complex, multi-step process.
But nothing in the avoidable consequences doctrine would change if the
procedure changed. In fact, the imaginary procedures may clarify why
courts insist that a defendant prove the amount of the offset, 262 rather
than forcing the plaintiff to prove it as part of the evidence of damage.261
The objection to the language of duty falters here. It deals with the
form of the doctrine, not its substance. Having focused on the method
by which we employ the avoidable consequences doctrine, the argument
ignores the essence of the doctrine. That essence requires the plaintiff
to act reasonably and imposes consequences for the failure to act
reasonably-a duty by any other name.
The existing procedures also provide some fairly strong indications
that plaintiffs really do have a legal duty to minimize the loss. Pattern
jury instructions reveal near unanimity in telling jurors that the plaintiff
has a duty to minimize the loss. 264 The words of appellate courts and
legislatures make very little difference if the actual decisionmakers, to
whom all reviewers must defer, are told to hold the plaintiff to a duty to
minimize damages. True, the instructions also tell the jurors to subtract
avoidable losses from the award, not to make a separate award to the
defendant in that amount. But they reduce the award because the
plaintiff breached a duty.
The language chosen for jury instructions may be an imperfect source

262. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 9, § 3.9, at 272; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 350 cmt. c (1979) (but noting different treatment for cases where basic
damage calculation already includes mitigation).
263. This is not the only reason to allocate the burden of proof to the defendant, but
if the procedures actually followed the counterclaim route, that probably would be a
sufficient reason.
264. Pattern jury instructions expound a duty to mitigate damages; they almost
never call it the avoidable consequences doctrine. See, e.g., COMMITTEE ON STAND ARD
JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL, SUPERIOR COURT OF L.A. COUNTY, CALIFORNIA JURY
INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL§§ 14.67-.68 (1994); EDWARD J. DEVITT ET AL., FEDERAL JURY
PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL§§ 85.13, 86.08 (1987); COMMITTEE ON PATTERN
JURY INSTRUCTIONS, DISTRICT JUDGES Ass'N, FIFTH CIRCUIT, PATTERN JURY
INSTRUCTIONS (CIVIL CASES) § 15.15 (1993); COMMITTEE ON PATTERN JURY
INSTRUCTIONS, DISTRICT JUDGES ASS'N, ELEVENTH CIRCUIT, PATTERN JURY
INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL CASES §§ 7.1-.3 (1990). Whether judges risk reversal by
amending or supplementing these instructions to remove or explain references to the duty
to mitigate would require investigation far beyond the scope of this paper. Such study
also seems unlikely to produce any useful information, even if the results proved
surprising.

272

[VOL. 33: 175, 1996]

Contract Remedies
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

of the law. It reflects the clearest and briefest way to produce an
intelligent result from persons untrained in the law. Courts might refer
to duty not because they think the avoidable consequences doctrine
entails a duty, but because calling it one communicates effectively with
the people who must decide the case, producing an appropriate
outcome. 265 The references to duty in numerous judicial opinions also
may simply represent a comfortable shorthand for a doctrine the
audience already understands. 266 Adding a phrase like "sometimes
called the duty to mitigate damages"267 may help people who, like me,
made it through law school without having heard of the avoidable
consequences doctrine. More troubling are the courts who tum this
around: the duty to miti~ate damages, "also called the doctrine of
avoidable consequences." 2 8 Perhaps, however, Dobbs is correct to
suggest that no one is likely to be misled. 269

265. Cf Christopher T. Wonnell, Problems in the Application of Political
Philosophy to Law, 86 MICH. L. REV. 123 (1987); Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and
Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984).
266. See, e.g., Wartzman v. Hightower Prods., Ltd., 456 A.2d 82, 88 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1983) (section heading: "Duty to Mitigate Damages"); S.J. Groves & Sons v.
Warner Co., 576 F.2d 524, 528 & n.5 (3d Cir. 1978) (referring to "the general duty to
mitigate damages" in text, but dropping a footnote stating that "[i]t has been said that
there is not a duty on the part of a plaintiff to mitigate damages"); Ford Motor Co. v.
EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 231 (1982) (referring to the "statutory duty to minimize
damages"). While SJ. Groves and Ford involve statutes codifying the avoidable
consequences doctrine, neither the U.C.C. nor Title Vil of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
uses either "duty" or "mitigate" to set forth the doctrine. See U.C.C. § 2-7l5(2)(a)
(I 995); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) ( 1988). The courts, however, have so internalized the
notion of a duty to mitigate damages that other language cannot conceal from them the
nature of the principle at stake.
References to the duty to mitigate damages seem to outnumber references to the
avoidable consequences doctrine. A quick survey of Westlaw on August 2, 1993,
revealed 370 cases in the Al/states database use the phrase "avoidable consequences,"
while 736 use the phrase "duty to mitigate damages." The latter phrase, of course, will
miss cases that refer to the duty to minimize damages, Dobbs's preferred usage. See
DOBBS, supra note 10, § 3.7, at 188; DOBBS, supra note 9, § 3.9, at 380 n.5. It also will
miss cases that rearrange the words, insert an extra word, or misspell a word. Nearly
twice as many cases (I ,478) use "duty" and "mitigate" in the same sentence in a
paragraph that mentions "damages."
267. See Chastain v. Owens Carolina, Inc., 426 S.E.2d 834, 835 (S.C. Ct. App.
I 993) ('"so-called duty to mitigate his damages"') (quoting Smalls v. Springs Indus.,
Inc., 388 S.E.2d 808, 810 (S.C. I 990)).
268. Walker v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 828 P.2d 621, 625 (Wash. Ct. App.
1992); See also Margaret H. Wayne Trust v. Lipsky, 846 P.2d 904, 912 (Idaho 1993);
Bernsen v. Big Bend Elec. Coop., 842 P.2d 1047, 1051 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993).
269. DOBBS, supra note 9, § 3.9 n.5.
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If the language simply reflected loose talk, it would deserve brief
notice and comment. Lawyers must use language precisely in order to
accomplish their clients' ends. Too often when one is tempted to
assume or to say, "You know what I mean," the other party truly does
not know what you mean-or, perhaps worse, thinks she does know
what you mean when that is not what you meant at all. 270 Such a
general lesson could end here, not requiring any further comment, let
alone a complete re-explanation of the avoidable consequences doctrine.
More troublesome, however, are the indications that the avoidable
consequences doctrine really is falling into the pattern described here.
Jeffrey Riffer and Elizabeth Barrowman recently called attention to an
entire line of cases in which courts have refused to apply the avoidable
consequences doctrine to federal regulators of failed financial institutions
when the regulators pursue actions against former officers and directors.271 The two scholars identify three reasons courts state for not
applying the doctrine: (I) the regulators owed a duty to the public, but
owed no duty to the former officers and directors of the institution; (2)
public policy required protecting deposit insurance funds by maximizing
recovery by the regulators; and (3) the government had not waived
sovereign immunity (under the Federal Tort Claims Act or otherwise) for
claims against regulators by former officers and directors. The first
rationale explicitly depends upon interpreting the avoidable consequences
doctrine to include a duty to mitigate damages. The third rationale goes
further; it applies only if that duty consists of a claim against the
government for damages. 272 The underlying assumptions employed by
these courts demonstrate the continuing image of the avoidable
consequences doctrine as a manifestation of contributory negligence.
These cases have little direct relevance to this Article. They involve

270. T.S. ELIOT, The Lovesong of J Alfred Pru/rock, in COLLECTED POEMS 19091962 3 (1970).
271. Riffer & Barrowman, supra note 9, at 411. The exact nature of the mitigation
claims does not appear in the article. At least one footnote suggests the government has
spent more than necessary to manage the affairs of the failed financial institutions. Id.
at 412 n.7 (commenting on excessive payments to accounting firms employed by the
regulators). Often, however, the mitigation claims relate to government decisions
regarding the sale of various assets of the institution. See, e.g., FDIC v. Stanley, 770
F. Supp. 1281 (N.D. Ind. 1991) (alleging unreasonable loan collection practices by the
FDIC after it seized the bank).
272. The second rationale seems equally satisfied by applying the avoidable
consequences doctrine, thus giving the regulators an incentive to be frugal, rather than
excusing their wastefulness by assessing unnecessarily large damages against others.
The policy rationale, however, reflects considerations outside the avoidable consequences
doctrine that arguably justify ignoring it. Those policies lie outside the scope of this
Article. The other two rationales purport to interpret the proper application of the
avoidable consequences doctrine, presenting issues directly relevant here.
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claims for statutory violations and breach of fiduciary duty, not breach
of contract. They invoke public policies specific to the regulation of
banks that may not affect the application of the avoidable consequences
doctrine in other contexts.
Courts deciding these cases, however, have not limited their pronouncements to the context involved. They hold that the applicable state
law rests the avoidable consequences doctrine on the existence of a duty
to mitigate. 273
The implication that the avoidable consequences
doctrine rests on the existence of duty in all cases threatens a broader
impact than the relatively limited range of banking cases described by
Riffer and Barrowman.
Refusing to apply the avoidable consequences doctrine in cases where
the plaintiff owed no independent duty to the defendant could nearly
obliterate the avoidable consequences doctrine. Since plaintiffs often do
not owe defendants a duty, the avoidable consequences doctrine could
disappear in a significant number of cases. The danger seems greatest
in tort cases, where the victim commonly owes no duty to the wrongdoer
who injures her--unless the duty arises because of the injury. 274
Contract cases may not present the same difficulty: each party to a
contract owes duties to the other, though some may already have been
performed. The duty of good faith and fair dealing inherent in every
contract may support a duty to minimize the loss--if that duty extends
beyond the breach. Material breach of a contract, however, generally
excuses remaining duties the nonbreaching party owed to the other.
Thus, courts may find it difficult to identify a duty that remains
following the breach. 275 Absent some fiduciary relationship, only

273. See, e.g., RTC v. Greenwood, 798 F. Supp. 1391 (D. Minn. I 992) (distinguishing FDIC v. Ashley, 749 F. Supp. I 065 (D. Kan. 1990), on the ground that it applied
Kansas law, which, unlike Minnesota, did not rest the avoidable consequences doctrine
on a duty to minimize the loss); RTC v. Kerr, 804 F. Supp. 1091 (W.D. Ark. 1992).
274. If the injury itself imposes duties upon the victim, it is hard to distinguish the
federal regulators. The government and the guaranty fund, as victims, would seem to
come within the same duty.
275. Section 237 of the Restatement makes a party's duties under a contract
conditional on the absence of any "uncured material failure" to perform by the other
party. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 237 (1979). A condition is defined
as an event that must occur before performance becomes due. Id. § 224. Thus, no
performance by the plaintiff is due following an uncured material breach. The language
is general, suggesting no exception for either the duty to act in good faith or a duty to
minimize the loss by reasonable means. To my knowledge, no court has ever excused
the plaintiff's failure to take reasonable measures to minimize the loss on the ground that
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precedent seems likely to keep the avoidable consequences doctrine alive
if courts begin to reject it where they cannot find an independent duty
that the victim owed to the wrongdoer. 276
These dire consequences seem as unlikely as they are extreme. The
cases misapplying2 77 duty language have been quite limited to
date. 278 Nonetheless, the avoidable consequences doctrine works quite
well when we do not conceive of it as a duty to minimize the loss or as
a counterclaim alleging that the plaintiff's negligence contributed to
causing the loss. The problem with the conventional wisdom lies in its
weak support, not the conclusions themselves. 279 Rather than discard
the conclusions, perhaps we should strive for better reasoning----a better
theoretical basis upon which to rest the avoidable consequences doctrine.
The expectation analysis of the avoidable consequences doctrine
provides a theoretical basis that explains existing pronouncements about
the avoidable consequences doctrine---at least in contract cases, and
probably in a broad array of cases involving property rights. If the
avoidable consequences doctrine accounts for the benefits a plaintiff
received as a result of the breach, then no duty to minimize damages

the plaintiff no longer owed a duty to the defendant following the defendant's material
breach. Yet that suggests that the avoidable consequences doctrine is not born of a
duty---0r, at least, not a duty under the contract. Thus, the duty to minimize the loss
either arises because of the injury (as suggested for tort) or does not exist at all.
276. This may not be entirely bad. My thoughts on the avoidable consequences
doctrine in tort cases require lengthy explanation that will not conveniently fit within this
Article. Rest assured (or, perhaps, tremble with fear at the prospect) that an article
setting forth those views will appear shortly. Michael B. Kelly, Living Without the
Avoidable Consequences Doctrine in Tort Remedies (forthcoming 1997).
277. To the extent that the existing dogma surrounding the avoidable consequences
doctrine remains tied to tort concepts, arguably the courts applying tort principles
actually have the better view of how to apply the duty to mitigate damages. They have
seen through the veneer of scholarly disavowal to the essence of negligence doctrine
lying at the roots of the duty to mitigate. But this does not suggest that they have
produced the better result.
278. The cases primarily involve actions by regulators of financial institutions
against former officers and directors. Policy arguments unique to this relationship or to
the recent savings and loan crisis may explain or even justify decisions not to apply the
avoidable consequences doctrine. But see Riffer & Barrowman, supra note 9, at 419-34
(rejecting policy arguments relied on by the courts deciding these cases).
279. Riffer and Barrowman amass an impressive array of authority to support the
conclusion that the avoidable consequences doctrine does not involve a duty to mitigate
damages. Riffer & Barrowman, supra note 9, at 411. After reading that compilation,
however, one is left with two impressions: (I) that the authorities offer very little
justification for the conclusion, relying almost exclusively on the consequences of the
defense (as an offset rather than a damage award); and (2) that the authorities nowhere
provide an explanation of what the avoidable consequences doctrine is, contenting
themselves with the conclusion that it is not a duty to mitigate. Given the rather shallow
attacks on the use of "duty" to describe the avoidable consequences doctrine, perhaps
the persistence of the terminology is understandable.
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arises. We offset the recovery not because the plaintiff should obtain
benefits by entering a substitute contract, but because she has obtained
benefits by receiving the opportunity to enter into a substitute contract.
We truly do not care whether the employee gets another job or the seller
finds a new buyer. They may take their benefit as leisure or goods
instead of money for the resale of their time or wares. As long as the
law awards them the amount of the loss they could not have avoided by
reasonable efforts, it has placed them in the position they would have
occupied if the defendant had performed the contract. The recovery is
smaller not because they could have received more, but because they did
receive more. 280 Thus, the expectation interest urges that we discard
all reference to a "duty" to minimize the loss.
In addition, the theory proposed here severs the link between the
avoidable consequences doctrine and contributory negligence. The law
subtracts losses as a necessary component of restoring the position the
plaintiff would have occupied if the defendant had performed, not as a
means of allocating to the plaintiff losses to which her own fault
contributed. In fact, the benefit analysis suggests that the failure to
minimize the loss did not produce a net loss at all, since the benefits at
least offset the avoidable portion of the loss. The two doctrines still
produce the same results, but for entirely different reasons. Concern for
the plaintiff's fault disappears; concern for the plaintiff's benefits takes
its place.
The approach suggested here permits us to set aside tort language.
This Article re-explains the avoidable consequences doctrine in a way
that does not depend on tort concepts. To the extent that scholarly
proclamations denying a duty to mitigate have a very thin acceptance
because they do not explain the existence of the doctrine in any other

280. To some extent, these statements overlook the objectifying presumptions
proposed in the earlier portions of this article. See supra Part I. Some individuals may
not have received as much as the law has assumed they received because they did not
know about the law, they miscalculated (either the effect of the law or the market value
of their benefit), or they did not act in a rational manner. These relatively rare
exceptions undermine the unqualified statements in the text without undermining the
desirability of reformulating the explanation of the avoidable consequences doctrine.
After all, the avoidable consequences doctrine itself imposes the ultimate objectifying
presumption by denying recovery to anyone who reasonably could have avoided the loss.
The objectifying presumptions suggested here do not exclude anyone who could have
recovered under the avoidable consequences doctrine as now formulated. Rather, they
bring the new rationale into line with the existing practice.
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way, this Article can fill that void. If conceptualized as a manifestation
of the expectation interest, the avoidable consequences doctrine needs no
reference to tort concepts to explain its existence. Provided courts
accept this new rationale, perhaps fewer cases will misapply the
avoidable consequences doctrine in the future.
B.

Improved Judicial Focus: Substitute Employment for More Pay

The expectation interest may offer some subtle assistance to courts
applying the avoidable consequences doctrine. If the avoidable
consequences doctrine primarily seeks to re-create the position the
plaintiff would have occupied but for the breach, courts may find easier
approaches to some intricate questions that can arise under the avoidable
consequences doctrine. The advantage need not stem from focusing on
the benefits of the breach, though that focus also may help. Rather,
some advantage comes from discarding the notion that the avoidable
consequences doctrine seeks to vary the position the person would have
occupied but for the wrong. By recognizing the fundamental harmony,
or perhaps unison, between the expectation interest and the avoidable
consequences doctrine, courts may approach some problems in more
useful ways. This section explores one such intricate situation.
When a discharged employee finds new work (or could have new
found work) at a higher salary than she received from the breaching
employer, the court must decide how to treat the surplus. 281 When the
employee promptly finds a better job, courts have little difficulty
concluding that the plaintiff can recover only nominal damages. 282
The employee resembles a seller who finds a buyer willing to pay more
than the contract price for the goods. She is better off after the breach
than she would have been if the buyer (or employer) had performed. In

281. When the plaintiff actually earns higher wages, the problem involves avoided
consequences rather than avoidable consequences. Even then, however, courts must
decide whether surplus earnings after the employee takes new work should be applied
to offset the damages for the weeks before the employee found the new job. The same
problem can arise if the employer argues that the employee could have found work at
a higher rate of pay if she had conducted a reasonable job search. The two situations
deserve identical treatment; the amount that was earned, like the amount that could have
been earned, is a proxy for the value of returning the employee's time to her. The
Article will continue to discuss actual earnings because cases exist addressing that
situation. Apparently, very few employers who discharge employees later contend that
the employees were so good that they could have earned more in a new job. Perhaps
employers seek to maintain a consistent litigation posture, contending the employee was
so bad that they had to fire her. Perhaps employers simply do not want to state publicly
that they underpaid the employee. In any event, cases exemplifying employees who earn
more following discharge are rare.
282. See, e.g., Coble v. School Dist., 116 A.2d 113 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1955).
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such cases, the most remarkable fact is that the employees would sue at
al1_2s1
A better substitute job presents an enigma when the wages cover only
part of the contract period, perhaps beginning a few weeks after
discharge or ending before the original contract term would have
expired. Consider, for example, the following situation: an employer
discharges an employee earning $2000 per month, two months before
her contract would have expired. The employee spends one month out
of work diligently looking for a new job. She finds a better job and
earns $2500 in the remaining month before her original contract would
have expired.

283. One case involved a doctor denied entry to a medical residency program.
While his actual earnings greatly exceeded the pay he would have received in the
program, he sought compensation for consequential damages----the lost income over his
life from being deprived of the education and training he would have received in the
program. In effect, the plaintiff sought damages as a buyer of education, while the
defendant preferred to characterize the contract as employment. These different
expectations explain why a plaintiff benefitted in terms of salary might nonetheless sue
for damages.
Another line of cases arises from an exception to the avoidable consequences doctrine
for public officials. Some states treat pay collected by public officials as an incident of
office rather than as compensation for the services, even suggesting that a public
official's entitlement to a salary does not "'partake of the nature of contracts, nor have
... the remotest affinity thereto."' Coble, I 16 A.2d at 116 (quoting Commonwealth v.
Bacon, 6 Serg. & Rawle 322, 323 (1820)). Teachers have sued despite finding better
work elsewhere, apparently hoping to take advantage of this exception. The Coble court
refused to apply this exception to public employees (like teachers) as distinguished from
public officials (such as the mayor involved in Bacon)-<lespite a statute stating "there
shall be no abatement of salary or compensation" in such cases. 116 A.2d at 115. A
similar distinction in statutory language prevented a superintendent of schools from
taking advantage of the exception for public officials. Mullen v. Board of Educ., 195
A.2d 195, 199-200 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1963) (no mitigation applied when
legislature used the word "compensation" instead of the word "salary").
The entire exception for public officials, if it has any merit at all, depends on policies
quite alien to the avoidable consequences doctrine as now formulated. One might
construct explanations based on the expectation interest, but only with unusual
assumptions, such as that elected officials become entitled to the salary for the full year
by virtue of election, regardless of their service in office. (This virtually treats the salary
as a prize for winning the election.) The theory proposed here might require an
additional assumption: that public officials remain entitled to earn additional income
from outside sources during their term. This may reflect public office as conceived in
earlier times---and may remain plausible in some areas. The exception and its reasoning,
however, probably merit reexamination in light of changes since Bacon was decided in
1820. This Article will not provide that re-examination; it will focus on results dictated
by the avoidable consequences doctrine, rather than statutory exceptions that do not
purport to pursue the same purposes.
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On one hand, the higher wages represent the fruits of an employee's
labor. She, not the breaching employer, generated the surplus and
deserves to enjoy it. Courts can produce this result by awarding the
employee $2000 salary for the month she was out of work (plus other
elements of damages, if any), but cutting off liability when she found the
new job. 284 By recovering $2000, the employee in effect earns $4500
for the two-month period, instead of the $4000 she would have received
if she had remained employed.
On the other hand, this puts the employee in a better position than if
the employer had performed. Allowing the employee to receive $4500
for a time when she had been promised only $4000 may deviate from
the expectation interest. The employee probably would not have
received that surplus if the contract had been performed. 285 The
employer, having never promised to pay this much, arguably should not
be compelled to pay damages that increase her total compensation to this
level.
The desirability of these two approaches may vary with the example
chosen. People who prefer to allow the employee to retain the surplus
may lean toward the first option. Changing the example, however, may
produce a different reaction. Suppose that the employee immediately
found a better job, but lost it (for innocent reasons not attributable to the
fault of any party) after one month. An approach that cut off liability
when the employee took a better job would produce zero recovery.
Thus, the employer would pay nothing, even though the employee would
have received $4000 in the two-month period instead of $2500. The
second approach, however, continues to provide a $1500 recovery in
damages, leaving the party in the position she would have occupied but
for the breach.
Courts could approach the choice mechanically, as an issue of the
proper time frame to consider. The court could consider the remainder
of the contract period as a single unit or as several distinct pay
periods. 286 An award for the two-month period (taken as a whole)
284. See. e.g., Smith v. Beloit Corp., 162 N.W.2d 585 (Wis. 1968).
285. The word "probably" leaves open the possibility that she could have found and
taken the new job while continuing to work for the first employer, then persuaded the
first employer to release her from her promise to work the last month.
286. Dicta suggest that the entire period consists of a whole. See Mullen, 195 A.2d
at 197 (characterizing the issue as a choice between "whether 'compensation' referred
to in the statute means full salary during the period of illegal dismissal before the right
to reinstatement accrued to appellant, or such salary reduced by the wages he received
in his [better job] during that period"). Interestingly, the court affirmed a decision that
employed neither of these approaches, but cut off damages when the plaintiff received
a better job, thus not reducing the damages by the surplus earnings he subsequently
received. Id. at 200. The court apparently did not recognize the difference between
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would give the employer the benefit of the improved job. The employee
should have received $4000 for that period, but actually received only
$2500. She should recover the remaining $1500 from the employer, but
no more. 287 An award calculated for each month individually produces
a different result. For the first month, the employee deserved $2000, but
received nothing. For that period, the employer must pay $2000. For
the second month, the employee expected $2000, but actually received
at least that much, leaving no balance for the employer to pay. 288
The avoidable consequences doctrine as generally formulated does not
dictate either result. More important, it does not provide courts with an
analytical framework in which to consider the appropriate result. The
avoidable consequences doctrine might treat the issue by considering the
extent of the duty to mitigate damages owed by the employee.
Alternatively, courts could resort to the purpose of the avoidable
consequences doctrine, considering which result would provide the best
incentive to minimize waste. Yet under either approach, either result
seems plausible.
As noted earlier, the prevailing view of the avoidable consequences
doctrine closely resembles a counterclaim for contributory negligence.289 Viewed as a duty to reduce the consequences the former

these two results.
287. For an age discrimination case calculating back pay for the entire period, see
Kolb v. Goldring, Inc., 694 F.2d 869 (5th Cir. 1982). The employee was out of work
only two months before finding a job that began at $22,000/year (the same salary he
earned before discharge, but without bonuses) and eventually rose to $34,500/year, more
than the raises the court found realistic from the former employer (maximum
$28,000/year, plus benefits). Id. at 871. The court found a jury verdict of $45,000
excessive. Id. at 874. The court, however, avoided allocating the surplus earnings to
the employer by cutting off liability on the date when the plaintiffs new salary exceeded
the old salary. Id. The court then calculated total earnings at the old job and total
actual earnings at the new one for the entire period (about three years). Id. at 871-75.
288. See EEOC v. Spokane Concrete Prods., 534 F. Supp. 518, 526 (E.D. Wash.
I 982). This approach arguably allows the court to avoid the problem posed in the
preceding paragraph. It may not matter whether the month of better employment comes
before or after the month of unemployment. Each month consists of a whole, for which
an award is calculated separately. The approach does not require a carryover (either
backward or forward) from one month to the next. Using monthly units to facilitate
calculation is fairly common. To my knowledge, no court has addressed arguments
about the propriety of periodic calculations in a case where it would affect the award.
289. See supra Part II.A.
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contract partner will suffer because of the breach,290 the doctrine seems
to require the court to award any surplus to the breaching employer. 291
But to some extent, that appearance depends on the scope of the duty to
mitigate damages. We could limit the duty to an obligation to seek and
to accept alternative employment. 292 Presumably, the employee fulfills
that duty when she begins work at the higher paying job. The duty to
the employer then ceases, as does the duty of the employer to the
employee. 293 Alternatively, however, the duty could continue for the

290. See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 131 {I 981) (treating the avoidable
consequences doctrine as a duty that survives the contract). This Article has suggested
a similar analogy, at least in connection with employment contracts. See supra text
accompanying notes 101-05. At times the duty will apply only during the term that
would have been covered by the original contract (as in the example of employment for
a specified term). At times the duty may extend beyond the original contract term (such
as a duty not to compete or a duty to resell goods reasonably, which generally arises
only after the original contract has ended, whether by its terms or by one party's material
breach).
291. The employee unreasonably failed to minimize the loss if she refused a job that
would have paid more money. Therefore, the amount that the employee could have
earned must be subtracted from the employee's claim.
292. See supra text accompanying note 103.
293. See Smith v. Beloit Corp., 162 N. W.2d 585 (Wis. 1968). The same result may
apply to employment discrimination actions, but perhaps for different reasons.
Discrimination cases often involve employment that had no set duration, but could have
continued for the life of both parties. In that setting, some cut-off date for continued
liability seems necessary unless the employer becomes the guarantor of lifelong
employment for all employees who suffer discrimination. The Supreme Court expressed
concern for the duration of back pay liability, especially given the prolonged nature of
many employment discrimination proceedings. See Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S.
219 ( 1982). In response, some courts stop damages when the employee obtains
"comparable" employment elsewhere. See Sims v. Mme. Paulette Dry Cleaners, 638 F.
Supp. 224, 230 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); State Dep't of Correction v. Finley, 575 N.E.2d 1026,
1029 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (dicta). Employment at a higher salary seems likely to
qualify as comparable employment under most circumstances. Even when the job is
quite different, the employee seems unlikely to claim it was not comparable if that will
mean reducing the amounts the employer owed for any earlier period. See Sims, 638 F.
Supp. at 230. (If the job is not considered comparable, the court must subtract the
earnings as interim earnings. Since the employee now earns more per month than she
earned at the original job, damages diminish as long as the employee continues to earn
the higher wages. Of course, an employee who lost the comparable job might not prefer
a cut-off date. See, e.g., Finley, 575 N.E.2d at 1028.) When the employee, given a
choice, almost certainly would have relinquished the old job for the new, the requirement
of comparable employment seems satisfied. In fact, one suspects that comparable
employment might include some jobs not quite as good as the original job. See Ford
Motor Co., 458 U.S. at 231-32 (worker forfeits back pay ifhe refuses ajob substantially
equivalent to the one he was denied).
Cases involving breach of contract for a definite period provide their own duration
term. The employee arguably deserves wages until the contract expires, regardless of
how often she may find and lose other employment in the interim. Thus, the decision
to cut off damages in Smith v. Beloit Corp. must rely on a different rationale, one more
closely (if implicitly) attuned to the argument in the text. 162 N.W.2d 585.
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entire term of the breached contract. The courts so hold when the
employee takes a lower paying job; the employer's obligation to make
up the difference continues. 294 Similarly, the employee may demand
that the employer continue paying wages if the substitute job ends before
the original contract period expires. 295 The employee retains a reciprocal duty to make reasonable efforts to keep the substitute job or to find
another if she loses the first substitute job.296 The duties imposed by
the avoidable consequences doctrine have no inherent cut-off date prior
to the conclusion of the breached contract. These continuing duties
suggest that the employee continues to serve the employer, but in a
remote capacity. As such, any surplus from the employee's labor should
inure to the employer (by decreasing the amount of damages she must
pay), just as surplus from the employee's labor in working for the
employer inured to the benefit of the employer.
The avoidable consequences doctrine offers no suggestion on this
rather detailed, practical issue. The doctrine dictates that the employee
act reasonably, but does not delineate the duty any further. In fact,
scholarly discussions of the avoidable consequences doctrine reject the
notion of duty altogether. 297 In addition, the avoidable consequences
doctrine exists at a level of generality that does not relate to the specifics
posed here. No one discusses whether courts should assess reasonableness on a monthly or weekly basis. Such computational issues generally
are entrusted to juries, operating under the most general instructions. 298

294. See, e.g., EEOC v. Spokane Concrete Prods., 534 F. Supp. 418 (E.D. Wash.
1982); cf Cleveland Indoor Soccer Co. v. Haaskivi, 605 N.E.2d 1315 (Ohio Ct. App.
1992).
295. For example, no one suggested that the employer's liability ended when the
employee found temporary employment at a better wage in Paragon Hotel Corp. v.
Ramirez, 783 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (tort of retaliatory discharge for filing
a worker's compensation claim). Nor did temporary work at the same salary end the
employer's liability under Title VII in Sims v. Mme. Paulette Dry Cleaners, 638 F. Supp.
224 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). While breach of contract may involve a less severe wrong than
tortious discharge or employment discrimination, the avoidable consequences doctrine
does not provide any internal rationale for treating the cases differently.
296. Brady v, Thurston Motor Lines, Inc., 753 F,2d 1269 (4th Cir. 1985); Sims, 638
F. Supp. at 229 (citing Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219,231 & n.15 (1982)).
297. See supra note IO and accompanying text.
298. The pattern jury instructions dealing with mitigation of damages--they almost
never call it the avoidable consequences doctrine----present the issue at the most general
level, apparently leaving counsel to explain how the general principles will apply in any
given case. See, e.g., COMMITTEE ON STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL, SUPERIOR
COURT OF L.A. COUNTY, CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL§§ 14.67-.68 (1994);
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As a result, decisions seem more likely to follow either the court's
intuitions or mechanical decisions that conceal their consequences.
The generality of jury instructions may strike some as an objection to
the entire project. What difference does it make how the law characterizes or particularizes the avoidable consequences doctrine if the decisions
ultimately come from juries who have not been instructed in these details
of the law? The objection, however, overlooks several important points
at which courts and, more particularly, lawyers must focus on the
appropriate measure of damages without the shield of an uninstructed
jury. In the first place, many cases are decided without a jury.299 In
those cases, the judge must apply the avoidable consequences doctrine
on her own, answering all the detailed questions posed here. Her

EDWARD J. DEVITT ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL
§§ 85.13, 86.08 (I 987); COMMITTEE ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, DISTRICT JUDGES
Ass'N, FIFTH CIRCUIT, PATTERN JuRY INSTRUCTIONS (CIVIL CASES)§ 15.15 (1993);
COMMITTEE ON PATTERN JuRY INSTRUCTIONS, DISTRICT JUDGES Ass'N, ELEVENTH
CIRCUIT, PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL CASES§§ 7.\-.3 (1990). Sitting judges
may particularize the pattern instructions to lay out the workings of the avoidable
consequences doctrine in more detail, as appropriate to the case at hand. The risk of
reversible error may lead judges to stick with instructions that already have been
approved rather than attempt to innovate.
299. Even when parties might prefer a jury trial, they cannot always obtain one.
Until recently, Title VII cases involved bench trials because the relief available had been
categorized as equitable. See Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122,
1125 (5th Cir. 1969); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 802 (4th Cir.), cert.
dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971); see also Great American Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v.
Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 375 & n.19 (1979). Cases arising under the labor laws may
begin before the National Labor Relations Board. See FLORIAN BARTOSIC & ROGER C.
HARTLEY, LABOR RELATIONS IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR § 3.02 (2d ed. 1986). Cases
involving state employees also may begin with administrative agencies. Two cases cited
earlier in this section began with state administrative decisions, subject to judicial review
but not trial de novo. See State Dep't of Correction v. Finley, 575 N.E.2d I 026 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1991); Mullen v. Board of Educ., 195 A.2d 195 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1963).
Some employment contracts place cases before arbitrators--particularly union
contracts, which commonly include guarantees of continued employment (until the
employee gives cause for discharge). Arbitrators are not bound to follow judicial
doctrines (such as the avoidable consequences doctrine) at all, let alone apply them in
the way the common-law courts might prefer. Cf Lentine v. Fundaro, 278 N.E.2d 633,
636 (N.Y. 1972) (quoting Exercycle Corp. v. Maratta, 174 N.E.2d 463,466 (N.Y. 1961))
("Arbitrators may do justice. It has been said that, short of 'complete irrationality,'
'they may fashion the law to fit the facts before them.'"). But see Garrity v. Lyle
Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793, 795 (N. Y. I 976) (rejecting arbitrator's decision to award
punitive damages as against public policy). Nonetheless, to the extent the avoidable
consequences doctrine identifies an important factor involved in shaping a just result,
arbitrators may seek out scholarly or judicial input concerning the best way to apply
it--Or, guided by skilled advocates, they may create similar results independently,
leading rather than following.
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decisions, like those of a jury, will be subject to review on appeal. 300
The appellate court, in order to discern whether the jury reached a
verdict supported by the evidence, may need to decide how the
avoidable consequences doctrine should be applied. Applying it the
wrong way may produce a verdict that the court must reverse as outside
the range of verdicts permissible under the evidence. In jury trials,
lawyers must know how to argue before the jury. No matter how
general the instructions, the jurors may need to perform some very
specific calculations. 301 The attorney must help them understand what
they should do------and perhaps even persuade them to employ one
approach as opposed to another. Naturally, efforts to limit what the
opposing lawyer may accomplish can arise via motions in limine (to
exclude evidence of higher paying jobs), motions to strike, motions for
partial summary judgment on mitigation issues, and similar motions or
evidentiary objections that shape the evidence and the argument the jury
hears. Calculating the settlement value of a case also involves some
prediction of what a jury will do, prediction that must begin with
knowledge of what the jury can and cannot consider. In short, lawyers
and judges cannot ignore the details involved in the workings of legal
doctrines, even when juries may apply them quite loosely. While some
decisions may be made with only the most general guidance, other
aspects of law and lawyering require attention to minute detail.
The expectation interest suggests a different framework for analyzing
this problem. It asks, quite simply, what would have happened if the
breach had not occurred. That inquiry might produce either result,
depending on the facts of a given case. But the inquiry identifies the
pertinent facts and the outcome appropriate in each case. Consider three
possible scenarios:
1. The employee might have been able to locate a new, higher

300. United States v. Hatahley, 257 F.2d 920 (10th Cir. 1958), presents a fairly
insightful look at the amount of detail appellate courts may expect of trial courts when
they decide damage issues without a jury. Jury cases also may offer the court a fairly
clear view of the amount awarded for lost earnings, either because the trial court
submitted special interrogatories to the jury, see Paragon Hotel Corp. v. Ramirez, 783
S.W.2d 654 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990), or because earnings constituted the only legitimate
element of damages in the case. See Smith v. Beloit Corp., 162 N.W.2d 585, 569 (Wis.
1968).
301. Sometimes the jury may not perform any calculations, but instead reach a nice
round number that sounds about right. But one does the jury an injustice to assume that
they never pay attention to detail in discussing damage issues.
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paying job while continuing to work for the original employer and
to reach an accord with the employer permitting her to resign early
in order to take the better job. 302
2. The employee might have been unable to locate the new, higher
paying job while working for the original employer. 303
3. The employee might have located the new job while working for
the original employer, but might have refused the job. 304
The first possibility supports a cut-off date when the employee began
the new job. But for the breach, the employee would have earned her
normal salary for the period before she located the substitute job, but
would have earned the higher salary thereafter. Similarly, the employee
would have no recourse to resume work for the employer if the
substitute job disappeared. 305 As a result, the employee, not the
employer, deserves the benefit of the surplus generated by the new job.
Even if the employee did not take the higher paying job (but should
have, if she had acted reasonably) the employer would have paid the
employee until the new job materialized and cannot claim a reduction in
damages below that amount. 306

302. The employer, whose breach indicates some willingness to dispense with the
employee's services, seems likely to have jumped at the chance to replace the employee
early. While some employers might seize an opportunity to extort concessions from the
employee desperate to leave, those situations seem likely to be relatively rare. When
they occur, they implicate the third scenario listed here.
303. This seems likely if she located the job only because she had her days free as
a result of the employer's breach.
304. While this possibility may seem remote, several possible motivations might
produce this result, including loyalty to her employer, a sense of moral obligation to
fulfill her contractual promises, or a preference to minimize change in her life. While
differences in the terms and conditions of employment also might explain the decision,
they introduce new variables that complicate the analysis. For now, assume that the jobs
involved are identical in all respects except salary.
305. This scenario posits that both parties were willing to terminate the original
contract in light of the employee's new offer. That termination would have ended any
claim the employee had against the employer on the date she left, leaving her at risk if
the new job proved temporary. An employee might not have given up a secure job (one
for a guaranteed term) even for a higher paying job that lacked such security. That
possibility, however, falls within the third scenario rather than this one.
306. Because the employee continued working for the employer until discharge, we
fairly can presume that she would have continued past discharge at least until the better
offer came along. Perhaps we must revise the assessment of the benefit of leisure
upward once the employee rejects ( or unreasonably fails to discover) a job that would
pay her $2500/month (all other things being equal). Unwillingness to work for $2500
implies unwillingness to work for $2000, perhaps even suggesting that she would have
quit after the first month. (The alternative assumption-bad faith by the employee-----does nothing to improve her claim to a second month of pay.) Nonetheless, the
discussion of benefits here offers no basis to estimate the value of leisure until the date
upon which the employee could have obtained a new job. Thus, unless we conclude that
she could have earned at least $2000 in the first month (but unreasonably did not),

286

[VOL. 33: 175, 1996]

Contract Remedies
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

The second possibility makes the opportunity to earn more money a
benefit of the breach. But for the breach, the employee would have not
have located the higher paying job. Allowing her to receive $4500 for
the two-month period puts her in a better position than she could have
occupied if the employer had performed. Thus, the entire $2500 earned
should offset the recovery. She would, however, have earned her full
salary for the remainder of the contract term---regardless of when the
better job would have begun or how long it would have lasted. Thus,
no cut-off date for damages (short of the duration term in the contract)
will end the employer's liability. The same result applies to the
employee who unreasonably fails to take the better job.
The third possibility duplicates the second in all significant respects,
but arguably requires different language. The opportunity to earn the
higher salary is not a benefit of the breach; the employee could have
found the job while employed. Nonetheless, the earnings are a benefit
of the breach, because the employee would have turned down the job
and earned only her original salary if the employer had performed the
contract. Thus, the entire $2500 should offset the recovery. 307

nothing suggests she would have left work with the employer in the first month because
she preferred leisure to employment.
307. The employee who refuses the job for $2500 after discharge poses an enigma:
a person who valued her leisure less than the $2000 for which she would have sold it
to the original employer, but more than the $2500 for which she refused to sell it to the
prospective new employer. The decision to value her leisure at $2500 remains
appropriate. Whatever the rationale that might permit a person presently employed to
reject a better offer, it does not inherently apply to an unemployed person faced with the
same offer. The decision to reject the offer while employed suggests that the employee
did not prefer either $2500 or leisure over $2000 plus loyalty, $2000 plus honor, or
$2000 plus stability. (From another point of view, we must subtract the psychic cost of
disloyalty, oathbreaking, or disruption from the value of leisure or alternative wages to
the employee who remains on the job instead of quitting, either to play or to work
elsewhere.) The discharged employee has no similar factors. She owes no loyalty to
the breaching former employer. No loyalty to the unemployment office compels her to
continue to draw benefits rather than take a job. She is not honor bound to remain
unemployed rather than break her commitment to either the unemployment office or the
breaching former employer. Returning to work does more to restore stability to her life
than to destroy it, if we may use the status quo ante as her preferred starting point for
inertia. Even differences in the conditions of employment, which may have made a
decision to stay with the original employer reasonable, do not justify rejecting the job
once discharged by the original employer unless the differences make the new job
unduly burdensome, risky, or humiliating. While other motivations could have been
proposed in note 304, supra, they should allow similar distinctions here between the
employed person and the discharged employee. Thus, the decision unreasonably to
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In each case, the inquiry focuses on the position the employee would
have occupied if the employer had performed the contract as promised.
The expectation interest itself, not some limitation on the expectation
interest, drives the result. Because the facts of each case may vary, the
expectation interest does not dictate a rule specifying a particular
result. 308
The expectation interest thus leads us to the appropriate inquiries and
provides relatively clear guidance once the factual matters have been
determined. By comparing the position the plaintiff would have
occupied but for the breach with the position she now occupies,
including the benefit of any leisure, the court can resolve matters without
recourse to a mechanical (and arbitrary) decision regarding the appropriate time periods into which to divide the period of unemployment. The
court need not even resort to the indeterminate policies behind the
avoidable consequences doctrine in order to achieve appropriate results.
In this way, recourse to general damage principles may help clarify the
issues courts confront when considering difficult questions concerning
the proper application of the avoidable consequences doctrine to less
common fact patterns.
CONCLUSION

Judges, lawyers, and scholars may benefit from revising the way we
think and speak about the avoidable consequences doctrine. While
principles of contributory negligence and causation may explain the
origins of the doctrine, those principles will not necessarily provide the
best guide to resolving cases. For this entire century, and perhaps
longer, courts and the academy have concurred in the view that the
avoidable consequences doctrine differs from contributory negligence

reject (or not to seek) a job at $2500/month should give rise to the nonnal inference that
the plaintiff valued a month of leisure more than she valued $2500.
308. This Article frequently has proposed objective rules to replace subjective
inquiries into the employee's actual preferences. This may seem like a suitable place
to propose another objective rule to eliminate the third possibility--that the employee
would have refused the higher paying job for subjective reasons if she had received the
offer while still working for the employer. But an objective rule will not distinguish
between the first two scenarios, which do not vary with the subjective preferences of the
employee, but with the ability of the employee to locate the higher paying job while still
employed by the employer. To the extent that the ability to search for a new job while
perfonning another job varies with the subjective abilities of the employee, an
objectifying assumption may be appropriate. We should ask whether the employee could
have located the better job if she had used reasonable efforts while still employed by the
employer. But the definition of reasonable efforts seems likely to vary from person to
person to a degree that the objectifying assumption may contribute very little in this
context.
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and does not give rise to a duty to minimize the loss------though the degree
to which those conclusions have been internalized varies significantly.
Unfortunately, our devotion to these conclusions has preceded any
coherent explanation of how the avoidable consequences doctrine can
exist independently of a duty to minimize the loss. Thus, we continue
to manifest contributory negligence principles in the avoidable consequences doctrine, even as we pay lip service to their irrelevance.
This Article proposes that the expectation interest can explain the
avoidable consequences doctrine in contract damages without any
reference to contributory negligence or to duty. In fact, we can live
without the avoidable consequences doctrine. The expectation interest,
when properly applied, can achieve the same result without any reference
to the avoidable consequences doctrine. If we recognize that a plaintiff's
decision about whether to avoid the loss turns on the relative merits of
using resources to avoid the loss or using them in some other manner,
then the choice not to minimize the loss evinces benefits that damage
recoveries must take into account. The size of the benefits, though often
difficult to measure directly, can be inferred from the decision not to
avoid the loss. The plaintiff must expect the benefits of using resources
in other ways at least to equal the benefit of minimizing the losses
caused by the breach. Thus, we have reasonable evidence that the net
loss suffered by the plaintiff does not exceed the full loss minus the
portion of the loss that she could have avoided by reasonable efforts.
The avoidable consequences doctrine, by reducing damages in this
amount, accomplishes a result that the expectation interest would require
in any event.
Recharacterizing the avoidable consequences doctrine as an incident
of the expectation interest does not require substantial modifications in
the way we apply the avoidable consequences doctrine. The existing
rules capture the essential requirements of the expectation interest quite
effectively. Recognizing the nature of the avoidable consequences
doctrine, however, may help courts decide when to apply it. Exceptions
to, or refinements of, the avoidable consequences doctrine require
justification not in terms of duty, but in terms of benefits or by reference
to the situation that would have occurred if the contract had been
performed.
Similarly, problems at the margin of the avoidable
consequences doctrine may receive clearer resolution if courts consider
the position that the plaintiff would have occupied if the wrong had not
occurred.
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Subtracting avoidable losses does not compromise the goal of full
compensation for losses actually suffered. Rather, it helps us accurately
assess the losses actually suffered in cases where some of those losses
would be exaggerated by neglecting the benefits of breach. The
avoidable consequences doctrine is not an exception to the rightful
position, but a corollary of it. We can implement the rightful position
fully if we acknowledge the need to subtract avoidable losses in our
efforts to avoid overcompensation.
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